Kosovo: Protection and Peace-Building

Protection of Refugees, Returnees, Internally Displaced Persons, and Minorities (1999)

OUT OF PRINT

I. Introduction

Human Rights First carried out a mission to Kosovo from July 29 to August 2, 1999, to examine the protection situation for refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and minorities in Kosovo as well as safeguards for the rights of those who have not yet returned. The mission also assessed the role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) within the overall structure of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Human Rights First's delegates were Philip Rudge and Sibylle Kapferer. The mission visited Pristina, Pec, Djakovica, Prizren, Urosevac, and Obilic. The mission had the benefit of meetings with staff of UNHCR; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); UNMIK; the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); the International Organization for Migration (IOM); various local NGOs; and Roma leaders at Obilic camp. (1)

This report builds on the work of a Human Rights First mission to Albania in June, which assessed the protection needs and problems of the 400,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees in Kosovo. It takes as its frame of reference Human Rights First's Legal Principles for the Protection of Kosovar Refugees and Returnees. (2)

II. General Context

On June 10, l999, the UN Security Council placed Kosovo under UN civil and military administration. (3) This step marked the end of a humanitarian tragedy in which thousands of Albanian Kosovars were killed in the course of ethnic cleansing by Serb forces and tens of thousands more were subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture, rape, and other human rights crimes. As a result of these wide-scale human rights abuses, more than 800,000 Kosovars fled as refugees, and perhaps 500,000 more people were displaced within Kosovo.

The mission arrived in Kosovo at a pivotal moment. Following the end of the NATO bombardment, the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, and the installation of UNMIK, there had been a mass return of refugees at a scale and speed that is historically unprecedented. Between mid-June and the beginning of August 1999, almost 90% of the Kosovar Albanians who had fled the province since March 1998 returned. Around 750,000 have returned from neighboring countries and further afield, and returns continue at a daily average rate of about a thousand people.

On the other hand, large numbers of Serbs and Roma, as well as other minorities, have left Kosovo, many prior to the refugees' return and many as a consequence of events and developments that followed it. It is estimated that, since mid-June, more than 75% of Kosovo's 200,000 Serbs have left the province. Many did so together with the retreating Yugoslav forces, before the arrival of KFOR, NATO's troops in Kosovo. Similarly, of the 40,000 to 50,000 Roma, a substantial but unknown number have departed. Departures of minority groups continue, as the security situation for ethnic minorities is becoming increasingly precarious. The physical security of minorities is the most pressing protection challenge facing UNHCR at present.

Inside Kosovo, the euphoria, resilience, and sense of "liberation" are high. The Kosovars have, they feel, re-taken possession after 10 years of dispossession and decades of authoritarianism. Towns and villages are bustling with economic and reconstruction activities. Yet this contrasts sharply with a very disturbing picture of continuing serious violations of human rights, murders, arson, abductions, and public disorder. More than 100,000 people are presently internally displaced, including returning refugees and minority groups. The indigenous civil administration has collapsed and there is no effective functioning police system or judiciary.

The civil administration component of UNMIK, which is mandated by UN Security-Council resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999, to carry out civil administration functions, including maintaining law and order through an international civil police, is slow to arrive. As of August 9, 1999, only 600 of its 3,100 international police personnel have been deployed. KFOR is responsible for ensuring public safety and order in the interim, but it does not have the necessary manpower or expertise, and the efficiency of its national brigades varies greatly throughout the province. The resulting vacuum is filled by others: in most municipalities, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has assumed authority and appointed "mayors" and other administrators. Yet its leaders are not able, or not willing, to take determined steps to curb revenge killings, the looting and torching of houses, and threats to the minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma, for which its members and supporters are believed to be responsible. Increasing Mafia-style criminality and continued paramilitary activities in some areas of the province add to the general climate of insecurity.

