We’re not Nazis, but...
The Rise of Hate Parties in Hungary and Greece and Why America Should Care

Graphic from Golden Dawn’s International Newsroom website
American ideals. Universal values.

On human rights, the United States must be a beacon. Activists fighting for freedom around the globe continue to look to us for inspiration and count on us for support. Upholding human rights is not only a moral obligation; it’s a vital national interest. America is strongest when our policies and actions match our values.

Human Rights First is an independent advocacy and action organization that challenges America to live up to its ideals. We believe American leadership is essential in the struggle for human rights so we press the U.S. government and private companies to respect human rights and the rule of law. When they don’t, we step in to demand reform, accountability, and justice. Around the world, we work where we can best harness American influence to secure core freedoms.

We know that it is not enough to expose and protest injustice, so we create the political environment and policy solutions necessary to ensure consistent respect for human rights. Whether we are protecting refugees, combating torture, or defending persecuted minorities, we focus not on making a point, but on making a difference. For over 30 years, we’ve built bipartisan coalitions and teamed up with frontline activists and lawyers to tackle issues that demand American leadership.

*Human Rights First is a nonprofit, nonpartisan international human rights organization based in New York and Washington D.C. To maintain our independence, we accept no government funding.*

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Human Rights First has for many years worked to combat hate crimes, antisemitism and anti-Roma discrimination in Europe. This report is the result of trips by Sonni Efron and Tad Stahnke to Greece and Hungary in April, 2014, and to Greece in May, 2014, as well as interviews and consultations with a wide range of human rights activists, government officials, national and international NGOs, multinational bodies, scholars, attorneys, journalists, and victims.

We salute their courage and dedication, and give heartfelt thanks for their counsel and assistance.

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“We are not racist or Nazi, but there is a problem with the Roma and we need to talk about that.”

–Zoltan Fuzessy, Jobbik Spokesman, May 2009
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1. Recommendations

To the U.S. Government

The primary responsibility for protecting the human rights of all persons in their territory lies with the governments of Greece and Hungary, and with their societies. However, U.S. leadership on human rights means prioritizing these pressing challenges to human rights.

Ten Things President Obama Can Do Now

1. Adopt a policy to reverse Hungary’s backsliding on democracy and to advance the rule of law, independent democratic institutions, human rights protections, and greater transparency. This policy should be an integral part of the U.S. strategy to reinforce the Transatlantic Alliance in the face of Russian action in Ukraine and the growing electoral strength of antisemitic, racist, pro-Russian parties in E.U. states. In his September speech to the United Nations General Assembly, refute Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s notion that “illiberal” nations are better off economically and articulate the dangers that authoritarian regimes pose to peace, prosperity and fundamental freedoms.

2. Call Prime Minister Antonis Samaras to: a) express support for his efforts to prosecute Golden Dawn leaders for operating a criminal organization and to purge the police forces of their accomplices; b) underscore the need for a credible prosecution of Golden Dawn that meets the highest European judicial standards and is not tainted by claims of political motivation; and c) offer assistance from U.S. law enforcement agencies to mount a credible prosecution and investigate Golden Dawn’s financial dealings, including outside Greece, and strengthen Greek law enforcement and judicial systems to combat hate violence, corruption, and abuse.

3. Call German Prime Minister Angela Merkel to discuss a) Greek political and economic conditions, as well as the need for Troika policies to blunt the suffering caused by austerity and to defuse the appeal of extremism; and b) coordinating policies on Hungary.

4. Instruct the Director of National Intelligence to investigate allegations of Russian and Iranian financial or other support of European far-right parties and present a classified assessment of whether the Kremlin is attempting to use such parties to undermine the European Union or thwart further NATO expansion. Release an unclassified version to Congress and the public.

5. At the North Atlantic Council meeting at the 2014 NATO Summit, express concern about the rise of neo-fascist parties in Europe and its impact on security and good governance in NATO member countries and the strength of the Alliance. Instruct the U.S. Ambassador to NATO and senior military officials to raise these concerns—especially with regard to Hungary and Greece—with their European counterparts.

6. Call on all governments to combat antisemitism and raise the issue in bilateral meetings. Send Vice President Biden to represent the United States at the 10th Anniversary of the OSCE’s Berlin Conference on Anti-Semitism this fall. Encourage senior leaders from Hungary and Greece to attend.
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7. Direct interagency working groups on countering violent extremism to include hate violence committed by European extremists as part of their overall strategy.

8. Task relevant U.S. agencies with compiling information on corruption by Hungarian and Greek political and business leaders as well as government officials suspected of funding violent extremists. Ensure that the United States is not contracting with, underwriting lending to, or otherwise enabling individuals or companies involved in support for such groups.

9. In the context of the G-8/G-20 anti-corruption agenda, seek commitments from Hungary and Greece to set in place policies and practices to impede high-level corruption and improve transparency and equal enforcement of the law.

10. Direct the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and State as well as USAID to step up efforts to promote broad-based economic recovery and entrepreneurship in Greece and Hungary, with emphasis on combating youth unemployment and other factors contributing to radicalization.

Additional Recommendations on Hungary

To the President and the National Security Council Staff:

■ Install a U.S. ambassador seasoned in managing the complex relationship with an ally that also has major challenges in democratic governance and protecting human rights.

■ Send senior public citizens, including former U.S. officials from both parties, to Budapest to discuss how abandoning liberal democracy would result in increasing political, economic, and strategic isolation for Hungary.

■ Speak out about the intimidation of independent media and NGOs, and the chilling effect it is having on Hungarian society.

■ Prioritize efforts to support embattled independent media, NGOs, and human rights defenders in Hungary. Develop a communications strategy to reach Hungarians who depend mainly on the state-dominated news outlets for information.

To the Department of State:

■ Secretary Kerry, in talks with senior European leaders, should convey U.S. support for E.U. efforts to hold Hungary accountable for violation of E.U. law, up to and including Article 7 proceedings, while respecting the E.U.’s sovereign right to make such decisions.

■ Also support efforts by the European Commission—led by Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Denmark—to implement the Commission’s new framework for addressing systemic threats to the rule of law in E.U. member states.

■ Recommend to the European Commission that it begin to implement the new framework by sending to Hungary a Rule of Law opinion, which should include the concerns about democratic governance and human rights already raised by the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the U.N.

■ Work with other members of the Community of Democracies to remove Hungary from its Governing Council with a vote on the matter
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at the next meeting of the Governing Council in El Salvador.

- Express disapproval of the government’s intimidation of the Hungarian media and other actions that have chilled free expression. Fund programs to support independent media outlets, which are on the verge of disappearing. Provide digital security training to independent Hungarian media and NGOs.

- Hold the Hungarian government to its promises of “zero tolerance” for antisemitism. Express concern about failures to:
  - Fully investigate and prosecute violent hate crimes;
  - Rebut antisemitic, racist or homophobic rhetoric, or inaccurate statements about the Holocaust, including by government officials and members of the ruling party;
  - Heed international objections that the new World War II memorial promotes inaccurate historical revisionism.

Monitor whether the government revises textbooks and makes visits by students to the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest and the Shoes on the Bank of the Danube a standard part of the curriculum.

If substantial progress is not being made on these issues, begin diplomatic efforts to ensure that Hungary does not become the 2015 Chair of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

- Urge the Government of Hungary to invite the European Union, Council of Europe, and OSCE to share expertise on improving the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of hate crimes. With the Department of Justice, offer bilateral assistance to the government in hate-crime data collection, police investigations and prosecutions, as well as assistance to NGOs working in this area.

- Condemn the raids on Hungarian NGOs receiving funds from foreign donors as direct intimidation. Insist that Hungarian authorities not abuse their power to investigate specific violations of campaign finance law or other suspected irregularities in order to harass NGOs not connected to those violations. Express the expectation that a European Union country should not use administrative harassment as a means to curtail the legal activities of NGOs.

- Work with European partners to fund embattled NGOs and projects aimed at improving the enabling environment for civil society groups in Hungary. Support NGOs that advocate legal and other reforms to protect human rights and improve transparency in campaign financing as a means to combat both corruption and covert financing of extremism.

Additional Recommendations on Greece

To the State Department and USAID:

- Develop an action plan for the Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security to assist Greece in: a) mounting a credible prosecution of Golden Dawn; b) protecting witnesses and officials involved in the prosecution; c) purging Greek institutions of Golden Dawn accomplices; and d) countering violent extremism.

- Urge the Greek government to request assistance from the Council of Europe, the E.U. and the OSCE, which have expertise and experience in training law enforcement bodies and judicial authorities on
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investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating violent hate crimes. With the Department of Justice, offer bilateral assistance to the government in hate-crime data collection, police investigations, and prosecutions, as well as assistance to NGOs working in this area.

Encourage Greece to implement fully its National Plan to fight corruption as a means to speed economic recovery and restore public trust in government. Engage with Greece’s Anti-Corruption Coordinator and explore ways to support his work through the multinational Open Government Partnership.

To the Department of Commerce:

- Lead an interagency review of barriers to U.S. investment in Greece, including corruption, burdensome bureaucracy, and weakness in the judicial system. Consult with the Greek-American community as part of this review.
To the U.S. Congress

- Send a bipartisan high-level delegation to represent the Congress at the 10th Anniversary of the OSCE’s Berlin Conference on Anti-Semitism this fall. Encourage Parliamentarians from Hungary and Greece to attend.

- Request a briefing from intelligence agencies on allegations of Russian and Iranian financial or other support of European far-right parties and whether the Kremlin is attempting to use such parties to undermine the European Union or thwart further NATO expansion.

- Hold hearings on the threat posed to U.S. interests by the rise of Golden Dawn, Jobbik, and other extremist parties in Europe. Request that senior administration officials: a) outline U.S. policies designed to undercut support for antisemitic, homophobic, racist, and violent far-right parties in Europe; b) assess the threat to U.S. interests (if any) posed by Putin’s Eurasian Doctrine—to create a Russia-led Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok; and c) evaluate Russia’s links with far-right European parties that oppose membership in the E.U. and NATO.

On Hungary

Lawmakers should request that administration officials testify about:

- U.S. strategy for combatting anti-democratic political trends, including Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s embrace of “illiberal democracy,” and the intimidation of independent media and NGOs.

- Status of prosecutions for violent hate crimes targeting Jews and Jewish community property, Roma, or LGBT individuals.

- Responses by Hungarian government officials and Fidesz party leaders to antisemitic, racist, homophobic or other hateful rhetoric by lawmakers in the national or European parliaments, or other Hungarian government or political officials.

- Status of the revision of Hungarian textbooks as well as making visits by Hungarian students to the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest and the Shoes on the Bank of the Danube a standard part of the curriculum.

- Whether existing U.S. economic policies toward Hungary should be retooled to promote youth employment and sustainable, broad-based development, or lessen opportunities for corruption and Hungarian dependence on Russian financing.
On Greece

Lawmakers should request that administration officials testify about:

- Status of U.S. efforts to assist Greece in mounting a credible prosecution of Golden Dawn suspects and other perpetrators of violent hate crime; purging law enforcement of Golden Dawn accomplices; and strengthening the Greek law enforcement and judicial systems to fight hate violence, organized crime, and corruption.

- U.S. views on how to promote broad-based, sustainable economic recovery for Greece and actions that could reduce youth unemployment and other factors encouraging radicalization.
To the European Commission

On Hungary

- Continue to initiate infringement proceedings against Hungary for violations of E.U. law.
- Consider bundling a group of related infringement actions together under the banner of a violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union.
- Begin implementing the new framework for addressing systemic threats to the rule of law in E.U. member states by sending to Hungary a Rule of Law opinion, which should include the concerns about democratic governance and human rights already expressed by the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the U.N.
- Through the Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs, the Directorate General for Justice and other mechanisms, provide core support for Hungarian NGOs to monitor and advocate policy change on rule of law, human rights, responses to violent hate crime, and corruption.

On Greece

- Review economic policies to find ways to blunt their effect on Greece’s poor and lower-middle-class citizens, and take measures to improve employment prospects, particularly among youth, to undercut the appeal of extremist ideologies.
- Offer assistance from EUROPOL to Greece in investigating the financial affairs and international transactions of Golden Dawn and its leadership in connection with their alleged criminal activities.
- Through the Directorate General for Justice, consider funding new programs to support Greek efforts to train police and prosecutors to combat violent hate crime and to increase judicial capacity to prosecute and try those crimes. Also consider funding programs designed to help hate-crime victims and promote better relations between police and communities targeted for hate violence.
To the Government of Hungary

The government of Hungary faces three inter-related challenges: 1) how to revise the Constitution to allow the executive to be effective while reinstating checks and balances on executive power; 2) how to combat hate crimes and discrimination so that all citizens may exercise their universal rights; and 3) how to deal with a democratically elected neo-fascist opposition party that promotes violations of human rights. Addressing these challenges will require simultaneous efforts to restore constitutional checks and balances and combat hatred and discrimination by rights-respecting means, in accordance with Hungary’s obligations to the E.U., Council of Europe, and OSCE.

