• The Case for an Envoy

• The Darfur Peace Agreement

• Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation

• Other Policy Issues

• Related Links

The Case for an Envoy

Resolving the Darfur Crisis: Appoint a U.N. Special Envoy

Last year Human Rights First called for the appointment of a high level U.N. special envoy to Darfur by Secretary-General Kofi Annan.  Human Rights First believed that a high-level U.N. envoy focusing solely on Darfur was needed to coordinate the international response to the Darfur crisis.  In December 2006, Jan Eliasson from Sweden, was appointed to this position.

The United Nations must focus a significant percentage of its energy on Darfur even while other world crises demand attention as well.  Intractable hatred in the Middle East and rogue states searching for or testing nuclear weapons, neither of these are going to be pushed from the U.N.’s view anytime soon.  But mass murder in a region that will shortly become a “catastrophe,” according to Jan Egeland deserves a place at the table with those other urgent issues. Ban Ki-Moon, the new Secretary-General, needs to devote a significant portion of every day of his term to fixing Darfur. 

Human Rights First calls for these key points to be addressed by the international community:

• The people of Darfur cannot afford to delay peacemaking while waiting for the U.N. forces.  Lasting peace can only be built upon a political process of grassroots dialogue and reconciliation that includes all stakeholders.  Human Rights First believes that reopening the Darfur Peace Agreement to bring non-signatories to the table, and progress towards the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation should be a high priority for the international community, even as it works to increase security in the region.  The U.N. Special Envoy must play an important role in this process.
• The United Nations is the sum of its members and cannot solve the most difficult problems it faces in the absence of strong leadership and commitment from member states—most important, the United States.
• China holds one of the keys to solving the crisis in Darfur.  The international community must use all diplomatic means available to press China to change its apparent unquestioning stance of support for the Sudanese government.
• The world community likewise must press key Arab League member states to engage with the Khartoum government on resolving the crisis.
• The international community must encourage key African Union member states to condemn the Sudanese government’s current military campaign in Darfur and its refusal to consent to the deployment of U.N. troops.
  
• It is critical that the maximum number of A.U. troops mandated be fully funded and that the forces’ expanded mandate be fulfilled.
• Effective security in Darfur will require transition of the A.U. forces into a U.N. force fully supported by the international community and clearly mandated to ensure protection to civilians in Darfur.

A determined and focused effort by the U.N., led by Jan Eliasson, the Special Envoy with the strong support of the Secretary-General, and in conjunction with other countries' special envoys is the best and perhaps only chance for each of these steps—and therefore a lasting peace—to be achieved.

Read letter HRF sent to U.N. General Assembly Members

In May 2006, the government of Sudan and a main rebel faction signed a peace agreement that sets forth a structure for addressing power and wealth sharing as well as security arrangements for the Darfur region. 

The parties signed the peace agreement under, and because of, intense international pressure – from the United Nations, powerful governments, and caring citizens all over the world who compelled leaders to act. But the security situation in Darfur remains tense: violence continues, the humanitarian relief work of international nongovernmental organizations remains greatly restricted, and the civilian toll is still climbing. The Darfur Peace Agreement is all but dead. 

Human Rights First believes that an effective response to the crisis in Darfur requires a three-pronged approach:

• A political and diplomatic effort to secure a lasting peace;
• Forces to protect the civilian population; and
• Humanitarian assistance.

With increasing attention to the need for forces and humanitarian assistance, Human Rights First is deeply concerned that not enough attention is being paid to the need for an enhanced political and diplomatic effort to secure a lasting peace.

Human Rights First’s recommendations include:

(1) There is an immediate need to (a) reopen the Darfur Peace Agreement to bring non-signatories into the process, and (b) to initiate the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation as called for by the Darfur Peace Agreement to establish an open and locally based peace process among all of the parties affected by the conflict in Darfur.

These consultations should include not only the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements but also the militias who are supporting the Government’s position, the array of ethnic and tribal groups who oppose the Government’s actions but have not formed armed militias, refugees, internally displaced people, women, civil society and exiled Darfurians. Jan Eliasson, the senior envoy, must play a key leadership role in ensuring that the process is fair and representative of all parties.

(2) There is a need for much greater pressure on regional governments as well as powerful governments in the world to exercise the political will to address the conflict.

The current challenge to get the Sudanese Government to cooperate with the transition from an African Union to a U.N. force in Darfur is a good example of the type of issue in which the senior envoy, with strong international support, could play a useful role. These sorts of diplomatic roadblocks continue to undermine the peace process, and are not being adequately addressed by the current structure.

(3) Despite the enormity of the problem and the staggering loss of life, there is still far too little public attention to Darfur.

In the coming months it will be more important to generate greater public attention to Darfur in countries like the United States and the nations of the European Union. The United Nations will need some of these countries to contribute significantly more funds, logistical support and in some cases military support if a lasting peace is to be achieved. Sadly, Darfur has not received the attention it deserves, and thus the political imperative is not there to force national political leaders to respond in ways that are commensurate with the need. The Special Envoy can also help address this need.