In this volatile context, the mission found that new administrative and military systems were being created by the hour, while carefully phased plans for graduated returns had been overtaken by events. At the same time, serious gaps and omissions that bear on the protection of refugees, returnees, IDPs, and minorities were becoming evident. The approaching onset of winter adds to the urgency with which these protection needs must be addressed.

III. The Human Rights Protection Situation for Refugees, Returnees, IDPs, and Minorities

In the circumstances currently prevailing in Kosovo, the most pressing human rights protection concern is the threat to the physical safety of minorities. Throughout the province, Serbs are targeted as a group, often in a systematic way, and irrespective of any personal responsibility for abuses against Kosovar Albanians or support for the previous Serbian regime. (4) This includes Croat and Bosnian Serb refugees, many of whom have already been displaced from their homes twice or perhaps three times, for example, in the expulsions from the Krajina. The situation of the Roma is more complex: in some areas where they had been well integrated with their Albanian neighbors before the NATO bombing, it has been possible for them to remain. In others, however, they are seriously at risk, as they are seen as closely connected with the Serbs and as having participated in atrocities and looting.

For both Serbs and Roma, access to food and other assistance is often difficult, as many are afraid to go to distribution points or markets. This may also be a problem for vulnerable people among the Kosovar Albanian returnees and IDPs, for example, the elderly, sick, or disabled. In some cases, the lack of identity and other documents relating to all aspects of life (including birth, marriage, or death certificates) results in difficulties accessing services and assistance. The large-scale destruction of identity and travel documents also impacts on their freedom of movement in important practical ways, for example by precluding them from travelling to Macedonia to purchase materials needed for repairing their houses or reopening their businesses.

Access to shelter is a problem for many, including returning refugees and IDPs. Before the NATO bombing, and also as a result of it, about 70,000 houses in Kosovo have been either completely destroyed or seriously damaged. Many people are currently camping next to, or even inside the shell of, their houses. Shelter kits distributed by UNHCR to help make at least one room habitable for the winter may not be sufficient, as there continues to be a shortage of tools and building materials, particularly timber. Moreover, a number of returning refugees have found their homes occupied by others and the absence of property records makes it difficult to prove ownership. Already, forced evictions are rising, and it is feared that the problem will intensify as the winter nears. In addition, women who have suffered sexual and other violence have special protection needs, in addition to facing traditional patterns of gender discrimination. For children, access to education is an urgent concern.

Addressing these needs, particularly those related to emergency shelter and assistance, is partly a question of funding, logistics, and coordination. However, the fundamental need for physical safety as well as many of the other protection concerns outlined above can be met only if there is a functioning civil authority and security presence. Its current absence has a serious effect on the immediate human rights protection situation of refugees, returnees, IDPs, and minorities in Kosovo as well as longer-term prospects for reconciliation and peaceful co-existence in the future.

A. The Absence of a Civilian Police and Justice System

One of the tasks of UNMIK, in cooperation with KFOR, is to promote security and safety so that all refugees and IDPs, regardless of their ethnicity, are able to return freely to their homes and live in conditions in which the highest standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected. Thus far, this goal is far from being achieved. Rising levels of violence and crime paired with virtual impunity make for an increasingly precarious security situation in Kosovo. The slow arrival of the civil administration pillar of UNMIK, which is responsible, inter alia, for police and judicial affairs, is a matter of great concern and has direct consequences for a variety of protection issues, including physical safety. (5)

The international police force to be deployed in Kosovo as part of UNMIK consists of some 3,100 civilian police officers. After a first phase in which it is to serve advisory and liaison functions, (6) the international civilian police is intended to carry out normal police duties and hold executive law enforcement authority. To date, however, only 500 international police officers have arrived, and with the remainder arriving at a rate of 200 per week, the police force is not expected to be complete until well into the autumn. (7) This also has direct implications for the establishment of a local Kosovo police force. (8)

The slowness with which the UN is putting its civilian administrators and police into place is explained usually by funding problems, bureaucratic delays in recruiting people, and also by the difficulties in finding those who have the necessary skills and experience. (9) UNMIK does not accept retired officers or those with a desk job, but is asking States to send highly skilled, active police personnel. Moreover, the fact that the international police force in Kosovo will be armed is a deterrent for some countries.