General Recommendations

- Revise the Fourth Amendment and other articles of the Fundamental Law to meet European and international standards, as expressed by the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the Venice Commission, and other international bodies.

- Cease harassment of NGOs. Introduce legislation to make financing disclosure requirements for NGOs more transparent, and make the Government Control Office (KEHI) an independent body charged with monitoring NGO spending of Hungarian state funding, not other sources of funding. If violations of the ban on foreign financing of political parties have occurred, address them through ordinary legal channels, taking care to apply the laws equally to ruling and opposition parties.

- Increase government transparency.

- Reform the campaign financing laws to require parties to declare their sources of funding.

- Revise textbooks and make visits by schoolchildren to the Holocaust Memorial Center and the Shoes on the Bank of the Danube a standard part of the curriculum.

- Send a senior official to the 10th Anniversary of the OSCE’s Berlin Conference on Anti-Semitism this fall to consult with other leaders about how to combat antisemitism, including in new forms that pose a threat to security and stability in the OSCE region.

Hate Crime Recommendations

Condemn Hate Speech

- In keeping with Prime Minister Orban’s policy of “zero-tolerance” against antisemitism, direct all government officials to improve the tenor and accuracy of their language to convey respect for all citizens when discussing ethnic or religious diversity.

- Rebut antisemitic, racist, or homophobic statements, including by government or Fidesz Party officials.

- Explain publicly why remarks that distinguish between “Jews” or “Roma” on the one hand, and “Hungarians” on the other, are offensive because of the implication that citizens of Jewish or Roma origin are not Hungarian.

Investigate and Prosecute Hate Crimes

- Insist that hate crimes be fully investigated and prosecuted.
Increase funding for personnel to expand investigation and prosecution of hate crimes.

Instruct police to give higher priority to investigating and prosecuting hate crimes targeting property. Make such acts an explicit offense. Explain to the public why “victimless crimes,” such as defacing property with anti-Roma or anti-LGBT slurs or desecrating Jewish cemeteries, have a disproportionately negative effect on Hungarian society as a whole.

Implement special trainings on identification and application of bias-motivated crimes for law enforcement, including prosecutors and judges. Implement new procedures to ensure these best practices will be institutionalized. Fund these efforts appropriately.

Invite the E.U., Council of Europe, and OSCE to share expertise on improving the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of hate crimes. Invite the OSCE to review hate-crime laws and conduct hate-crime training for police, prosecutors, and judges. Reach out to other E.U. members, such as Germany and the U.K., which have experience combatting racist violence and retraining police.

Collect better statistics

Cooperate with civil society in a public-private partnership on a data compilation system to track the actual number of hate crimes, prosecutions, convictions, and punishments and report them to the OSCE via its monitoring website http://hatecrime.osce.org/. Request assistance from or cooperate with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR.)

Support Victims

Improve access for hate-crime victims to justice, counseling, and other legal and social assistance, as part of the implementation of E.U. Directive 2012/29/E.U. on support and protection for victims of crime.

Legislative Recommendations

Amend the Fundamental Law and Act CCVI of 2011 on the Legal Status of Churches to establish clear criteria for the official recognition of a religious organization that are fully in line with international norms and the recommendations of the Venice Commission. Transfer the authority to register religious organizations from Parliament to an independent court, as contemplated in the April 8, 2014 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.

Revise the 2013 Media Law, which restricts freedom of expression and information. Abolish the Media Council. Curtail the powers of the Media Authority and stipulate that its decisions may be appealed to a court of law. Abolish registration requirements for print and online media. Revise the Freedom of Information Act so that denial of requests for information may be appealed before a court of law.
To the Government of Greece

Golden Dawn’s continued popularity, even after revelations about its Nazi ideology and its alleged role in two murders and dozens of assaults, underscores the need for a rigorous and credible prosecution that meets the highest European judicial standards and is not tainted by accusations of political motivation. It is also imperative that the government continue efforts to identify, dismiss, or where appropriate prosecute police and other officials who have aided, abetted, or participated in crimes by Golden Dawn. Uprooting attitudes about racial superiority from public life will require a joint governmental-civil society action plan to combat hatred and violence, in accordance with its E.U., Council of Europe, and OSCE commitments.

Recommendations to the Government

Strengthen Efforts to Prosecute Golden Dawn and Reform Police

- Request international assistance in gathering evidence on the financial activities of Golden Dawn and its leadership in connection with their alleged criminal activities. Specifically, request assistance from EUROPOL and other international law enforcement agencies, including INTERPOL, the FBI, and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) in investigating any transnational financial connections of Golden Dawn leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos and others charged in the case.

- Increase security for prosecutors, magistrates, investigators, and witnesses in the criminal case against Golden Dawn leaders. In particular, provide security to undocumented migrants who may testify in the case and are most vulnerable to reprisals. Allow them to enter the Greek witness protection program, now only available to Greek citizens.

- Avoid actions that could feed the perception that the case against Golden Dawn may be politically motivated by scrupulously protecting all rights of the accused.

- Expedite trials for the police officers who have been charged with aiding, abetting, or joining in Golden Dawn crimes.

- Step up efforts to arrest perpetrators of ongoing racist attacks and determine whether they are the work of Golden Dawn supporters, other extremist groups, or lone actors.

- Further investigate Golden Dawn’s claim to have official allies, including inside the security and armed forces.

Make Racial Superiority Politically Unacceptable

- Adopt a zero-tolerance policy toward and strongly condemn racist, antisemitic, or homophobic statements by public officials and members of the New Democracy Party. Encourage other political parties to follow suit.

- Denounce intimidation and threats, and prosecute attacks against medical clinics, teachers, artists, and bloggers, in response to Golden Dawn’s self-appointed role as defender of “Greek values” across society.

- Send a senior Minister to the 10th Anniversary of the OSCE’s Berlin Conference and Declaration on Anti-
Semitism this fall to discuss with other leaders how to combat antisemitism in its modern forms.

- Conduct anti-racism training programs for the State Security Services, the Armed Forces, and Coast Guard officers tasked with intercepting boats of migrants trying to enter Greece.

- Overhaul Greek textbooks and educational curricula to:
  - reduce ethnocentric or highly nationalistic descriptions of world events;
  - cover the rise of European fascism, the ideology of the Nazi Party, and the Holocaust;
  - discuss the role of Greek units that collaborated with the Nazi occupation as well as the role of citizens in sheltering Greek Jews and otherwise resisting Nazi deportations of Jews; and
  - include a unit on modern antisemitism, racism, and religious intolerance.

- Establish specific training modules in the school for judges on international agreements and jurisprudence on human rights, combating hate-crime violence and human trafficking, and the protection of refugees. Invite the Human Rights Commission and civil society groups with expertise to conduct parts of this training.

### Improve the Response to Violent Hate Crimes

- Invite international and European organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the E.U., and the OSCE, to assist in training law enforcement bodies and judicial authorities on investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating violent hate crimes.

- Instruct the Ministry of Public Order to issue a new directive to the police to mandate the investigation of hate motivation for crimes, and to institute procedures (e.g. a specific form or guidelines) to make it easier for the police to do so, superseding Circular 7100/4/3 of May 25, 2006. This form should be easily used by all police officers, not only by those officers and units specially trained to address hate crimes.

- Abolish the 100 Euro ($130) filing fee for victims who wish to file a hate-crime complaint.

- Establish at least one prosecutor who spends 100 percent of his or her time on prosecuting hate violence, and on ascertaining whether crimes have a racist motive.

- Direct the Ministry of Justice to create an official and uniform system to monitor and record hate crimes in cooperation with the Greek police, the Greek Ombudsman, the Racist Violence Recording Network, and other NGOs. Cross-reference this data with incidents reported through the Racist Violence hotline. Request assistance from ODIHR on creating a standardized data compilation system to track hate crimes, prosecutions, convictions, and
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sentences. Also report incidents to the OSCE via its monitoring website http://hatecrime.osce.org/.

- Improve access for hate-crime victims to justice, counseling, and other legal and social assistance as part of the implementation of the E.U. Directive on support and protection for victims of crime. Support civil society groups that provide legal and other services to victims. Ensure that all criminal justice officials are trained to cooperate with NGOs as well as victim communities.

**Recommendations to the Parliament**

- Regardless of the fate of proposed legislation on hate speech, amend the Criminal Code to establish a specific criminal offense of bias-motivated violence, in order to ensure that the bias motivation is investigated and addressed at every stage of the proceedings involving violent crime.

- Amend Article 19 of the Immigration Code or otherwise legislate to suspend deportation or detention of undocumented migrants who have been victims of racist violence, enabling them to file complaints and participate in their cases. This could be similar to the protection framework that has been adopted for victims of trafficking and as foreseen by Directive 2012/29/E.U. governing the protection of victims of crime.

- Amend the current legislative framework to establish an independent mechanism in the Ministry of Public Order to receive and investigate complaints of police abuse and other arbitrary actions.

- Adopt a Parliamentary code of conduct to deter politicians from making antisemitic, xenophobic, racist, homophobic, or other hateful remarks from the floor or in public appearances. Use the code as grounds for disciplinary measures that could be imposed on MPs under Article 77 of the Greek Parliament's Standing Orders.
2. Executive Summary

Greece’s Golden Dawn and Hungary’s Jobbik represent the bloody tip of the far-right spear in Europe. In the May elections for the 751-member European Parliament, voters from at least 14 of the European Union’s 28 countries elected representatives from far-right parties that espouse values that undermine human rights. In all, they won 59 seats.

The leaders of these 14 parties express a wide range of political views, from finely nuanced bigotry to misogyny to adoration of fascist heroes of World War II. At least eight of them are pro-Russian. All have expressed either antisemitic, xenophobic, racist, homophobic, anti-Muslim, or anti-Roma sentiments. Golden Dawn is by far the most violent and has directly threatened the Greek state. Jobbik has been the most successful in advancing authoritarian and discriminatory policies, and it has sponsored paramilitary activity. Both have had enormous impacts on their societies.

Golden Dawn is a purely Nazi party, led by a man who was imprisoned for the attempted bombing of a movie theater and has for three decades associated with Nazi collaborators who ruled Greece from 1964-74 during the “Regime of the Colonels.” Jobbik officials have described Roma as animals and insects, and told Jews to start looking for a place to hide. Leaders of both parties have used their position in their national parliaments to deny the Holocaust and rehash ancient canards against Jews. The hatred these two parties promote has inspired waves of violence against minorities—including, in the case of Golden Dawn, murders.

On the geopolitical level, the rise of neo-fascist parties poses a challenge to the United States, and not only because Americans are horrified by the specter of barbarism within the European Union. At least eight of the 14 far-right parties have adopted a pro-Russian stance. Given rising tensions with Russia over Ukraine, the Transatlantic Alliance is more important than ever. Greece and Hungary are strategic NATO allies, but Golden Dawn and Jobbik want to pull out of the E.U. and NATO. Both see Russia, not the E.U. or the United States, as their natural ally.

The situation is not Europe in 1936, but neither are these parties the mere political fringe of the neo-Nazi skinhead movement. The European elections were a wake-up call, or should have been. The United States needs a strategy to defend human rights and the rule of law inside its old friends and democratic allies in Europe.

Key Findings

The rise of extreme far-right parties in Greece and Hungary is not simply the result of economic crisis. It represents a failure of governance.

Other European nations also suffered economic shock and massive unemployment, but even in some countries with histories of right-wing dictatorship, including Spain, Portugal, and Italy, the far right did not do well in the recent elections. (In Bulgaria, the viciously antisemitic Ataka party virtually collapsed.) The governments of Greece and Hungary, for very different reasons, allowed Jobbik and Golden Dawn to put down deep roots, which will be difficult to eradicate. These movements are unlikely to fade away on their own even when the economy improves.
Some supporters are violent, though the parties are trying to sanitize their images.

Both Jobbik and Golden Dawn leaders tried to sanitize their images during the 2014 election campaigns. But covert antisemitic and xenophobic code words and symbols were there for voters who knew where to look. Supporters of these parties have committed acts of violence, and shadowy sympathizer groups that are even more extreme do some of the dirty work. In Greece, attacks on migrants have continued even while all 18 of the party’s lawmakers are under criminal investigation or in jail. Refugees from conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, and other countries are especially threatened, fleeing their homes only to face attacks from Golden Dawn supporters.

Jobbik and Golden Dawn have had demonstrable impact on their national governments and institutions, nurturing the extreme tendencies in each country.