Human Rights First hopes that Jan Eliasson will rally the international community, keep pressure on the parties to the conflict, especially the Sudanese government, and keep the media spotlight on Darfur.

The Darfur Peace Agreement

Key Provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)

On May 5, 2006, the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur, held in Abuja, Nigeria, concluded with an agreement between the Government of Sudan and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) rebel group.  Two other rebel groups, another faction of the SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), did not sign the agreement; the African Union (AU) has established a May 31 deadline for these other groups to agree to its terms.

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) covers four main subject areas: 

• Power Sharing;
• Wealth Sharing;
• Security Arrangements; and
• Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC).  

Each of these is summarized below.

Power Sharing

• Establishes, as the fourth ranking national official (after the President and two Vice Presidents) a new position of Senior Assistant to the President, to be chosen from a list proposed by the rebel groups that sign the DPA. 
• Provides that this official will serve as chair of a new Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) with principal responsibility for implementing the DPA.  (The TDRA also will include the heads of agencies responsible for core functions such as rehabilitation and resettlement, reconstruction and development, settlement of land disputes, implementation of security arrangements, and compensation for losses resulting form the conflict.)
• Provides that eight of the ten TDRA members will be nominated by the rebels.
• Reserves for members of rebel groups that sign the DPA a minority of government positions, including one governorship, two deputy governorships, and almost 30 percent of the seats in the regional legislatures, until national and regional elections are held in three years.
• Establishes mechanisms to help train and place Darfurians in other local and national positions, with a target level for representation in the national civil service to be determined by a Panel of Experts to include some members nominated by the rebel groups that sign the DPA.
• Exempts Darfurian students from payment of school fees for five years, and reserves for ten years 15 percent of incoming seats at universities in Khartoum, and 50 percent at universities in Darfur for such students.
• Requires that no later than 2010, a referendum is to be held in Darfur to determine whether the three regional states should be consolidated into one region (seen as likely to increase Darfur’s influence in the national government) or remain separate states.

Wealth Sharing

• Provides for a Panel of Experts to establish a formula for allocation to Darfur of a fair portion of national revenues, including from the oil industry.

• Establishes a new Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund to manage rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development -- to be funded by the national government at levels of $300 million in 2006 and $200 million each in 2007 and 2008, and also financed by international donors
• Creates a Compensation Commission with guidelines for determination and payment of compensation and other remedies for victims of the conflict, and provides that the national government will make an initial $30 million contribution to the Compensation Fund.
• Grants refugees and internally displaced persons the right to restitution or adequate compensation for property loss.
• Establishes a Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission to assist such persons and facilitate their safe return home.
• Establishes commissions to arbitrate title disputes and develop policies for land use management and natural resource development.

 Security Arrangements

• Sets out a specific timeline and organizational structures for (1) disarming the pro-government Janjaweed militia within five months, (2) incorporating members of the rebel groups into the Sudanese military forces or assisting their integration into civilian life, and (3) returning principal responsibility for law enforcement in Darfur to a reformed civilian police force.
• Provides that the Janjaweed will be confined to their camps and must relinquish all heavy weapons before any rebel forces are asked to withdraw and demobilize.
• Prohibits armed forces from displaced persons camps and other civilian areas, including humanitarian supply routes.
• Grants expanded powers to the African Union-run Ceasefire Commission, including to identify those responsible for ceasefire violations and to recommend measures against them by the AU Peace and Security Council.
• Provides that these security arrangements will be monitored by African Union peacekeeping forces (which are expected to be strengthened and then integrated into a United Nations peacekeeping force by later this year).

Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC)

• Provides for the African Union to convene 60 days after the Agreement comes into force a community-based reconciliation process in Darfur – in  recognition that many stakeholders in Darfur were not represented by the negotiating parties in Abuja.
• Specifies that this DDDC process is to be chaired by an “African of independence and integrity” and assisted by a team of elders from Darfur, and shall have between 800 and 1000 delegates, to include sheiks and tribal leaders, refugees, internally displaced persons, women, rebel groups, militias, civil society, and other local parties. 
• Provides that this process is to be organized by a Preparatory Committee appointed by the African Union and to include members of the rebel groups and the Government of Sudan, as well as tribal leaders and representatives of civil society and international organizations including the African Union, United Nations, and Arab League.
• Empowers the DDDC to make recommendations to the relevant local and national authorities, and to establish a permanent Peace and Reconciliation Council to continue its work.

Other Policy Issues

What the World is Saying About Darfur and R2P – Almost Nothing

HRF and 18 Organizations Condemn Violence in Darfur (PDF-50KB)

Coalition letter on Darfur to President Bush (PDF-20KB)

NGOs Call on U.S. Congress to Support and Strengthen Peacekeeping Efforts in Darfur

Accountability for Crimes in Sudan

Related Links (external)

"Is Darfur Doomed" on Salon.com

"Pressure on Darfur" on Tompaine.com

"Truce and Troops" in the Washington Times