Setting up a judicial system in Kosovo and finding qualified staff for it also poses problems for UNMIK. To date, 28 judges, investigating judges, and public prosecutors have been appointed. Most are Kosovar Albanians who worked in the judiciary before 1989 and as lawyers during the past 10 years, but there are also Serbs and members of the Turkish minority. The newly appointed judicial officials have started to work in various regions, dealing with those detained by KFOR since it arrived in Kosovo.

UNMIK has determined that Yugoslav law should be applied as it was in force as of March 23, 1999, (10) to the extent that it conforms to international human rights standards, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights.

Human Rights First's Analysis and Recommendations:
If this is to be the applicable law, Human Rights First believes that UNMIK must act swiftly and systematically to identify inconsistencies between this law and applicable international norms. Legislation and regulations must then be amended, published, and widely disseminated in the appropriate languages. UNMIK should expand its current efforts to train and appoint judges, prosecutors, and other necessary legal personnel.

The rapid creation of a functioning and fair police and justice system is critical to the future of Kosovo, the enduring safety of its citizens, and their right to exercise their fundamental human rights. Human Rights First believes that the slowness of the UN bureaucracy in deploying the necessary personnel, particularly the 3,100 international civil police officers, can only partly be explained by the complexity of the unexpectedly large return.

Human Rights First urges all governments to ensure that the civilian police now needed arrive as soon as possible. It endorses calls for an increase in the strength of the police force and calls on governments to send additional police officers without delay.

Human Rights First also calls on the international community, and in particular, DPKO and the OSCE, to work on a standby arrangement, which could be activated in similar situations in the future, whereby qualified personnel can be mobilized quickly to ensure that these fundamental issues of civilian order are part of the emergency first phase response. In cooperation with these agencies, States may pursue the possibility of identifying a pool of suitable staff that may be deployed at short notice, analogous to the practice of some major NGOs who keep rosters of personnel, deployable at 24 to 48 hours notice.

Human Rights First emphasizes the importance of adequate training in international human rights and humanitarian law for those participating in international civilian police forces, and calls on OHCHR and OSCE to adopt this as a priority.

B. KFOR and Protection

Under Security Council resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999, it is KFOR's role to ensure public order and safety until the international civil administration can take responsibility for this task. Clearly, UNMIK is not in a position to do so as yet, and the role of KFOR is critical if law and order is to be maintained in Kosovo. UNHCR and other agencies are also dependent on KFOR to do this if they are to implement their separate human rights protection functions. But KFOR is facing serious constraints in discharging its task of ensuring public order and safety. This is related not only to a shortage in manpower but also to its lack of expertise in policing techniques. KFOR is a military force, trained to ensure area security, which, together with demilitarizing, is clearly a priority. It has some military police officers but is not trained to provide personal security.

There is widespread concern about the unevenness of the response by the different KFOR brigades to breaches of law and order, and the different signals being sent by this. Thus, in some areas, KFOR arrest and detain people for relatively minor offences, while in others they have failed to intervene even when witnessing looting and arson. The limited deterrent effect of KFOR's interventions in many cases is compounded by the lack of sufficient detention facilities and of a functioning judiciary. Often, those apprehended are released after a short time. While, for the most part, cooperation on the ground between UNHCR and KFOR appears to be good, requests for the deployment of soldiers to protect specific vulnerable groups are not always granted.

Concern was also expressed at the varying legal standards applied by the different national KFOR contingents when proceeding to arrest and detain people. (11) The troops' knowledge of protection and human rights standards is often limited, and there still seems to be very little clarity about what law they should apply. While the SRSG has affirmed that Yugoslav law applies in Kosovo to the extent that it conforms with the European Convention on Human Rights, the actual text of the Yugoslav statutes does not seem to have been made available to KFOR.