Jobbik and Golden Dawn have made large gains in local, national, and European Parliament elections. Both parties have benefited from the tolerance, if not the tacit support, of the governing parties, which have competed with the extremists for votes. In Hungary, Jobbik has helped Prime Minister Viktor Orban to become more authoritarian, pursue historical revisionism, violate European norms of constitutional democracy and human rights, and most recently, declare that Hungary rejects liberal democracy and will become an “illiberal state.” In Greece, Golden Dawn infiltrated the police and weakened the Greek government, which waited far too long to begin prosecuting its leaders for running a criminal organization and to purge police officials who enabled their crimes. Neither government has done enough to combat hate violence and protect vulnerable populations. And in the case of both Greece and Hungary, for very different reasons, the assumption that E.U. democracies are self-correcting over time with respect to extremism in the political system has been thrown into doubt.

The extreme right parties threaten fundamental European values and E.U. cohesion.

Jobbik and Golden Dawn are not poised to take power soon, but their malevolence and the corrosive effect they have on their societies and the political conversation in Europe should not be underestimated. They are more than Eurosceptic: they want their countries out of the European Union precisely because they do not respect fundamental European values, including human rights, non-discrimination, and democratic checks and balances. They also oppose the limits on national sovereignty and the commitments to respect existing borders to which their countries agreed in order to join the E.U.

The United States needs to know more about the Russian connection.

According to Peter Kreko of Political Capital, almost all of the far-right parties that won seats in the May 2014 European Parliament elections have been courted by Russia. Pro-Russian far-right parties have opposed E.U. sanctions against Russia for its behavior in Ukraine and have attempted to give international legitimacy to its annexation of Crimea. Some analysts assert that Kremlin cultivation of far-right parties is part of President Vladimir Putin’s strategy to weaken the E.U. from the inside, to blunt anti-Russian policies in the E.U., and to
prevent further expansion of NATO. There are allegations that Jobbik has received financial support from Russia and Iran. These concerns deserve full investigation.

The U.S. government needs a strategy to help Greece, and counter democratic backsliding in Hungary.

The United States must engage directly to address the human rights and rule of law challenges in Greece and Hungary as part of its overall strategy to strengthen the Transatlantic Alliance. It will need different strategies to deal with its two old friends: Hungary, a democratic backslider, and Greece, with a government that has been weakened by severe recession and soaring unemployment but has belatedly begun to prosecute Golden Dawn leaders and their accomplices in the police for violent crimes. The United States needs to recognize that these successful neo-fascist movements in Europe are no longer just an E.U. problem. To the extent that they undermine the E.U., NATO, or our allies, they are an American problem, too.
“Our free nations cannot be complacent in pursuit of the vision we share—a Europe that is whole and free and at peace. We have to work for that.”

–President Barack Obama, Warsaw, June 4, 2014

3. Introduction

Latent antisemitism, racism, and xenophobia have lurked within European societies for centuries—as they do in the United States and many other countries. In the wake of World War II, national laws in many European states gradually criminalized many manifestations of hatred and incitement, and the European Union adopted a range of antidiscrimination policies. But the European financial crisis thrust the poorest E.U. member nations into deep recession, and a sharp increase in unemployment coincided with high migration from non-European countries. This rekindled old bigotries and fanned new resentments. Alienation from decision-makers in Brussels and Berlin, and anger over foreign-imposed austerity policies, have aggravated the sense of grievance. Hate-mongering has re-emerged as a powerful tool deployed by a new generation of ambitious, unscrupulous politicians.

Yet in Europe, as on every other continent, some countries do a better job than others in educating their publics to reject hatred; and some governments are better than others at explaining the dangers of scapegoating, a task each society and each generation must tackle anew.

These healthy societies are by no means immune from ancient canards against Jews or Roma; or racist sentiment toward migrants from Africa, Asia or the Middle East; or the rejection of homosexuality or other non-traditional sexual identities and behaviors. But their governments are better at setting norms and enforcing laws and policies designed to curb the manifestations of hatred through deeds that threaten other people, violate their fundamental rights, or harm them.

In other countries, the hatred festers and becomes harder to exorcise. This report is about two of those places.

This report examines the human rights implications of the antisemitic, racist, fascist and pro-Russian parties in Hungary and Greece, as well as the impact of the far-right parties on the governing parties of the European Union, regional security, and U.S. foreign policy.

Three immediate lessons:

First, the rise of far-right parties in Greece and Hungary cannot be explained away by the economic crisis. The rise of right-wing extremist political parties in many parts of Europe is often rationalized as an inevitable product of the shock of the economic crises, declining living standards, austerity policies seen as imposed from abroad, high unemployment, and lack of hope. All of these factors played a huge role in boosting the fortunes of the European far-right—
but in Greece and Hungary, at least, there were other, potent factors, including the behavior of the governing parties. Thus it cannot be assumed that as economies improve, extremism will fade. In Hungary and Greece, well-organized extreme-right movements long predated the European economic crisis; with help from sympathizers in high places, they adroitly positioned themselves to benefit from the ensuing misery. Both parties had gained followers by portraying themselves as the unrepentant heirs to proud nationalist and irredentist traditions. And in both countries, there was pre-existing demand for their ideologies.¹

![Golden Dawn supporters cheer the party’s advances in the European Parliamentary elections (AP Photo/Nikolas Giakoumidis).](image)

However, other members of the European currency zone were also forced into austerity policies in exchange for the rescue packages they needed to keep their economies afloat, yet have not seen the resurgence of neo-fascist, politicized antisemitism that Greece and Hungary have. Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Cyprus all suffered sudden financial shock, a crisis of confidence, and acute economic distress. (Greece has suffered most by far, Hungary less than some others.) Like Greece and Hungary, Spain and Portugal had also experienced periods of right-wing dictatorship, but the economic crisis did not revive right-wing ideologies. Moreover, Italy’s ultra-right Northern League has actually lost steam due to a corruption scandal, dropping from 10.2 percent of the E.P. vote during the crisis of 2009 to 6 percent of the vote this May, even as Italy’s GDP declined and its unemployment rate nearly doubled.²

**The second lesson is that the delayed response by governments to these purveyors of hate has already had serious consequences.** For years the governments of Hungary and
Greece allowed well-organized, violent extremist movements to grow and metastasize. By 2006 in Hungary and by 2008 in Greece, hate movements burst from relative obscurity to send hundreds of angry men into the streets. They revived the symbols, rhetoric and strategies of Nazism and other 20th Century fascist movements, updated them to exploit Euro-crisis economic anxieties, and drew new supporters with skilled use of social media. They staged frightening marches and motorcycle demonstrations, invaded minority neighborhoods, used threats and violence in systematic terror campaigns, and operated for several years with impunity.

From a historical perspective, the failure by law enforcement to counter Jobbik and Golden Dawn should not be considered unusual. In Hungary, persecution and pogroms against the Roma and Jews happened for centuries, and widespread discrimination against the Roma in the post-War era had made violence against them a low priority for all Hungarian governments. In Greece, law enforcement agencies have been ineffective in curbing political violence from the left since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974. The November 17 group, a Marxist-Leninist movement formed in 1975 and for years described as the most dangerous terrorist group in the West, assassinated 23 people and waged at least 103 attacks before 19 of its members were unmasked in 2002. One of the key assassins, convicted in 2003, walked away from parole this year and threatened more violence against the state to protect the Greek people against austerity policies. Many other terrorist attacks have never been solved, and leftist and anarchist groups that operate in some Athens neighborhoods continue to have violent clashes with police and Golden Dawn.

The notable delay in the prosecution of serious crimes alleged to have been committed by party members or supporters of Jobbik and Golden Dawn has reinforced the perception expressed by many Hungarians and Greeks that the ruling parties were tolerant of their homegrown militants because they benefitted politically from having a fascist boogeyman on their right flanks. Such views may be a conspiratorial explanation for the structural incompetence of the police, which includes a notable lack of expertise in dealing with hate crimes as well as other extremist violence.

Golden Dawn and Jobbik have now won a sizeable number of seats in their national parliaments as well as the European Parliament, making the parties—and the even more extreme right-wing sympathizers that hide in their shadows and do the dirty-work—far more difficult for their respective governments to counter. Both have had a negative impact on the ruling parties, drawing out the extreme tendencies within the ranks of Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras’ New Democracy party and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party.

Just as the downturn in the economy was not the only factor in the rise of Golden Dawn or Jobbik, so will it take more than an upturn in the European economy to root out Golden Dawn and Jobbik, or the sentiments that enabled their rise. Both parties have tapped into deep historical narratives that have been running through their nations for centuries, and both have jumped the line into the mainstream by attracting voters that do not share their fascist ideology but do see in them the possibility of national salvation, or revenge against the ruling elites, or both. And both parties have developed highly successful recruiting techniques and organizational mechanisms for drawing in and radicalizing alienated youth. The far-right movements will not disappear without
concerted efforts to track their crimes, strengthen the prosecutorial and judicial systems to prosecute and try hate-crime suspects, undercut the appeal of their radical agendas, and to offer positive alternatives and employment programs for youth.

So far, such efforts have been belated, tepid, unsuccessful, or nonexistent. Neither the Greek nor Hungarian governments have succeeded in denting the popular appeal of violence espoused by Golden Dawn and Jobbik, even as these parties worked their way into the political mainstream and increased their mandate in two successive elections. Instead, both governments have engaged in some efforts to control them, but also efforts to pander to and co-opt their voters. This report will also document how in both Hungary and Greece, the popularity of the far right enticed or allowed the center-right ruling parties to adopt some of the rhetoric of Jobbik and Golden Dawn, and in some cases, their policies.  

The third take-away is that the far-right parties have been able to rise because of underlying weaknesses in Greek and Hungarian institutions. Both countries have suffered from endemic corruption, lack of full independence in the judiciary, and other institutional problems. For very different reasons, in both countries, the unstated assumption that E.U. democracies are self-correcting over time with respect to extremism in the political system has now been thrown into question.

 Democratically elected Jobbik and Golden Dawn lawmakers have made antisemitic, racist or xenophobic statements from the floor of the Parliament itself. Worse, they have made hatred of Jews, gays, Roma, socialists, migrants and even Brussels bureaucrats seem acceptable, if only by making it so commonplace. Suspicions that Jobbik and Golden Dawn might be receiving clandestine funding, helping their followers get weapons, and running training camps for extremists appear not to have been properly investigated.

The pro-Russian tilt of both parties became more problematic in 2014, when both Jobbik and Golden Dawn came out in favor of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its subsequent actions in Ukraine, contrary to the polices of their governments. Golden Dawn and Jobbik oppose all sanctions against Russia—as do many other European far-right and far-left parties.
Greece and Hungary are now making remarkably belated attempts to discredit their fascist parties. In Greece, following the murder of a Greek rap musician in September, 2013, the government conducted mass arrests of Golden Dawn members of parliament and other party leaders, accusing them of directing a criminal organization that committed assault, murder, and other crimes. Authorities hope to bring the case to trial in the fall of 2014. In Hungary, a 2009 court decision banned the Hungarian Guard, the neo-fascist paramilitary group founded by Jobbik leader Gabor Vona, but successor groups replaced them. Despite longstanding allegations that Jobbik might be receiving funding from Russia and Iran, the government did not take public action until three weeks before the European Parliamentary elections, when it accused a Jobbik member of the European Parliament (MEP), Bela Kovacs, of spying for Russia.

In both countries, the governments’ methods for pursuing criminal cases against democratically elected officials have drawn criticism of the prosecutions as politically motivated or insufficiently rights-respecting. The approach of prosecuting extremist parties for their deeds, not their speech, is entirely correct—but such investigations and prosecutions must be conducted according to the highest standards of European legal practices, in order to strengthen public faith in the rule of law.
Mask of Legitimacy

In their spring, 2014 election campaigns, both Jobbik and Golden Dawn tried to sanitize their images. They denied any connection to violence, shelved their antisemitic rhetoric, and played down their Nazi origins to appeal to more moderate voters. In strikingly similar makeovers, each party’s campaign advertising portrayed their candidates as wholesome, fresh, and above all, not tainted by corruption. Golden Dawn recruited two retired generals, as well as other citizens untainted by Nazi associations, to run on its ticket. With this shift “from boots to suits,” the parties appeared to be rebranding themselves as more benign Eurosceptic nationalists worthy of a protest vote, at the very least.

This effort succeeded. On April 6, Jobbik won 21 percent of the vote for the Hungarian parliament, increasing its strength, and on May 25, it won 15 percent in the European Parliament (EP) election, keeping its three seats. Political analysts said Jobbik would have done even better had the Hungarian government not requested that the European Parliament lift Kovacs’s immunity so that he could be prosecuted for espionage. Kovacs has denied all charges and was reelected.

The Golden Dawn candidate for mayor of Athens—a man who sports swastika tattoos, once read from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion from the floor of Parliament, and hit a female M.P. on live television—lost the May 22 local election, but with a staggering 16 percent of the vote. Although he was under investigation for violent crimes, the MP, Ilias Kasidiaris, won more than 20 percent of the vote in several upper middle-class neighborhoods of the city near areas where migrants have settled.

