Latest Army Report: More Involved in Abuse Than Previously Reported

Maj. Gen. Fay Calls Abuse “Torture” – First Official Use of the “T-Word”; Report Is Another Piece in the Abu Ghraib Puzzle, but Comprehensive Investigation Still Needed

NEW YORK – Aug. 25 – The Pentagon today released the results of an Army inquiry on the role of military intelligence personnel in prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib facility in Iraq. The 177-page report, begun by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay last spring, makes clear that the torture and ill treatment suffered by detainees at Abu Ghraib were not simply the work of “a few rotten apples,” as some officials have argued, but reflected systemic failures in discipline and command.

The report found that 23 U.S. military intelligence personnel and four contractors were involved in 44 instances of prisoner abuse between July 2003 and February 2004 that could prompt criminal charges.

USE OF THE “T-WORD”

At the press conference where the report was released, Army Maj. Gen. George Fay said some of the instances of abuse at Abu Ghraib amounted to torture.

“This is the first use of the word ‘torture’ by a senior government official to describe the actions of U.S. military personnel in Iraq,” said Eric Biel, Senior Counsel of Human Rights First. “It represents a significant step forward. The significance is more symbolic than legal, but it is a first step — finally moving past denial and toward recognition, which will help make sure this kind of treatment does not happen again.”

Human Rights First believes that while the Fay report and its predec essors — the Schlesinger Panel report released yesterday, and the Taguba and Army Inspector General Reports — all move the important conversation about abuse at Abu Ghraib forward, a comprehensive, independent investigation is still needed. (A list of the required attributes of such an investigation are below.)

“This report adds to the growing body of information on what happened at Abu Ghraib,” said Biel, “but we still don’t have a full picture, which is why we continue to call for a comprehensive, independent investigation.”

A recent Human Rights First report on secret detentions, for instance, documents a number of other U.S. detention facilities used in the war on terror — facilities the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has not been allowed to visit. The report is available at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/EndingSecretDetentions_web.pdf

“If these abuses were going on at sites visited by the Red Cross,” said Biel, “how do we find out what is happening in U.S. military detention facilities no outsiders have been allowed to visit?”

An example of the need for more information on the secret detention issue is the Fay report’s finding on the issue of “ghost detainees” — prisoners who were not registered at Abu Ghraib and were kept away from inspectors of the ICRC.
The report states: “The number of ghost detainees temporarily held at Abu Ghraib, and the audit trail of personnel responsible for capturing, medically screening, safeguarding and properly interrogating the “ghost detainees,” cannot be determined.” At the press conference, Gen. Paul Kern noted that while eight such cases can be documented, the actual number may be much higher, noting that “without records, it’s difficult to document” just what happened.

Human Rights First has raised concern about the issue of ghost detainees, and the recent official acknowledgement by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that he ordered the hiding of at least one prisoner from the ICRC.

“We again call for the Administration to allow the ICRC unfettered access to all those our government is holding in custody at all U.S. military detention sites,” Biel said.

CRITERIA OF INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION

As stated above, Human Rights First believes that the President should establish a comprehensive, independent investigation into the U.S. government’s detention and interrogation practices. To overcome the deficiencies of existing investigations, such a commission — modeled on successful efforts such as the just-concluded 9/11 Commission — would satisfy the following criteria:

1. It must be bipartisan and led by recognized experts of unimpeachable credibility in military and intelligence operations, human rights and international law.
   
2. It must be fundamentally independent of the Executive Branch, with commission members selected jointly by appropriate congressional and executive officials.
   
3. It must have access to classified information and a mandate to inquire into information from all relevant agencies and all levels of authority.
   
4. It must have the power to take testimony under oath, and to subpoena witnesses.
   
5. It must be empowered to offer whistleblower protection to all those with relevant knowledge, including those who may fear retribution for testifying truthfully.
   
6. It must review and build on the findings of investigations already underway.
   
7. It should, to the extent consistent with U.S. national security classification needs, be open to the public — a feature unique to democracy and essential to the commission’s credibility in the United States and around the world.

INVESTIGATIONS: BACKGROUND

The Fay Report was intended to complement Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba’s report, which was leaked in May 2004, and examined the role of military police in the Abu Ghraib abuse. The Fay investigation initially focused on lower level military intelligence officials, but its scope was widened to permit examination of the role of officers as high as Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the commander of U.S. armed forces in Iraq. The Fay Report recognizes possible criminal responsibility beyond the seven military police charged with abuse, recommending charges against at least 20 military personnel, CIA officers, and civilian contractors. Though the report criticizes U.S. military commanders for a litany of a failures including poor leadership, confusing policies, insufficient discipline, and chaotic prison conditions, it does not assign blame or responsibility for the abuses.

The release of the Fay Report comes on the heels of the Schlesinger Panel report, released August 24, and the Army Inspector General’s Report released last month.

The Schlesigner Panel report found that top Pentagon civilian and military officials bore responsibility for the abuses. The Army Inspector General Report documented 94 cases of confirmed or alleged abuse by U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq since the end of 2001.

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