In addition, certain national contingents are viewed by the population as enemies-this applies, in particular, to Russian and Greek soldiers, who are seen as friendly to the Serbs. Coming from the States that were the leaders of the NATO intervention against the Yugoslav forces, American and British soldiers are sometimes mistrusted by both Serbs and Roma.

Human Rights First's Analysis and Recommendations:
In view of the critical importance of KFOR for UNHCR's ability to implement its protection mandate, the above-mentioned shortcomings and constraints in KFOR's capacity to ensure public order and safety are a matter of serious concern. Human Rights First is particularly disturbed at the uneven application of protection standards by different national KFOR contingents, and their varying levels of awareness of human rights issues.

Human Rights First believes that there is an urgent need for a unified peace-keeping code, based on international human rights standards, for international forces who are faced with law enforcement and policing duties in these complex situations and humanitarian crises. There is a need to ensure that peace-keeping troops are trained to respond in a uniform and even-handed manner to violations of human rights law, and in some cases breaches of international humanitarian law, by all sections of the population.

The current situation in Kosovo, and future crises that will inevitably face the UN in the future, make it essential for DPKO, with OHCHR, to elaborate a human-rights based code of conduct to be applied by peace-keeping forces. (12) Human Rights First believes that NATO, with its activities in Kosovo, could also make a valuable contribution in this regard.

But this will take time. There is an immediate and urgent need for KFOR, with UNMIK and OHCHR, to identify current best practices within national contingents, make them uniform, and provide the necessary training.

C. Accountability for Human Rights Abuses: The KLA

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has stepped into the power vacuum that exists in Kosovo. It has done so in the immediate aftermath of a humanitarian tragedy in which gross criminal offences were committed by Serb forces on a massive scale. This is a situation in which there is both the motive and the opportunity for retaliation and revenge, which only independent and effective law enforcement and policing structures can prevent.

The KLA appointed administrators are acting as a de facto government. Although they do not have formal legal authority, in many places they are genuinely achieving a lot in terms of the restoration of services at the local level, and sometimes even the realization of some kind of public order. This is popular with much of the population.

On the other hand, much of the violence and many of the crimes since the arrival of KFOR are attributed to persons linked with the KLA, including killings, kidnappings, threats, and intimidation of minorities. The KLA leadership routinely denies any involvement of its members in these acts. But, increasingly, Kosovar Albanians who are seen as opponents of the KLA are said to be under threat, particularly in remote rural areas that are controlled by the KLA. Although the KLA could be a voice of moderation, in reality it is often quite the contrary.

There is widespread concern about the international community's failure to take a more assertive stance with regard to the KLA's illegal exercise of authority and alleged responsibility for human rights abuses. The manner in which UNMIK and various governments, in particular the U.S., treat the KLA as the de facto authority in Kosovo without making it publicly clear to the leaders that human rights abuses will not be tolerated, is a serious mistake with potentially far-reaching consequences for the political future of Kosovo. The notion that the KLA is to be favored as a stabilizing factor, regardless of human rights abuses and undemocratic structures, is particularly dangerous. In addition, many fear that the slow pace at which the civil affairs pillar of UNMIK is being established will mean that UN administrators in the municipalities will arrive late this year and their deployment may provoke resentment as a "colonizing force" if they appear in towns and villages where the KLA has established a "better than nothing" functioning system.

Human Rights First's Analysis and Recommendations:
The international civil administration in Kosovo needs to be put into place as quickly as possible. Human Rights First calls on the U.S. and other governments to make the necessary personnel available to UNMIK as a matter of urgency, and to ensure that sufficient resources are provided, so that the current power vacuum can be filled with legitimate authorities as quickly as possible.