In E.P. elections a week later, Greek voters gave Golden Dawn 9.4 percent of the vote, for the first time sending three neo-neo-Nazi candidates to represent them in Brussels.

Across Europe, the overall picture was more mixed, with some far-right parties advancing—a neo-Nazi party in Germany also won a seat in the European Parliament—and many extreme Eurosceptics scoring huge gains. In France, Marine Le Pen of Front National won the elections with 24.9 percent of the vote, and in Denmark, the Danish People’s Party won 26.6 percent. However, the far-right lost ground in Italy, Slovakia, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria.

Skinheads in Parliament, Handcuffs of Honor

Now that Golden Dawn and Jobbik have been re-elected despite their well-known views and policies, it will be even more difficult for their governments to counter their hate ideologies as the parties distance themselves from their extremist brethren. As a result of its strong showing, Jobbik won both a deputy president post in the new Parliament and a Supreme Court ruling that a news program could not call it a “far-right” party, as that constituted an opinion, not a fact, and might harm Jobbik’s image. Golden Dawn, however, dropped the pretense of moderation immediately after the election. Its imprisoned leader Nikolas Michaloliakos appeared in front of Parliament in what he called “handcuffs on honor” and raged against fellow lawmakers for
WE’RE NOT NAZIS, BUT…

abetting the government in his “political persecution.” Supporters sang the Nazi SS anthem in front of Parliament in June as lawmakers voted to lift his parliamentary immunity.

Even as Golden Dawn’s lawmakers sit in jail awaiting trial, violent street attacks are continuing, albeit at a lesser pace. This suggests that decapitation of the top leadership through criminal prosecution will be insufficient to stop the activities of members or supporters who are now trained and practiced in the use of violence against migrants, Muslims, leftists, LGBT people and other “enemies.” Furthermore, the three newly elected Golden Dawn candidates in the European Parliament have not been touched by the prosecution’s case against the leadership.

The other far-right parties in the European Parliament failed to pull together 25 MEPs from seven countries to form a parliamentary group, which would have brought them additional public funding and speaking time. They could have done so had they been willing to include Golden Dawn and Jobbik MEPS in their alliance, but even France’s Marine Le Pen and the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders considered them too extreme and antisemitic. Nevertheless, even without formal pan-European alliances, the far-right parties may vote together. And though vastly outnumbered, the ultra-nationalists do have a platform, public funding, and the perquisites of office. By their mere presence in the European Parliament and the legitimacy it conveys, they undermine the shared values that are at the heart of the Transatlantic Alliance, and corrode the principles of respect for universal human rights and democratic norms that are the foundation of the European Union.

**Whither Hungary, Whither Europe?**

The strength of the extreme-right in the May, 2014 parliamentary elections delivered a shock to the European body politic. Orban’s much-discussed July 26, 2014, speech, in which he announced that Hungary would now become a special sort of “illiberal” democracy, also appears to be a tipping point, one whose implications are not yet fully understood.

Orban’s indictment of liberal democracy as having failed Hungary economically may resonate elsewhere in Europe, and beyond. He argued that liberal democracies are no longer globally competitive, and held up Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey as today’s success stories. The striking declaration that Hungary’s European Union membership does not preclude it from building “an illiberal new state based on national foundations” directly challenges the E.U.’s willingness to defend its liberal democratic identity as well as its human rights norms. In the United States, leading editorial pages responded with demands that the E.U. begin the process of stripping Hungary of its voting rights. (Such a procedure would be seen as tantamount to expelling a country from the European Union.)

At a moment when democracy is suffering setbacks in many parts of the world and antisemitism and other hatreds are rising, the United States is called not only to stand up for its vision of rights-respecting, liberal democracy but also to demonstrate once again how such systems can outperform authoritarian states in lifting their struggling middle and working classes. It is the wellbeing of these citizens, still the losers six years into the European financial crisis, that the extreme right purports to defend.

With Moscow becoming more aggressive in pursuing its Eurasian Union policies, the E.U. leadership in Brussels under fire from within, antisemitism erupting across Europe, economic
woes persisting and desperate migrants still arriving, it is unlikely that the European extremist parties will fade away soon. Each government will need to manage the potential threat to human rights and democratic values—even when these are unpopular. Most will be required to campaign against democratically-elected hate parties in upcoming elections.

To meet the challenge, this report focuses on specific legal and policy measures that could help governments combat the political exploitation of hate without violating the right to free speech. The report analyzes the weaknesses in the law enforcement and judicial systems that have allowed Golden Dawn and Jobbik to operate with relative impunity, and suggest proactive steps that could be taken to address hate crime. It documents how the rise of these and other extremist parties has already coarsened the tone of public discourse inside two European Union democracies. It also explores the problems and opportunities presented by the Greek government’s unprecedented legal case against Golden Dawn, which is expected to come to trial later this year.

This report also tells the stories of some of the victims of hate, in hopes that justice can be done for them and for others who told us they were too afraid to allow their cases to be included here.

Finally, it makes recommendations for policymakers in the United States, Europe, Hungary, and Greece, as well as civil society leaders and NGOs, to support political, institutional, cultural, and systemic reforms to protect democratic freedoms and human rights in the future and inoculate the public to reject the politics of hate. In the final analysis, this is the only enduring defense against fascism masquerading as democracy.

Washington, D.C., August 13, 2014
4. Why It Matters: A Geopolitical Overview

Greece and Hungary are important American friends and allies. Our historic ties run deep, the vast majority of our citizens share fundamental democratic values, and the United States is home to large Greek-American and Hungarian-American communities. Americans have long admired the courage that the Greek partisans displayed in standing up to the Nazi invasion and contributing to the victory of the Allies in World War II, as they admire the bravery of the Hungarian people in rebelling against Soviet occupation in 1956 and in building a new democracy after 1989. It is in this context of longtime friendship that the United States must address the rise of neo-Nazi parties in Greece and Hungary and democratic backsliding in Hungary as potential threats to U.S. geopolitical interests.

The need for a broad engagement strategy is urgent. Even if fascist parties in Hungary and Greece remain unable to win control of their governments, the malevolence of their ideologies should not be underestimated. Nor should their pernicious effect on their own governments and institutions, or their campaigns to persuade the public that the national interest lies in rejecting the E.U., NATO, and trade and other agreements between Europe and the United States. However, these threats to the Transatlantic Alliance have received insufficient attention from senior U.S. policymakers, particularly amid crises in Ukraine, Syria, Gaza, Iraq, and Nigeria. \(^1\)

**Antisemitic, Racist Parties Threaten the E.U. from Within**

The ascent to political power of parties that espouse antisemitic, racist, violent and ultranationalist ideologies threatens to corrode the fundamental values of the European Union from within. These include the primacy of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic norms; the surrender of all preexisting territorial claims as a prerequisite for ending millennia of war between European countries; the enforcement by each member state of strong protections for minority rights and strict anti-discrimination laws; and a willingness to forfeit some degree of national sovereignty in exchange for the political, economic, and security benefits of membership in a larger and more powerful political entity. All of these are incompatible with the ideologies of ultranationalism, ethnic superiority, antisemitism, anti-Roma, and homophobic ideologies espoused by Jobbik and Golden Dawn, which each won three seats in the European Parliament (E.P.) in May, 2014, and continue to play influential political roles in their respective countries.

These two parties are arguably among the most extreme in the E.P. in their rhetoric, which is designed to fan hatred and legitimize its expression, and in the violence they have fomented. Their stance goes far beyond the Euroscepticism that was seen the primary driver of the victory of many other European far-right parties in the E.P. elections. In fact they are so antisemitic and extreme that even Marine Le Pen, whose Front National won the French election with a record 24.86 percent of the vote, and Geert Wilders of the Netherlands declined to form a coalition with them in the European Parliament—thereby forfeiting the extra money, speaking time and influence they could have received by forming a parliamentary group.
Oddly, Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s status as elected officials inside an E.U. body will help them campaign against the E.U. Jobbik had previously called for a national referendum on Hungary’s membership in the E.U. because it is “a net loser of the European Union.” The demand for a referendum is no more than a rhetorical gesture when Fidesz holds a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The assertion that Hungary is a “net loser” from the E.U. is demonstrably false from a fiscal point of view, as E.U. spending on Hungary is 534 euros per capita, and the E.U. spends 537 percent more on Hungary than Hungary contributes to the E.U.

In order for policymakers to address the problems posed by the electoral legitimization of extremist parties in Europe, it is important to differentiate at least between two key ideological strands of the various parties: Euroscepticism and “Euro-fascism.” The latter term does little to elucidate the important differences among various European ultra-nationalist, parties, including their political attitudes and their propensity to incite violence.

The term Euroscepticism is also used to cover a wide range of individual and party attitudes toward the E.U. These include advocating withdrawal from the European Union and/or the Eurozone; curtailing or rolling back some forms of European integration; or advocating reform of the vast E.U. bureaucracy, which many voters see as overly intrusive or unresponsive to its 28 member nations.

Euroscepticism in and of itself does not threaten U.S. interests. As a matter of national sovereignty, every country has the right to quit the E.U. or to refloat its own national currency; as a matter of U.S. policy, it would be undesirable for Washington to position itself as for or against
any E.U. government’s decision on such a matter. However, to the extent that Euroscepticism is used as political cover by parties with a more covert agenda of racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, or incitement to violence against minorities or the states, it serves as a fig leaf for a dangerous fascist agenda.

However they are defined, Golden Dawn and Jobbik are already corroding the tone of public discourse in Europe with hateful rhetoric designed to shock and offend. Their position in the European Parliament gives them legitimacy back home, even as they campaign against the European Union from the inside. The more the E.U. is preoccupied with internal revolt, the less it can function as an essential U.S. partner in advancing regional and global security. And the presence of elected fascist parties will inevitably distract or destabilize their national governments, threatening the U.S. ability to maintain strong bilateral relationships with its important allies.

The challenge for policymakers is that far-right parties such as Jobbik and Golden Dawn express both Eurosceptic and fascist views, which must be disentangled in order to craft an effective response.13

The Far-Right Challenge to the Transatlantic Alliance

Although Greece and Hungary have small populations, both are NATO members in frontline regions that are becoming more important on the U.S. strategic map. As members of the European Union, their economic and political stability has direct bearing on the EU’s internal cohesion, the effectiveness of its governance, and the ability of the E.U. to contribute to global peace and security efforts on and beyond its borders.

European Communist parties have long rejected NATO; but Hungary’s Jobbik Party and Greece’s Golden Dawn Party oppose NATO from the far right side of the political spectrum. Both support withdrawal from the European Union and NATO, and both see Russia as their natural ally. One of Hungary’s three Jobbik members of the European Parliament was recently accused of spying14 for Russia, and there is mounting evidence of Iranian support15 for Jobbik due to its antisemitic activities.

In Greece, two retired generals who had held senior European commands were elected to the European Parliament on the Golden Dawn ticket, raising questions about the extent to which other segments of the Greek Armed forces sympathize with their views. Golden Dawn claims to have wide support inside the security forces, as well as the friendship of Russia. Judging from those who have already been dismissed from the security forces for connections with Golden Dawn or its crimes, the party has infiltrated the police, secret service, and other branches of the government.
Because many European fascist parties have won a small percentage of the vote in their countries for years, policymakers have been slow to recognize the potential threat posed by Golden Dawn and Jobbik. In an archetypal example of the dangers of allowing hate crime and hate politics to fester, Jobbik won 15 percent of the European Parliament vote and Golden Dawn drew 9.6 percent even with its top leadership in jail, raising concerns about key allies just at the moment when tensions over Russia’s intervention in Ukraine makes the strength of NATO alliance a top Transatlantic concern.

**Hungary**

Until 2008, Hungary, with a population of 9.9 million, was considered an economic and political success story—a country that made a quick transition from Communism and lifted many of its citizens into a comfortable middle-class lifestyle.

However from 2002-2009, under a socialist government, Hungary’s economy deteriorated due to overspending and corruption scandals, paving the way for the return of former Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who had led a conservative government between 1998 and 2002.

The geopolitical significance of the rise of the extreme right in Hungary must be understood in the context of Orban’s extraordinary remaking of Hungary since 2010. Since he swept into office with a two-thirds majority, Orban has made sweeping economic, legal and political changes, strengthened ties with Moscow and Beijing and improved relations with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia, and other wealthy nondemocratic countries that can provide financing for deals with Hungary. Germany is the largest foreign direct investor in Hungary, accounting for 22 percent of its inflow, followed by Austria and the Netherlands. U.S. economic investment is less important, accounting for only 4 percent of Hungary’s foreign direct investment. This single statistic indicates why the United States has relatively little economic leverage with the Orban government. However, 40 of the U.S.’s top 50 multinational companies do business in Hungary, including GE, Ford, Citibank, Exxon Mobile and Dow Chemicals.

