http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/04/30/interrogators-speak-out-torture-is-illegal-immoral-and-ineffective/ Human Rights First builds respect for human rights and the rule of law to help ensure the dignity to which everyone is entitled and to stem intolerance, tyranny, and violence. Wed, 15 May 2013 16:48:00 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2.1 http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/04/30/interrogators-speak-out-torture-is-illegal-immoral-and-ineffective/#comment-134167 Wagon Repairman Tue, 01 May 2012 20:21:11 +0000 http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/?p=18490#comment-134167 Like most articles of this bent, there are many facts asserted here but the only "evidence" is edited interviews with 4 or 5 handpicked individuals from the entire intel community. It is not a secret that the most reliable information comes from establishing rapport, analyzing data, and contrasting results of the other developed sources to contradict and refine information. What no one mentions is how long that process takes and how time devalues the intelligence gathered. Had we known the type of knowledge Moussaoui possessed, would we in retrospect have opted for a method that takes months and only sometimes yields the truth, or methods that make an intended mass murder uncomfortable to save the lives of 3,000 innocent people? No one advocates every goat herder and Koran salesman be put to the test, however, the question of time and place can be easily answered. For example, the methods promoted by these experts were tried on Abu Zubaydah initially and failed miserably. When subjected to the methods being criticized he almost immediately began to yield volumes of information. Granted it was not all true; some was contradictory and intentionally misleading. Regardless of that, almost every early break in dismantling Al Qaeda can be traced back to these interrogations. We discount the operational savvy of our enemy when we imagine that bringing them chicken nuggets every day for 6 months is what led them to give up names, times, and places. Valuable targets know the normal limitations of US treatment. They are fully aware that they need only stall long enough that their information is useless. The success of the rapport approach might just as easily be linked to the sources' understanding of time sensitivity as anything else. Once captured by the US, serious jihadists know for a fact Martyrdom is off the table. The only way to aid their cause is to maintain silence. It takes significant time to deprogram and wear down the cultural and religious beliefs they have fought for and seen their fellow jihadists die for. I wouldn't dream of diminishing the contributions of the gentlemen being interviewed. I would question their access and how their personal beliefs sway their perception. The bottom line is that convicting a terrorist is gratifying but it is a decidedly poor apology to the dead. Like most articles of this bent, there are many facts asserted here but the only “evidence” is edited interviews with 4 or 5 handpicked individuals from the entire intel community. It is not a secret that the most reliable information comes from establishing rapport, analyzing data, and contrasting results of the other developed sources to contradict and refine information. What no one mentions is how long that process takes and how time devalues the intelligence gathered.
Had we known the type of knowledge Moussaoui possessed, would we in retrospect have opted for a method that takes months and only sometimes yields the truth, or methods that make an intended mass murder uncomfortable to save the lives of 3,000 innocent people?
No one advocates every goat herder and Koran salesman be put to the test, however, the question of time and place can be easily answered. For example, the methods promoted by these experts were tried on Abu Zubaydah initially and failed miserably. When subjected to the methods being criticized he almost immediately began to yield volumes of information. Granted it was not all true; some was contradictory and intentionally misleading. Regardless of that, almost every early break in dismantling Al Qaeda can be traced back to these interrogations.
We discount the operational savvy of our enemy when we imagine that bringing them chicken nuggets every day for 6 months is what led them to give up names, times, and places. Valuable targets know the normal limitations of US treatment. They are fully aware that they need only stall long enough that their information is useless. The success of the rapport approach might just as easily be linked to the sources’ understanding of time sensitivity as anything else. Once captured by the US, serious jihadists know for a fact Martyrdom is off the table. The only way to aid their cause is to maintain silence. It takes significant time to deprogram and wear down the cultural and religious beliefs they have fought for and seen their fellow jihadists die for.
I wouldn’t dream of diminishing the contributions of the gentlemen being interviewed. I would question their access and how their personal beliefs sway their perception. The bottom line is that convicting a terrorist is gratifying but it is a decidedly poor apology to the dead.

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