The international community's focus should be on establishing fully functioning political institutions in Kosovo. Human Rights First stresses the importance of promoting conditions which allow for the participation of different political parties and groupings, and the representation of all sectors of Kosovar society in this process.

No political party or grouping should be allowed to exercise authority without accountability. In particular, the U.S. and other governments should press the leadership of the KLA to assume responsibility in cases where human rights violations have been committed by its members or supporters, and to take effective steps to prevent any such acts.

Human Rights First therefore urges the international community to ensure that the KLA, and all other groups or parties with aspirations to civilian power, publicly undertake to honor and implement basic human rights norms. (13)

D. The Need for Justice

Kosovo has been the scene of very serious crimes, most notably since March 1998. There is a need to investigate these crimes and bring those responsible to trial. This is essential not only to strengthen the prospects of restoring justice in Kosovo; investigations into the crimes committed would also help alleviate the trauma of their victims, including large numbers of returning refugees. If justice is seen to be done, this should have a positive impact on efforts aimed at reconciliation and confidence-building between Kosovar Albanians and other ethnic groups.

Yet in the current situation in Kosovo, there is a vacuum of justice. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) will prosecute the leaders and planners of the crimes under its jurisdiction. Five indictments have already been brought against Yugoslav President Milosevic and four other senior officials. But it is clear that the ICTY will be able to handle only a limited number of cases. All other criminal prosecutions, whether of war crimes or of other criminal offences, will have to be undertaken by national judicial institutions, which are only just beginning to be built.

Human Rights First's Analysis and Recommendations:
The U.S. and other governments should ensure that the necessary resources are available for the ICTY to fulfil its mandated responsibility for international prosecutions for war crimes. Human Rights First believes that this would be beneficial to the ICTY's credibility in the province and enhance the confidence of Kosovars in the Tribunal's authority.

Clearly, the current vacuum in domestic judicial capacity can only be remedied through rebuilding and strengthening the justice system in Kosovo.

In the interim, and until a functioning national criminal justice system can be established, the international community should devise ways of ensuring that evidence necessary for future international and domestic prosecutions is preserved.

IV. Protecting the Rights of Refugees Who Have Not Returned

Since mid-June 1999, when KFOR entered Kosovo and declared the province "relatively safe" for return, more than 90% of the Kosovar Albanians who fled the province have returned, including virtually all of the more than 700,000 who fled to neighboring countries. In addition, since July 15, 1999, more than 30,800 have returned from countries outside the region. (14)

In fact, large numbers of refugees returned to Kosovo at a time when it was not safe to do so. UNHCR counseled them to wait, so that assistance could be ensured and the danger of mines and booby-traps assessed. The refugees returned regardless. Faced with their overwhelming desire to go back, UNHCR provided assistance and transport to areas identified by KFOR as "relatively safe." The voluntary return of Kosovar Albanian refugees continues and KFOR has declared Kosovo to be "reasonably secure" (with the exception of certain pockets). Nevertheless, given the precarious security situation, the continued threat posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and the absence of a functioning civil administration, police and judiciary, UNHCR is of the view that no one who does not wish to return should be sent back now. This applies particularly for members of ethnic minorities, but also to Kosovar Albanian refugees and even rejected asylum-seekers and those who have any other legal status in third countries. (15) The situation should be re-assessed in spring.

So far, there have been no indications that refugees have been returned to Kosovo against their will. However, some cases have given rise to concern about the quality of information refugees received from governments and agencies prior to deciding voluntarily that it was safe to return. UNHCR is therefore planning to interview all future returnees upon arrival to find out what information they were given before they left their countries of asylum.