The new Hungarian Constitution adopted hastily in 2011 eroded key democratic checks and balances and set off a series of legal actions by the European Union that have attempted—but so far failed—to bring Hungarian law back in line with E.U. democratic standards. As Orban rebuffed international complaints about Hungary’s human right practices and played cat-and-mouse with the E.U., relations with Washington also cooled. Orban has not been invited to the White House, and President Obama did not call him immediately to congratulate him on his victory in the April, 2014 elections.

Because of its location bordering Ukraine and close to Russia, the president and other U.S. officials have made clear that they value Hungary’s ability to play a positive role in addressing the crisis in Ukraine.

Hungary is a tiny contributor of funds and troops to NATO, but it has sent forces to the Balkans and Afghanistan, for which the United States frequently expresses its gratitude. It commanded a joint battalion in the Balkans in 2008, headed a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan, and sent an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) that works...
with forces from its partner, the state of Ohio. Hungary also hosts the Papa Airbase, home to the Strategic Airlift Consortium’s C-17 operations, which assist NATO logistical operations. While U.S. forces will be drawing down from Afghanistan, the Hungarian military’s activities in the Balkans will likely remain of particular importance to the United States.

Orban has also reaffirmed his commitment to E.U. membership, though carefully balancing this with his view that economic growth will only come through the East.

“Isolation is a bad answer, because he who does not sit at the table should not be surprised if he is put on the menu,” Orban said in April.

In some ways, Orban and his Fidesz party appear to be moving toward neutrality between East and West—while enjoying the umbrella security guarantees of NATO. For example, in 2010 Orban said that “We are sailing under a Western flag, though an Eastern wind is blowing in the world economy.” He announced at the London School of Economics that “We Europeans need Russia. We need sooner or later—rather sooner than later—a strategic alliance with Russia.”

Orban went on to argue that NATO security protections are not enough; Hungary is vulnerable without other sorts of protection as well:

“Security guarantees—OK, NATO membership is a kind of. We need guarantees in terms of energy, commercial routes, trade and infrastructure from North down to South, not just to have the infrastructure between East and West which makes us vulnerable at this moment. If we can get those kinds of guarantees as part of the European project of having a strategic alliance between Russia and the European Union, we will be in favour of that.”

State Secretary Janos Lazar, who is Orban’s right hand man and seen as a possible successor, described Hungary’s relationship with Russia is “a well-operating marriage of interest, which is becoming increasingly enjoyable.” The shift in Fidesz’ orientation away from its European critics is notable, as both Orban and Lazar had been harsh critics of Putin just a few years earlier.

Orban’s July 26 speech has further strained relations. While Hungary’s leftist opposition party decried the “Putin-ization of Hungary,” the U.S. ambassador to Budapest took the unusual step of providing written responses to questions about the speech for Hungary’s major newspaper. U.S. and European officials are seeking to understand what the declaration of “illiberal democracy” will mean in practice. Does Orban merely intend to chart a more independent course, does he plan to downgrade Hungary’s Western alliances and ally itself with the authoritarian camp, or is he challenging the E.U. to censure Hungary so that Orban can blame Europe for forcing Hungary out of the Union, thus allowing him not to make the legal and constitutional changes that the E.U. has demanded?

It also raises fresh questions about Hungarian participation in NATO as tensions with Russia rise. Orban has promised to support the E.U. position on Ukraine, condemned the Russian annexation of Crimea and vowed to respect E.U. sanctions against Russia as well as the important principle of territorial integrity. However, in July, 2014 Orban opposed the expansion of sanctions against Russia, saying it “would run counter to the interests of both Europe and Hungary.” The country
that in 1989 was eager to end what it now calls “the Soviet occupation” and align with the West remains almost entirely dependent on Russia for its energy and now for financing. Shortly before the annexation of Crimea, Orban signed a deal for Russia’s Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation to build a nuclear power plant in Paks, in eastern Hungary. Russia will also provide up to $13.5 billion in financing, making Hungary a creditor of Russia’s for two decades to come.28

Contrary to Orban and his Fidesz Party, Jobbik has supported the annexation of Crimea—both because it supports Russia and because it has designs on Transcarpathia, the region of Ukraine bordering Hungary where many Hungarians live. Jobbik opposes E.U. sanctions against Putin or his Ukrainian proxies (as do many other former Soviet-bloc countries with energy and economic ties to Russia.) Like Orban, however, Jobbik wants better economic ties to the east, and advertises that increasing foreign trade with Hungary would give eastern economies “bridgehead’ towards the markets of the European Union.”29 Jobbik also opposes the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a trade treaty the United States aims to conclude with the E.U.

With its three seats in the European Parliament, Jobbik can be expected to join in these stances with other far-right parties that see more benefit to having closer economic, energy, cultural, and religious ties with Russia than with what they view as a domineering West that is moving away from conservative Christian values.

One Jobbik member of the European Parliament (MEP), Bela Kovacs, was educated in Moscow and had been making that case in public for years. Shortly before the May European Parliament (E.P.) election, the government declared that it would seek to prosecute Kovacs as a Russian spy.30 Political analysts said Jobbik was hurt by the scandal, receiving only 15 percent of the vote in the E.P. election, down from the 21 percent it had scored in the Hungarian parliamentary elections a month earlier.

Hungary’s policies toward ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries also have the potential to create problems for NATO and the E.U. The Orban government has made the protection of Hungarian minorities abroad a top priority. It has granted dual citizenship and the right to vote to ethnic Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine. They wound up in these countries when Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory in the Treaty of Trianon, after being on the losing side of World War I. This loss of territory and population is generally viewed as a national tragedy that has scarred the Hungarian psyche. The Hungarian right has always been determined to reunite ethnic Hungarians inside the 1920s borders. Hungary’s World War II leader Miklos Horthy did manage to get some of the lost lands back with Nazi Germany’s help in exchange for collaboration, but Hungary lost them again after the war. Hungarian nationalist and many ordinary citizens display maps of “Greater Hungary,” including recently on bumper stickers.

As soon as it took power in 2010, the conservative Fidesz Party fulfilled one of Jobbik’s campaign promises by declaring June 4 the “Day of National Cohesion” to mark “the anniversary of the day the peace treaty was signed in the Grand Trianon chateau of Versailles in 1920.”31 Fidesz fulfilled another Jobbik demand with the granting of dual citizenship. This was opposed by Hungary’s neighbors, but Orban persisted as part of a populist campaign to restore Hungarian
national pride, and was repaid in 2014 when votes from Hungarians in neighboring countries gave him the margin needed to retain his two-thirds majority in Parliament. 32

Although Hungary shares only a small stretch of border with Ukraine, today as many as 150,000 ethnic Hungarians live inside the area in southwest Ukraine known as Transcarpathia (to Ukrainians) and Subcarpathia (to Hungarians). Another 1.2 million ethnic Hungarians also live in Romania, in the Transylvania region, where both Jobbik and Fidesz campaigned hard for the votes of the new Hungarian citizens abroad. Jobbik uses its platform in the European Parliament to pursue its agenda of reuniting “Greater Hungary” in some form.

In 2013, for example, a Jobbik MEP argued that Serbia should not be admitted to the E.U. until it grants territorial autonomy to the Hungarian minority. 33 This year, another Jobbik MEP, Tamas Gaudi-Nagy, rose on the floor of the Council of Europe Assembly wearing a T-shirt that said, “Crimea legally belongs to Russia! Transcarpathia legally belongs to Hungary!” and declared Ukraine to be “an artificial country,” prompting one blogger to call him a “fascist vulture.” 34 Such theatrical performances usually draw news coverage, but when they don’t, lawmakers post their own You-Tube videos on right-wing websites.

Jobbik also tries to export its ideology to nearby countries, including Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Poland. According to Reuters, the party said that “it hoped the people of central and eastern Europe would unite in an “alliance that spreads from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea,” to counter what it called Euro-Atlantic suppression. 35

Since the Ukrainian crisis, the fate of ethnic Hungarian minorities in Transcarpathia has become a sore spot. Even their number is disputed; the Hungarian government claims there are 200,000, while the last Ukrainian census put their population at 150,000. Orban infuriated other
Eastern European nations by advocating “autonomy,” vaguely defined, for the Transcarpathian Hungarians, while saying that Ukraine’s territorial integrity had been violated by Russia. After a sharp protest from Poland, the Hungarian Foreign Minister on May 14 said Orban was not demanding “territorial” autonomy. Other officials suggested that he meant Hungarian-Ukrainians should have “cultural autonomy,” such as linguistic and other rights.

Some analysts also warn that violent ultra-nationalist campaigning inside Romania for the reunification of Transylvania with Hungary could create tensions between Hungary and Romania, two NATO and E.U. members. Secessionist sentiment is reportedly highest in the region of Szeklerland. Already, an irate Romania has expelled Jobbik leader Gabor Vona, the Hungarian Guard, and the leader of the 64 Counties Youth Movement, but the latter remains which has been active inside Transylvania. Relations with the Orban government are strained, and a spat between two NATO members would only benefit Russia. (See “The 64 Counties Youth Movement,” page 58 Error! Bookmark not defined.) Other analysts dismiss this scenario as far-fetched, arguing that most Hungarians in Romania and Ukraine reject Jobbik and its calls for their autonomy.

These minor machinations are likely to remain just that—unless Ukraine were to break up. Should the pro-Russian east manage to secede, Hungarian extremists would likely redouble their efforts to bring the ethnic Hungarian regions of western Ukraine under their “protection.”

**Greece**

Beyond a natural revulsion at seeing Golden Dawn’s barbarism in the birthplace of democracy, the United States has a strategic interest in seeing its old friend and ally remain a strong and rights-respecting democracy that can stand up to extremist violence of all stripes.

Greece has punched above its weight for millennia. Greek partisans played a critical role in winning World War II for the Allies by putting up a fierce resistance to the Nazi invasion, and paid dearly for their liberation. After a brutal civil war, Greece joined NATO in 1952. It withdrew from NATO’s command structure from 1974 to 1980 following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The United States supported Greece’s military dictatorship from 1967-74, a decision that triggered anti-Americanism and for which President Bill Clinton later expressed regret. Greek forces have participated in counterterrorism, counter-piracy, and NATO operations worldwide, including in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and most recently, Libya. Athens has extended hospitality and a safe haven to Americans caught up in regional unrest, most recently during the crisis in Egypt.

Greece’s strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the center of a region that stretches from the Balkans to North Africa, near Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Libya, makes it a crucial NATO ally in an increasingly volatile region. Greece hosts a U.S. Naval support base at Souda Bay on the island of Crete. It is also a vital link on the Trans Adriatic Pipeline being built to bring natural gas from the Caspian Sea through Greece and on to Europe. The current Samaras government, as well as the majority of the Greek population, sees Greece with its 11 million citizens as an integral part of the E.U. and NATO. Golden Dawn and its sympathizers are campaigning hard to undercut popular support for these alliances.
The Cypriot branch of Golden Dawn is also small but problematic. It received less than 3 percent of the vote in the latest elections but is determined to prevent a peace deal between the Cypriot Greeks and Turks, a high priority for the U.S. government. Vice President Biden visited the island in May to encourage negotiations. A political solution to the long-running Cyprus problem could pave the way for better relations between Greece and Turkey, both vital NATO members, and smooth plans for exploitation of the vast hydrocarbons in the eastern Mediterranean. A pipeline through Cyprus to Turkey and on to Europe would also reduce dependence on Russian gas.

Golden Dawn’s Cypriot chapter, the National People’s Front (ELAM), is virulently anti-Turkish and opposed to the federation plans supported by the Cypriot Greek and Turkish leaders. A senior Cypriot Turkish leader in Washington, Ahmet Erdengiz, noted that ELAM is believed responsible for attacks on Turkish Cypriots and migrants. He warned that “it is critical that Western governments, including the United States, ensure that ELAM and like-minded groups not be allowed to sabotage the quest for peace in Cyprus.”

The Russian Connection

In the aftermath of the 2014 elections, political analysts have noted that the majority of the far-right parties that won seats in the E.P. are pro-Russian. Notable exceptions are Finland and Latvia, which are virulently anti-Russian. (In Ukraine, which is not an E.U. member, the ultra-nationalists are also anti-Russian but collapsed in the May 25 presidential election, winning only 0.7 percent of the vote.)
An analysis by Hungarian think tank Political Capital, “The Russian Connection”\(^4\) indicates that the majority of European far-right parties are committed allies of Russia, while a large number are neutral. Most of the left-wing parties have pro-Russian stances as well. This represents a sharp about-face for European right-wing parties, which had always been staunchly anti-Communist and saw Soviet Russia as the primary threat. They now find common ground with Russian President Vladimir Putin as a strong, nationalist leader who defends Christianity and stands up to the West both economically and in terms of traditional social values, including opposing abortion and same-sex marriage.

Generally, analyses of the pro-Russian tilt of the far-right parties take place under the auspices of national security discussions, not the human rights agenda. At this moment, however, Putin is not only in conflict with the United States and the European Union over Russia’s...
intervention in Ukraine. He is also, increasingly, a role model for other authoritarian nations in showing how to suppress human rights and democratic freedoms, control the media, suppress and jail political opponents, crack down on NGOs, and claim to have legitimate electoral support for these policies.

While denouncing antisemitism within the nationalist movement in Ukraine, Russia has turned a blind eye to the antisemitism among its own allies and in the quasi-governmental “Nashi” youth group. It has encouraged friendly relations with the openly antisemitic Jobbik and Golden Dawn parties, as well as a wide range of other parties with more covertly antisemitic views.

Under Putin’s Eurasian Doctrine, Russia has also had a policy of organizing conferences of far-right parties and friendly NGOs. In November, 2013, for example, the Golden Dawn spokesman Ilias Kasidiaris joined the British National Party’s Nick Griffin, then a member of the European Parliament, and Roberto Fiore, the head of the Italian far-right New Force Party, on a visit to Moscow where they held a joint news conference. New Force shares with Golden Dawn and Jobbik the position that Italy should withdraw from the European Union.

Other top Golden Dawn and Jobbik leaders have also visited Moscow, where they have been received by Alexander Dugin, the extreme nationalist ideologue who has developed the Eurasian Doctrine and reportedly has the ear of Putin. Dugin has advocated a Russian-led Europe “from Lisbon to Vladivostok.” In 2013, Jobbik leader Gabor Vona delivered a lecture at Lomonosov University at the invitation of Dugin. Vona also met with the speaker of the Russian Parliament, whom Dugin was advising, as well as the chairman and the deputy of the energy policy committee. According to Jobbik, Vona “referred to America as the deformed offspring of Europe, and the E.U. as the traitor of our continent,” whereas Russia “preserves its traditions and does not follow the culture of money and the masses.” One website linked to Golden Dawn reported that Dugin had even sent a letter to Golden Dawn leader Michaloliakos in prison. In Bulgaria, the far-right antisemitic Ataka party also reportedly had close links and alleged funding from Russia, even while Moscow was decrying antisemitism in Ukraine.

Recent events have persuaded some analysts that Russian diplomacy specifically aims to develop far-right parties to undermine the European Union and NATO from within. Mitchell A. Orenstein, for example, argued that “in the European Union, [Putin] hopes that his backing of fringe parties will destabilize his foes and install in Brussels politicians who will be focused on dismantling the E.U. rather than enlarging it.” If this was Putin’s goal, the results of the European Parliamentary elections can be viewed as a victory for Moscow.

Romania and Moldova are clearly concerned, as evidenced by their decision in May to join Ukraine in refusing an airplane carrying Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin to pass through Romanian air space. This followed Rogozin’s visit to Tirasol, the capital of the Transdniester region, which wants to break away from Moldova and reunite with Russia. Russia’s Moldova policy, as well as its actions in Ukraine, have raised concerns that Moscow could stir up ethnic animosities and secessionist sentiment elsewhere in the ethnic patchwork quilt of Eastern Europe.
Economic Factors: It Isn’t Just About Money

The rising popularity of far-right political parties in Europe is certainly in part due to the economic crisis, the collapse of living standards, austerity policies seen as imposed from abroad, high unemployment, and lack of hope. Greece has suffered by far the most economic hardship, Hungary less than some others. In Greece, the unemployment rate hit an all-time high of 27.8 percent in July 2014—even higher than the U.S. unemployment rate of 25 percent in 1933, at the peak of the Great Depression.50

However, in Greece and Hungary, at least, there were other potent factors that allowed Golden Dawn and Jobbik to crash into mainstream politics—including the behavior of the ruling parties, New Democracy in Greece and Fidesz in Hungary. An exclusive focus on economic causes feeds the implicit assumption that as economies improve, extremism will fade. But this is not guaranteed.

As the three graphs below indicate, the presumed correlation between economic hardship and support for the far-right party does not hold true everywhere and certainly should not be mistaken for causation. Only in Greece do the data support a causal link.

Graph 1
Graph 2

Greece Economy and Golden Dawn Support

Graph 3

Hungary Economy and Jobbik Support
In Hungary and Greece, fringe neo-Nazi movements long predated the European economic crisis, gaining followers by portraying themselves as the unrepentant heirs to proud nationalist and irredentist traditions. But they drew less than one percent of the vote. Jobbik and Golden Dawn adroitly positioned themselves to benefit from the economic crisis, but neither has advanced serious policies for creating jobs or boosting economic growth.

Jobbik used the crisis to pursue its anti-Roma agenda while Golden Dawn seized on it as an excuse to drive out migrants who were “taking Greek jobs” out of the country. Both charged that their corrupt Western lackey governments could not or would not protect ordinary citizens, and that only they had the strength to fight the system and defend the interests of their nations against predatory foreign powers, including Jewish banks and Zionist cabals. Voters continued to back Golden Dawn and Jobbik long after their ideologies had been covered extensively in the mass media. Some analysts said voters either wanted radical change, or intended to punish the ruling parties. In Greece, the journalist Dimitris Psarras wrote, “The entire political system has collapsed. The group of citizens supporting Golden Dawn just wants revenge.”

The financial crisis has certainly helped Jobbik and Fidesz and hurt the left. However, Hungary has long suffered relatively high poverty rates, particularly in rural and Romani areas, both before and after it joined the European Union in 1994. After the financial crisis of 2008, the country has suffered two recessions, GDP has dropped, and unemployment soared. In the April, 2014 elections for the national Parliament, Jobbik did particularly well in the country’s stricken northeast, which has the lowest per-capital GDP and the highest unemployment rate—and a youth unemployment rate that hit 36 percent in 2012. Jobbik gained up to 30 percent over its 2012 vote in some areas. But in some districts in the depressed southwest of the country, Jobbik lost to the leftist alliance and came in third. Regional analysis showed a wide range of voting patterns and except in the northeast, unemployment was not correlated with support for Jobbik.

For many reasons, it would be dangerous to assume that the extremist parties will fade away as the economy improves. We simply do not know enough to make such predictions. If anything, this report finds that the hate parties have put down deep taproots that will make them more difficult than ever to eradicate.

**Conclusion: The United States Needs a Strategy**

Fears of surging neo-Nazi parties whose armies will march across Europe like Hitler’s hordes are overwrought. In Greece and Hungary, it is highly unlikely—though not impossible—that Jobbik or Golden Dawn could take power. There is, however, a real and present danger that the strength of these parties will continue to undermine human rights and rule of law at home; encourage pandering to far-right voters by center-right politicians aiming to compete for the far-right vote; and undermine the cohesion and the fundamental values of the European Union. Antisemitism can spread. Democracy can falter.

Strong ultra-nationalist movements at home would make it more difficult for Greece and Hungary to be friendlier neighbors to Turkey and Ukraine, or stronger bilateral partners for the United States. The more Eurosceptic the Greek and Hungarian publics, the less able their
governments are to play a positive role within the European Union or abroad, including in E.U. human rights programs, peacekeeping missions, and development efforts around the world.

The rise of fascist parties also poses a threat to the economic recovery of Greece and Hungary. Corruption and ineffectual government deter investment; but so does the specter of mobs waving swastika flags. Much was written during the economic crisis about the “contagion effect” of financial market fears hopping from country to country, or the so-called “butterfly effect” in the global financial system, by which the breeze from a butterfly’s wings in one nation could destabilize the finances of another nation thousands of miles away. It was only three years ago that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Council (E.C.) deemed Greece and Hungary to be such butterflies, and authorized multi-billion dollar stabilization packages.

Just as both countries are seen as too big to fail financially, so are they too important to be allowed to fail politically. The European Union cannot tolerate black holes for human rights inside its own territory. Yet Hungary is sliding away from democracy, and Greece is suffering an acute crisis of governance, human rights, and the rule of law.

For the Obama administration, it is no longer prudent to view the deteriorating conditions in Greece and Hungary to be an E.U. problem. It’s an American problem, too. History teaches us that wounded or humiliated nations are dangerous nations, that hatred unleashed causes violence that spills across borders, and that in the age of the Internet, small groups can now exercise disproportionate political influence. In the case of Golden Dawn, this is a low-probability scenario, but one that poses high risks to regional peace and stability in a flammable neighborhood. As this report documents, there are already grounds for concern about the possible destabilizing effects that ultra-nationalists could have beyond their borders—in Ukraine, Romania, Cyprus, and Turkey.

Particularly at a time when the United States is faced with multiple foreign crises and a range of demands on its diplomacy and resources, it must tend to its base: its democratic allies in Europe. Most of all, it must support core allies—the demoralized Greek and Hungarian politicians and civil society activists and intellectuals who are fighting back against the forces they see undermining democracy and respect for human rights in their societies. The most prudent and cost-effective U.S. response lies in nurturing its ties with Greece and assisting it in efforts to prosecute Golden Dawn and strengthen Greek institutions. In Hungary, the United States must step up its efforts to turn back Orban’s anti-democratic policies, even at the risk of provoking the prickly Orban to limit cooperation with NATO.

Above all, the United States should not repeat the mistake made by the Greek and Hungarian governments in underestimating the malevolence, popular appeal, and staying power of the neo-fascist movements. Instead, it should use its old relationships to support the European Union and the national governments in taking stronger measures to protect human rights and the rule of law on its territory; and cultivating new ties with individuals and groups that are active in combatting hateful ideologies, discrimination, and violence in their own communities.
5. Hungary

Jobbik: Bad and On the Rise

Origins of Jobbik

Jobbik was founded in 2003 by Gábor Vona, the son of a staunchly anti-Communist rural farming family. Jobbik began as a conservative Christian group at the ELTE University in Budapest. The group became known as the “Movement for a Better Hungary.” The party was considered politically insignificant, winning just 2.2 percent in the 2006 elections.

Jobbik, and the extremist movements to the right of Jobbik, are the heirs to many earlier right-wing Hungarian movements, including those that had allied themselves with Hitler’s Nazi Party prior to World War II. It revitalized latent hostility toward Jews, Roma, and homosexuals, all of whom were targeted by the Nazis, and added new targets of hatred—including Israel, Muslims, and Western-leaning socialists. And it began to organize grass-roots activists willing to act on those hatreds.

Vona himself is seen as a charismatic figure who casts himself as a defender of Hungary’s traditions and territory against predatory foreigners. Unlike many other right-wing European leaders, who are virulently anti-Islam, Vona has written favorably about Islam and made common cause with Palestinians because of his hatred for Israel.

The Hungarian Guard and its Successors

In August, 2007 Vona founded the Hungarian Guard, a paramilitary organization, in order to recruit members to Jobbik and boost its popularity. The Hungarian Guard staged mass demonstrations in Budapest—3,000 people reportedly attended its first swearing-in ceremony. Its jack-booted members wore uniforms similar to those of the Arrow Cross, a Hungarian fascist party that ruled the country at the end of the Second World War and collaborated with the Nazis in rounding up Hungarian Jews for deportation to death camps from 1944-45. (In all, about 585,000 Jews perished in the Hungarian Holocaust. The Arrow Cross leader, Ferenc Szálasi, was appointed by Hitler during the last months of occupation. Under his rule, as many as 80,000 Jews were deported to death camps and about 20,000 were marched to the banks of the Danube and shot. Their deaths are commemorated by an installation of shoes along the riverbank in Budapest.

After the war, Szálasi was tried and executed by Hungary for crimes against the state. His Arrow Cross flag and emblem are now banned. But the red-and-white striped “Arpad” flag, a medieval flag revived by the Arrow Cross, and
WE’RE NOT NAZIS, BUT…

a very similar green emblem, are now used by the Hungarian Guard and other neofascist groups.61

The Hungarian Guard began to hold regular marches through Roma neighborhoods that terrorized the local population, often ending in rock-throwing and violence. In 2008, three of Jobbik’s top leaders resigned from the party to protest the Guard’s activities.

After more than a year, the Hungarian Guard was declared illegal by a Budapest court in July 2009, on the grounds that its goal had been to spread fear among the Roma population.62 The judge also concluded that the group was antisemitic, based on a Guard spokesman’s description of Jews as “Zionist rats,”63 and noted that its violations of minority rights ran counter to the Hungary’s Constitution and its international obligations.

Members of the Arrow Cross Party Arresting Jews, 1944.64

The court decision to outlaw the Hungarian Guard did not put an end to public manifestations of aggressive neo-Nazi behavior. Instead, the extremists reshuffled and renamed themselves, and continued to parade under new names, including the “New Hungarian Guard.”65 The government went back to court again, and in April, 2011, it won a second judgment from the Court of Szaravas that the old Guard was identical to the new Guard.66 The Court sentenced one of its leaders to one year probation for ‘abusing the right of association’.

As early as 2007, however, the German Der Spiegel magazine remarked that Orban’s Fidesz Party, then the opposition party, did not condemn the Hungarian Guard’s activities. The magazine reported that that “the failure of the biggest center-right party, Fidesz, to condemn
Hungarian Guard has led to charges that it tacitly supports the extreme-right.\textsuperscript{67} Similar accusations were made repeatedly in the following years.