Moreover, while return may be "reasonably" safe for many and most refugees continue to push for return, particularly from countries outside the region, there are also some refugees for whom safe return is not possible, either now or at a later stage. Both in Macedonia and in Albania, UNHCR is currently conducting surveys of the residual caseload to find out why some of them are unwilling, or unable, to return. Identifying categories of persons who may not be able to return safely to Kosovo is also part of UNHCR's protection strategy for Kosovo. They may include the following:

• Members of ethnic minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma.
• Kosovar Albanians known, or perceived, as opponents of the KLA, such as, for example "draft age" males who have not participated in the activities of the KLA and are therefore perceived as "draft evaders" or "deserters."
• Prominent members of the KLA and the LDK, respectively, who may be at risk as a result of the ongoing power struggle between the KLA and the LDK, but also because of rivalries between different groups within the KLA.
• Husbands and wives in mixed marriages.
• Kosovar Albanians who had not been dismissed from their jobs during the past 10 years, or who had some links with the previous Serbian regime.
• Kosovar Albanians who are - rightly or wrongly - associated with the recent abuses by Serb forces or are accused of being "collaborators."
• Particularly vulnerable persons who will not be able to reconstruct or repair their houses or will not have access to assistance and services, for example, elderly and sick persons or single female heads of households, etc.

Generally, the threat to these groups (with the exception of the last category) is likely to be greatest in rural areas known to be KLA strongholds, as they are more prone to possible human rights abuses and severe discrimination.

The most effective way for refugees to establish whether or not it is safe to return is by "go and see" visits, in which one member of the family is allowed to travel to the family home and then return to the country of asylum. Until September 1999, refugees staying with host families in Macedonia and holding "green cards" are allowed to cross the border into Kosovo and return to Macedonia a total of three times, provided that not all of the family go with them. Those who have been registered in the camps and hold "white cards" no longer benefit from this option, as the Macedonian government now considers that those who return to Kosovo, even on a short visit, have repatriated. Some of the host countries outside the region allow refugees to return and reenter within a certain period of time. (16) France allows "go and see" visits for one member of a family and provides some financial support. IOM will facilitate "go and see" visits, and groups may travel through Macedonia on their way to and from Kosovo. "Go and see" visits should become easier with the re-opening of Pristina airport for chartered and eventually commercial flights.

Human Rights First's Analysis and Recommendations:
Human Rights First calls on host governments to ensure that refugees contemplating return have access to the best possible information about conditions in Kosovo. Human Rights First welcomes the possibility offered by some governments to refugees contemplating return to conduct "go and see" visits; such visits should be supported by current host States, both financially and in terms of maintaining a continuing legal status in the host State. UNHCR should closely monitor the process in the host countries.

In view of the immense pressures on the social structures inside Kosovo and the coming harsh winter, Human Rights First calls on host countries to respect the wishes of those refugees from Kosovo who do not wish to return at this stage. Under no circumstances should forced repatriation be attempted by host States. For those who may not be able to return safely for the reasons set out above, asylum States should regularize their status by normal individual refugee determination procedures.

V. UNHCR's Protection Strategy

The protection mandate of UNHCR in Kosovo goes beyond its core mandate for refugees and returnees, covering also IDPs and minority groups. (17) UNHCR is the lead agency of the humanitarian component of UNMIK, responsible for the overall coordination of all humanitarian assistance.

Among UNHCR's priorities in the present humanitarian emergency phase is the provision of shelter material (e.g., tools, plastic sheeting) and other assistance (including food, blankets, mattresses, hygienic items, etc.) to those in need. After the winter, UNHCR's involvement in providing assistance will decrease, as shelter (re-)building will be taken over by other agencies under the reconstruction pillar of UNMIK. However, UNHCR has already, and must continue to have, a strong protection role.

UNHCR's protection strategy reflects this. While focusing on immediate needs such as ensuring the physical safety of those at risk, it also aims to promote conditions in which refugees and IDPs may return to their homes in safety, and in which the different ethnic groups can live together. Wherever possible, UNHCR will try to prevent displacement and encourage initiatives in support of confidence-building, reconciliation, and integration.