Meanwhile, a group calling itself the “Civil Guard Association for a Better Future,” and other militias continued to intimidate and abuse the local Roma population, notably during a 16-day “occupation” of the village of Gyongyospata\textsuperscript{68} in 2011. One woman carrying a two-year-old girl in her arms was reportedly threatened with an ax by a known far-right activist who boasted of his exploits on the Internet. The police refused to investigate a racist motive for the crime and did not pursue the case.\textsuperscript{69}

The ordeal of the Roma villagers was covered extensively in the international media, prompting an Easter weekend evacuation of about 300 Roma citizens by the Hungarian Red Cross and an American, Richard Field. Only after this embarrassing incident did the local police arrest the leader of the right-wing Hungarian National Defense Association\textsuperscript{70} militia group.

Field said he had spoken to a number of families, including one whose attempt to purchase a house outside the Roma ghetto “had inspired Jobbik chairman Gabor Vona to invite the banned [Hungarian Guard’s] successor organization to occupy Gyongyospata on the pretext of protecting its 2,800 inhabitants from “Gypsy crime.”\textsuperscript{71}

Field also criticized a committee of the Hungarian Parliament that had formed to investigate the incident, including Field’s role in “falsely portraying Hungary as being in a state of civil war” and “providing false information portraying Hungary in a negative light.” In a letter to the Budapest Times, he wrote:

“It seems the Hungarian parliament is not interested why local police allowed uniformed vigilante guardsmen and members of various radical hate groups to terrorize Gyongyospata’s Roma inhabitants for 16 days in March, or why they failed to enforce existing statutes prohibiting threatening behavior and violence against members of communities, or why it was necessary for several young men to end up in [the] hospital before the government put a stop to attacks on Roma communities.”\textsuperscript{72}

Similar anti-Roma demonstrations were held elsewhere in the country. In 2012 in the town of Devecser, where a fight between Roma and other villagers had broken out, rightists massed to “defend” the villagers against the Roma. Jobbik, “the official organizing force behind the event, included in the event well-known violent extremist organizations and paramilitaries.”\textsuperscript{73} Three Jobbik MPs attended.\textsuperscript{74} Following anti-Roma speeches, the marchers proceeded to Roma houses and shouted such slogans as “You are going to die here!”\textsuperscript{75} Stones were thrown, but no one was injured. Videos of parts of the events were posted on radical-right websites. Police did not intervene. (For more about the police response to hate crimes, see page 60.)
Jobbik Rises to National and European Parliaments

Jobbik’s vote rose ten-fold from 2006 to 2014. Its popularity continued to rise as Jobbik lawmakers in the Hungarian Parliament and the European Parliament used media coverage and their own communications to report to the public on their activities.

The party was openly friendly to Russia and Iran, and used its websites to advertise those relations. Prior to the 2010 elections, a former Hungarian ambassador to NATO and the United States, Andras Simonyi, declared that Vona “maintained a close relationship” with then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Vona announced before the 2009 E.P. elections that he would invite Iranian observers to the Hungarian election to assure orderly contact. Iran stayed home, but Jobbik members were known to visit its embassy in Budapest and hold party events at an Iranian-owned restaurant in Budapest. There have been persistent reports that Iran provided funds to help Jobbik prior to the 2010 election because of its support for antisemitic parties, but these have never been proven. However, Jobbik has developed a sister-city program with Iran and welcomed economic delegations from Iran to promote investment, particularly in cities where Jobbik holds the mayor’s position.

TABLE: Election Results for the Hungarian Parliament and for the European Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th># of overall votes</th>
<th>% of overall votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>119,007</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>855,436</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,020,476</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>% of votes received</th>
<th>% of seats in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)</td>
<td>43.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fidesz-Hungarian Civil Union (KDNP)</td>
<td>42.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)</td>
<td>6.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Fidesz-Hungarian Civil Union (KDNP)</td>
<td>52.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)</td>
<td>19.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)</td>
<td>16.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Fidesz-Hungarian Civil Union (KDNP)</td>
<td>44.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unity (MSZP-EGYUTT-DK-PM-MLP)</td>
<td>25.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)</td>
<td>20.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Factors Leading to Jobbik’s Rise: Organization, Ideology, Identity

A number of other factors in addition to the economy that led to Jobbik’s rise must be taken into account in formulating a strategy to protect human rights in Hungary.

Financial Factors

The economic crisis certainly was a key driver in Jobbik’s popularity, but it is not sufficient to explain Jobbik’s rise. (See "Economic Factors: It Isn’t Just About Money" on page 35.) Both Fidesz and Jobbik have benefited politically from the bad economy.

Hungary has long suffered relatively high poverty rates, particularly in rural and Romani areas, both before and after it joined the European Union in 1994. After the financial crisis of 2008, the country has suffered two recessions, GDP has dropped, and unemployment has soared. The percentage of Hungarians who said they were "strongly dissatisfied with the government’s performance" rose from 13 percent in 2010 to 24 percent by early 2013. 80

CHART: Hungary Youth Unemployment, GDP, and Jobbik Support 81

In the April, 2014 elections for the national Parliament, Jobbik did particularly well in the country’s stricken northeast, which has the lowest per-capita GDP and the highest unemployment rate in Hungary. Jobbik gained up to 30 percent over its 2012 vote in some areas. But in some districts in the depressed southwest of the country, Jobbik lost to the leftist alliance and came in third. Regional analysis showed a wide range of voting patterns 82 and except in the northeast, unemployment was not correlated with support for Jobbik. On the contrary, Jobbik’s Facebook fans, a majority of whom were young men, were more likely to be employed than their peers. In a 2012 survey, only 10 percent of male Facebook fans were unemployed, 83 compared with an
overall youth unemployment rate that hit 36 percent that year. The party’s popularity has since risen even as the youth unemployment rate has declined somewhat.

As outlined below, several other important factors propelled Jobbik’s rise. Therefore, economic growth alone without tackling corruption, crime, and national pride is not likely to take the wind out of Jobbik’s sails.

Jobbik was founded in 2003, five years before the European financial crisis. Its agenda was primarily to oppose socialism and Communism, impose law and order, and uphold Hungary’s honor, including by getting back territories it lost after World War I. When Vona’s radical paramilitary, the Hungarian Guard, swore in its first 56 members in August, 2007 in Buda Castle the country’s GDP was rising and unemployment was up less than 2 percent over 2005 levels. The European financial crisis did not engulf Hungary until fall of 2008. In October, 2008 Hungary received a $25 billion stabilization package from the European Central Bank (ECB), IMF, and the World Bank and introduced austerity measures that would lead to the ouster of the Socialist government. Orban also enforced austerity measures, including new taxes and cuts to public services, which kept Hungary in the good graces of Germany and other European lenders. Recently the country has been able to float bonds to cover its debt, and the IMF now reports that Hungary’s economy is growing again. Economists are pessimistic that the Hungarian economy will begin creating many jobs anytime soon, but that does not necessarily mean that some of the young Jobbik voters could not easily decide to shift their votes elsewhere.

**Jobbik as Corruption Fighter**

One of the largest factors in Jobbik’s appeal is its emphasis on corruption. Jobbik argues that the effects of the economic crisis have been “greatly magnified... by the workings of a politics that has been both nefarious and corrupt.” It has held anti-corruption demonstrations against the Fidesz government, and insists that it is the only party defending the interest of the working Hungarian against the elite.

**Collapse of the Left**

Second, Jobbik’s rise from 2006-2010 was also based on profound voter disenchantment with how the ruling Socialists had handled the economic crisis. Approval ratings for the social democratic MSZP Party plummeted from 43 percent to 19 percent after it suffered a string of corruption scandals and agreed to austerity measures that violated its election promises. This represented a stunning collapse for the left, which had played a leading role in Hungarian politics since 1989. An analysis of Hungarian extremism by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung concluded that Hungarian society in general was shifting toward the right, but that “the sector of the electorate hardest hit by the austerity measures turned to the extreme right.”

As one politician said, “If there were a good democratic opposition, Jobbik wouldn’t stand a chance.”

**Superior Grassroots Organization and Use of Social Media**

Third, Jobbik has developed a grassroots organizational structure that continues to attract adherents. Though it received just 2.2 percent of the vote in its first election in 2006, it already
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had at least 52 branches nationwide. According to a former Jobbik member, the Hungarian Guard was a “recruiting tool” that drew in thousands of followers who were then channeled into the Jobbik Party. Jobbik headed into the 2010 elections with 800 branches, and won 16 percent of the vote. By 2014, the number of branches was estimated at 1,000–1,100, and Jobbik won nearly 21 percent, although it failed to win any single electoral district.

Jobbik has also made skillful use of social media to reach out to young voters and condemn mainstream media channels that favor the ruling party. Jobbik was more active on Facebook than any other Hungarian Party, and this also drew recruits to its branches. As voters joined Jobbik and rose in the party ranks, they were gradually introduced to its antisemitic ideology. Members were also indoctrinated by introducing them to far-right websites, including www.kuruc.info. Though reportedly written from Budapest, kuruc.info is hosted on a server in California, and gets more than 50,000 unique daily visitors. This has been a source of contention between the Hungarian government, which maintains it cannot prosecute the site for hate-speech or incitement because it not based in Hungary, and the U.S. government, which has declined to shut down the site on First Amendment grounds. However, in July, 2014 the registered owner of the website, a retired Hungarian winemaker, reportedly fled California for Canada to escape the FBI, which had charged him with threatening a lawyer who had been asking about his website.

**Ideology Offers Identity**

Fourth, Jobbik’s far-right ideology appeals to a wider spectrum of voters than those suffering from austerity policies. A study by Demos UK and Political Capital of 2,000 Jobbik Facebook supporters found that they did not fit the stereotype of the “losers of the transition,” the undereducated and unemployed. Instead, they were predominantly college-educated males under age 30, motivated by “a desire to protect identity, ideological and cultural considerations rather than economic ones.” Jobbik has used university student governments as a particularly effective recruiting tool.

Jobbik has also attracted some former Fidesz supporters. Some are drawn to Jobbik’s antisemitic message; others have become disgusted with what they see as widespread corruption in a self-serving elite. Still others agree with the “Hungary for Hungarians” theme that has had broad appeal in other E.U. nations.

Like other extremist groups, Jobbik offers party members an identity and social group for recruits who “just want to belong,” as one former member put it. They can enter a world of right-wing rock bands, tattoos, clothing, symbols, and an antiestablishment subculture—a phenomenon widely reported throughout Europe. Some Jobbik members have drifted even further right into more radical groups.
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Antisemitic, Anti-Roma, Homophobic

“We have an internal problem that is Gypsy crime and an external threat—the Jewish invasion.”

—Jozsef Inancsi, leader of the Hungarian Guard, May, 2013

During the Soviet domination of Hungary from 1945-89, expressions of antisemitism were supposed to be outlawed. In fact, Jewish Hungarians were at times persecuted. Political antisemitism reemerged with a vengeance in 1993, with the rise of the far-right Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP). MIEP peaked in 1998 with five percent of the vote. Jobbik is its chief successor as the representative of an increasingly radical Hungarian right. However, Jobbik is by no means the only party that harbors anti-Semites, homophobes or Roma-haters.

Jobbik’s Antisemitism

Jobbik’s overt antisemitism is shocking both in its pure racist Nazi rhetoric and the antisemitic myths spread by its leaders. They skillfully comeling ancient canards about Jews and hatred of Israel with post-financial crisis anxieties. They whip up fears of “international” (i.e. Jewish) bankers destroying the Hungarian economy, foreigners buying up land, and Israel “colonizing” Hungary. They have also made virulently antisemitic statements on the floor of Parliament. Jobbik officials, not its street supporters, made all the following statements, which were all widely reported in the Hungarian media. However, despite—or because of—their remarks, these officials were reelected in 2014:

"Now is the time to finally say: Israeli occupation is ongoing in our homeland. This is a fact, for evidence we need only to think about the overwhelming dominance of Israeli capital investments, property developments in Hungary. And the Gypsy people are a biological weapon of this [Israeli occupation]. They use them as tools against the Hungarian people."

—Eniko Hegedus, Jobbik Member of Parliament, May, 2011

"The Israeli conquerors, these investors, should look for another country in the world for themselves, because Hungary is not for sale."97

—Gabor Vona, Jobbik President, May 2013

"I think now is the time to assess...how many people of Jewish origin there are here, and especially in the Hungarian parliament and the Hungarian government, who pose a national security risk to Hungary."

—Marton Gyongyosi, M.P. and Leader of Jobbik’s Foreign Policy Cabinet, Nov. 2012

Jobbik members in local government have also made antisemitic statements:
“...The head of the cultural department said Hungary is preparing for two huge commemoration events in 2014: one is about the Hungarian victims, the heroes, who fell in the [Second World] war, the other is the Holoscam... excuse me, Holo—caust... still not working, Holocaust. It was intended, excuse me.”