The protection framework proposes strategies for different categories including:

• Returning refugees: a monitoring mechanism will be established in cooperation with OSCE, the OHCHR, and NGOs, to assist UNHCR in identifying and removing obstacles to return and facilitating the reintegration of returnees, and to ensure the sustainability of repatriation based on the principle of voluntariness;
• IDPs: UNHCR will identify their numbers and protection needs, and assist them in finding local sustainable solutions, preferably return to their homes;
• Croatian and Bosnian Serb refugees: UNHCR is working on durable solutions, including repatriation for those who wish to return to Croatia or international resettlement; it will monitor the situation of those who wish to remain in Kosovo and provide transport for those who want to relocate to Serbia or Montenegro;
• Minority groups: to the extent possible, UNHCR favors measures that prevent displacement, and will continue to work with KFOR to create a secure environment for minority populations. Where displacement becomes inevitable, UNHCR will try to provide safe temporary sites and work on conditions conducive to return through a variety of confidence-building measures. Exceptionally, UNHCR will assist the transfer outside Kosovo of people in life-threatening situations. With a longer-term perspective, UNHCR will promote establishing a domestic legal framework for the protection of minorities in Kosovo; (18)
• Vulnerable groups: through its protection officers and community services officers, UNHCR will address the special protection needs of women (psycho-social counseling and legal matters related to gender-related violence or discrimination), children and other vulnerable groups, such as elderly, sick, disabled, or unaccompanied people.

Human Rights First's Analysis and Recommendations:
Human Rights First welcomes the protection framework developed by UNHCR and believes it is grounded in fundamental principles of respect for human rights and non-discrimination.

Human Rights First believes that UNHCR's efforts to achieve sustainable local solutions and promote conditions that are conducive to the peaceful co-existence of all ethnic groups in Kosovo should be supported. Clearly, the success of the protection strategy depends upon a variety of outside circumstances including the restoration of functioning political and judicial systems, and other institutional mechanisms to protect human rights, prevent discrimination, and provide shelter and other social assistance. Given the volatility and instability of the situation at the present moment, prospects for success are uncertain. Despite the many obstacles this strategy will face, it is by no means an exercise in futility. In particular, capitulating to the notion of ethnic separation means perpetuating the spiral of violence and laying the seeds for renewed violence, human rights abuses, and displacement.

Human Rights First calls on the U.S. and other governments to support the principles and implementation of the UNHCR protection strategy and encourages them to do this publicly and represent this view to UNHCR at the highest levels. Pressures from donors for UNHCR to be deeply involved in important and immediate shelter and assistance programs should not detract from this fundamentally important protection work, which is at the heart of UNHCR's mandate. The necessary resources, including adequate numbers of properly supported protection staff, must be provided.

VI. Other Important Issues

A. Support for Civil Society

There are currently plans by foreign governments, including the U.S., to invest significant amounts of money in the non-governmental sector in Kosovo. Over the last 10 years, a vibrant alternative civil sector developed to run the parallel social system for the Kosovar Albanian majority. Civil society in Kosovo needs no "discovering," but rather respect and recognition for its long standing work. Strengthening the role of this sector is essential to provide complex services needed to alleviate the trauma of returning refugees, IDPs, and other vulnerable individuals; to help them re-acquire their rights and integrate into the labor market and a revived cultural world; and to facilitate the promotion of respect for human rights in respect of civil and political but also social, economic, and cultural rights.

Human Rights First's Analysis and Recommendations:
Human Rights First welcomes initiatives by the U.S. and other governments to support the civil sector in Kosovo. Human Rights First is of the view that foreign governments should work with the NGO sector within the perspective outlined above, and cooperate closely with the OHCHR, and the OSCE office, in particular OSCE's Human Rights Directorate.

Learning lessons from Bosnia, Human Rights First believes that the strengthening of indigenous civil society organizations in Kosovo should be pursued with great sensitivity to their needs and priorities. The prudent allocation of the funds required will need to take note of the real absorption capacity of these organizations, their proven contribution, and their longer-term potential for creative work.

B. The Need for a Long-Term Vision

There is a high degree of hostility at every level between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs, and to some extent also the Roma. For this reason, the process of eventual reconciliation at present seems a distant and almost inconceivable aim. But there are some important exceptions where tolerable co-existence prevails, for example, the case of Roma in Landovica who returned to their houses following reconciliation efforts by UNHCR. (19) These show that reconciliation and peaceful co-existence is possible even at the present time and should not be surrendered as a realistic goal for the future. For the most part, however, as in similar post-conflict situations elsewhere, the international and local emphasis has to be first on "normalization" before the painful processes of actual "reconciliation" can even be attempted. This is equally the case for returning refugees as for those who stayed, and for all communities without discrimination.

The activities that are being planned and implemented by the UN and the NGO community in these very early days of post-conflict recovery will profoundly affect the longer term prospects for the entire society, including the satisfactory reintegration of returned refugees and the avoidance of future internal displacements or refugee movements. There is widespread concern that the international community deals with the current problems in a "reaction" mode, rather than developing, and applying, longer-term strategies for sustainable democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights. UNHCR, and its protection framework for refugees, returnees, IDPs and ethnic minorities in Kosovo, is a notable exception in this regard since it is based on the longer-term goal of promoting conditions for the long-term peaceful coexistence of all ethnic groups in Kosovo.

Human Rights First's Analysis and Recommendations:
Human Rights First urges the U.S. and other governments to help the leadership of UNMIK to articulate a vision for the province that situates the entire recovery and reconstruction process within the context of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, and thereby into theintegration process. There is no clarity about the endgame of the mainstream of the European social and economic international commitment; unless there is such a vision and it is vigorously promoted from top to bottom, future displacements and irreconcilable ethnic conflicts are likely to recur.

Human Rights First believes that Kosovo presents an opportunity not only to restore the human rights of people traumatized by war and conflict, but also to demonstrate a model of social justice within the wider European human rights framework. While the focus of its recent mission was on Kosovo, Human Rights First also stresses that, for the future prospects of peace and security in the Balkans, efforts must be made to address the protection needs of other refugees from the conflicts within the former Yugoslavia, notably the immense refugee population living in Serbia, which will otherwise remain a cause of instability and great human suffering.

VII. Conclusion

In his briefing to ECOSOC on July 23, 1999, Sergio Vieira de Mello, acting Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) until July 15, 1999, said that "...the image of normality, the many signs of a vigorous new beginning, mask formidable difficulties which make Kosovo perhaps the greatest challenge the United Nations has ever faced, in view of the mandate it was given to assume the actual interim administration of the province."

The pressure to satisfy immense needs in all areas of social and security policy and the impact of increasingly well-documented accounts of the problems in Kosovo emerging in the world press may well add tensions to an already problematic situation; they threaten to encourage the taking of short cuts, the backing of the wrong horses, the opting for the immediate and demonstrable donor gratifications of humanitarian assistance at the expense of sustained human rights based work.

Yet the success of protection efforts in Kosovo will be judged according to how far the rights of returning refugees and returnees are consolidated, the discrimination and fear felt by the minorities are alleviated, the particular needs of the very vulnerable are met, and the principles of refugee protection are promoted across the UN system. Human rights safeguards must be implemented as a matter of urgency, and in a sustained manner over the coming critical months. They must deal not only with the specific current realities, but also promote conditions for the peaceful co-existence of all the people of Kosovo and for the return of those who are still abroad or have fled after the end of the conflict, and to prevent renewed violence and displacement in the future. These efforts should be guided by international human rights principles, and in particular European standards of human rights and protection of minorities.

Endnotes

1. Human Rights First is grateful to UNHCR at headquarters level in Pristina and in the various Field Offices in Kosovo and in Skopje for providing logistical support and advice on many substantive issues that arose during the mission.

19. See UNHCR/OSCE Report on the situation of minorities, at para. 40.