–Tibor Agoston, Jobbik Member, Debrecen City Council

Jobbik has cultivated a young, fresh image to boost public appeal. It has also sought out non-traditional politicians who put a modern spin on antisemitism or hatred of Roma. One of Jobbik’s stars is MEP Krisztina Morvai, a former human rights lawyer who led the Jobbik ticket in 2010 and was re-elected in May.

A Wikileaks cable allegedly sent by the U.S. Embassy in Budapest describes Morvai:

“Self-confident, sometimes arrogant and occasionally mocking in her responses, Morvai described herself as a lawyer and a ‘human rights activist’ (not your typical fascist or Nazi career.) Anti-international business, anti-globalization, an E.U. skeptic and defender of ‘Hungary for Hungarians’... Dubbed ‘Nazi Barbi’ in the Hungarian press, Morvai, a former Fulbright Scholar comfortable with both high-level discourse and the crudest anti-Semitic rhetoric, is clearly relishing her increasingly potent public profile.”

It is impossible to prove whether Jobbik’s national propaganda efforts have resulted in an increase in antisemitic, anti-Roma, or other bias motivated attacks—in part because Hungarian government does not collect proper hate-crime statistics. Jewish community leaders were unanimous in reporting that physical attacks are rare, but verbal insults and intimidation are on the rise. At the same time, Jewish leaders point out that verbal abuse and harassment is much less of a problem for Jews in Budapest than in other European cities, notably Paris and Berlin.

A number of recent surveys indicate that antisemitic attitudes remain widespread—and are by no means limited to Jobbik supporters. In 2012, as Jobbik’s popularity was rising along with its antisemitic rhetoric, the European Union surveyed Jews to learn whether antisemitism was a problem for them. The survey found that:

- 90 percent of respondents who consider themselves Jewish and who were living in Hungary at the time of the survey consider antisemitism to be “a very big” or a “fairly big” problem.
- 90 percent said antisemitism has increased in the past five years.
- 72 percent consider expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public spaces to be “a very big” or “a fairly big” problem in Hungary.
- 75 percent said that they frequently hear that Jews have too much power in Hungary.
- 59 percent had heard Jews being blamed for the current economic crises.
- 57 percent had heard someone say that Jews have exploited Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes.

A more recent survey documented a rise in antisemitic attitudes among the Hungarian public after Jobbik’s entrance into the Hungarian mainstream and the Parliament. This poll, conducted in
November, 2013 by the Action and Protection Foundation (TEV), a Jewish group in Hungary, found that up to 40 percent of respondents had antisemitic attitudes. Moreover the pollster, Andras Kovacs of the Central European University in Budapest, reported that among those who accepted some antisemitic stereotypes, the proportion of people who displayed open antipathy toward Jewish individuals increased dramatically in 2010, when the xenophobic far-right Jobbik party entered parliament for the first time.

“There is a clear correlation between Jobbik’s entrance and the prevalence of antisemitism in polled populations,” Kovacs said. Kovac concluded that 35-40 percent of the 1,200 people surveyed accepted some antisemitic stereotypes: 7 percent were deemed extremely antisemitic, one-quarter of the sample appeared “devoid of any form of anti-Semitic prejudice,” and the remaining third could not be categorized. A May, 2014 global study by the Anti-Defamation League also found that 41 percent of Hungarians expressed antisemitic attitudes, as determined by an 11-question standardized survey on attitudes toward Jews. While its methodology was criticized by some as exaggerating the degree of antisemitism, in the case of Hungary, the Global 100 Survey findings confirmed the work of many previous pollsters, scholars, and human rights activists.

Polling confirms that antisemitism is most prevalent among Jobbik supporters—but not all Jobbik voters are antisemitic. Kovac’s study deemed about half of Jobbik supporters were deemed antisemitic. Political Capital’s polling found that 28 percent of all Hungarian respondents believed antisemitic conspiracy theories, but among Jobbik supporters, that figure rose to 46 percent.

Desecration of a Jewish cemetery in Hungary. and the graffiti saying, “Stinking Jews!” “HoloLie,” and “There was no Holocaust but there will be!”

Contrary to conventional wisdom, belief in antisemitic conspiracies was more prevalent among affluent Hungarians than the poor. Moreover, there was no correlation between antisemitic attitudes and higher education, and the young were more antisemitic than their elders, indications that “the Hungarian educational system fails to reduce antisemitism,” the study found.

While the persistence of antisemitic attitudes is disturbing, it is the activation and politicization of hatred that is most dangerous—and in that, Jobbik has clearly succeeded.
As with other neo-Nazi groups, Jobbik leaders blame a large and powerful international Jewry that controls the global banking system for many of Hungary’s woes. Its antisemitic themes include blaming Jews for being at the vanguard of the “Israeli capitalist conquest” of Hungary, for exaggerating the Holocaust (referred to as the “Holoscam” or “Holo-lie”), and for supporting socialism, which they see as an ideology that has outlasted Soviet occupation and crippled Hungary for more than two decades after 1989. In far-right Hungarian propaganda, “Liberal” is used as synonym for “Jew.”

In its early years, Jobbik deflected criticism of its overt neo-Nazi rhetoric as being inspired by Hungary’s foreign enemies, including “a Jewish conspiracy to colonize our land and rob our resources,” as the editor of the party magazine Barikad said in 2012.111

During the 2014 election campaign, as Jobbik was attempting to play down its antisemitic image, the party began to portray itself as a victim of Western “political correctness” that inhibits necessary political discourse among ordinary Hungarians who do not necessarily share those values. In a campaign appearance on the outskirts of Budapest in April, 2014, a Jobbik candidate told the crowd that “the worst crime a Hungarian politician can commit nowadays days is telling a Jewish joke.” He was referring to a Socialist politician who had been forced to resign some years earlier after “joking” about the Hungarian victims deported to Auschwitz during an appearance at the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest. The line drew laughs from an audience that included a young man with a Hitler haircut, a military uniform, and a neo-nationalist arm band.112

Jobbik officials have a long track record of claiming they are not antisemitic or neo-Nazi, while continuing to spew hate speech and make threatening statements. These are occasionally followed by apologies, more often by assertions that their remarks had been distorted by international Zionists or their Hungarian lackeys.113

“Have you noticed how all the news reports that refer to, and condemn, Jobbik’s supposed ‘rhetoric’ never actually quote any of it, to let you judge it for yourself?”114

−Jobbik.com

Some Jobbik comments appear deliberately intended to drive Jews away. For example, MEP Krisztina Morvai, a former Fulbright scholar, suggested that “liberal-Bolshevik Zionists” should start thinking about “where to flee and where to hide.”115 Such statements cannot be interpreted as purely rhetorical in Hungary, where 550,000 Jews were killed during the Holocaust, both by the Hungarian authorities and by the occupying Germans, with help from Hungarians. Some 810 Hungarians are recognized as “Righteous” people for protecting Jews.116 But after the 1956 rebellion, many Jews again feared for their lives and fled the country.
Jobbik’s Crusade against the Roma

“We are not racist or Nazi, but there is a problem with the Roma and we need to talk about that.”
—Zoltan Fuzessy, Jobbik Spokesman

“There are national tendencies, there are greatest tragedies, striking Hungarians the widest, the deepest, and this is Gypsy crime... We need to talk about this, about who is killing Hungarian people, who is stealing their wealth, their crops... We need to talk about this, because these are the real problems.”
—Elod Novak, Jobbik Member of Parliament

The Roma are Hungary’s largest minority, making up about 7 percent of the country’s 11 million residents. As is the case elsewhere in Europe, Roma have not been well integrated into Hungarian society, where they face official and private hostility and discrimination in employment, housing, and education. The vast majority lives in poverty—at least half a million people. The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights for Hungary, Laszlo Szekely, noted in his 2012 report that about ten percent of Hungarian villages either “have irreversibly become ghettos of poor Roma people or are becoming so.” In 2011, three-quarters of Romani males between the ages 15-64 were unemployed. The unemployment rate of Romani women has always been even lower, estimated at 84 to 87 percent in 2011.

Negative attitudes about the Roma cut across a wide swath of Hungary’s population and its political leaders. Nevertheless, Jobbik’s leaders have tried to use their political gains to make it more acceptable to express anti-Roma hatred in the public discourse. Beginning with its 2007 pre-election campaign, Jobbik repeatedly used the racist noun “Gypsycrime” to suggest that Roma citizens are genetically prone to becoming criminals. It also ran a campaign ad that said “You want to get rid of parasitism? Then vote for Jobbik!” The ad showed a mosquito under a red “No” circle. Many Jobbik leaders combine anti-Roma and antisemitic rhetoric, or imply that both are non-Hungarians.

Some evidence suggests that Jobbik is having an impact on perceptions by and about Roma. In a study carried out by the official Equal Treatment Authority, 95 percent of Roma in Hungary believed that ethnic discrimination is widespread and has been growing in recent years. In 2011, a survey of attitudes towards Roma in Hungary found that 60 percent of those surveyed shared the view that “the inclination to criminality is in the blood of Gypsies.” Previous surveys that asked the same question, however, showed that public attitudes have barely
improved over the last decades. For example, the percentage of people agreeing that Roma have a genetic predisposition to crime was 64 percent in 1994, dropped as low as 53 percent in 2002, but rebounded to 60 percent in 2008. Moreover, the number of Hungarians who accept school segregation, though low, is rising. The percentage of Hungarians who said that “all gypsy children have the right to attend the same class as non-gypsies” fell from 89 percent in 2002 to 86 percent in 2008 to 82 percent in 2011. As these figures show, no government of any political party has done much to eradicate these old prejudices, but Jobbik has certainly been effective in exploiting them (though seemingly not as effective as it has been in increasing antisemitic sentiment.)

One of Jobbik’s animating ideas is that Hungary must institute work requirements as a condition of receiving social welfare benefits, promising voters that they would make Roma, whom Jobbik have described as “parasites,” “vermin,” and “animals,” work for their benefits. This proposal was later embraced in part by the ruling Fidesz party as a restoration of “traditional values.”

Under the Fidesz government’s 2011 “Renew Hungary Program,” the rules for the unemployed changed. While before, unemployed people were only required to accept jobs that were one grade lower than their current qualification level, under the new law, the unemployed people must accept any job offered by the government labor center in order to receive unemployment benefits. After those benefits expire, “everyone is offered the opportunity of community work and the job-seeker may decide whether to accept it or return to the labor market and try to find a job.”

Community leaders say the recession has wiped out jobs in Roma areas, and any jobs that are being created elsewhere are not given to Roma. In a survey by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2012, 42 percent of the adult Roma who had experienced unemployment in the last five years said that they experienced discrimination because of their background. As a result, many Roma participate in community work programs of dubious value, some of them run by mayors who share Jobbik’s ideology, typically paying below minimum wage. Those receiving state benefits are also required to make their homes available for inspection, a measure obviously devised to address the racist view that Roma homes are unclean.

Roma residents in one town reported that authorities often show up at their homes and make such spot inspections, including of their refrigerators. One woman opened her refrigerator to show that it was chock full of food, noting that she keeps it full at all times, because when Roma refrigerators were found to be empty or lacking fresh meat, their children have been taken away.

Jobbik has consistently denied any involvement in violence against Roma, and this claim is impossible to disprove since the Hungarian government, with a tiny number of exceptions, has systematically failed to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible for hate attacks.
Although Hungary has not kept reliable hate-crime statistics, it is clearly the Roma who are most often targeted for racist violence. In a rare study of hate-crime motivations by the Athena Institute, 48 percent of verified hate-crime cases were found to be motivated by racism, 44 percent by antisemitism, four percent by homophobia, and four percent by both racism and anti-Semitism.

In a spree of attacks in 2008 and 2009, extremists killed six Roma Hungarians, including a 4-year-old boy, and wounded 55 people, almost all of them Roma. In a number of the “Roma Murders” cases, assailants threw Molotov cocktails at Roma homes, and sometimes then shot from close range at the people fleeing the burning house. In 2009, four suspects were arrested. Their trial took two and a half years. NGOs and families of the victims complained that police had botched the investigation and had failed to bring a case against other known conspirators. In August, 2013, four-and-a-half years after the first shooting, four neo-Nazis were convicted. Three were sentenced to life in prison, and the fourth, who drove a getaway car, was sentenced to 13 years in prison. One of the murderers confessed that his intention was to intimidate the entire Roma community.

Hungarian Human Resource Minister Zoltan Balog hailed the verdicts, and acknowledged that the case had been mishandled. “While accepting the fact that we must recognize that the complete truth has not been uncovered, this sentence strengthens my belief that no perpetrators of racist crimes can escape the law in Hungary, and especially savage murderers pay a worthy penalty for their deed,” he said.

None of the Roma citizens interviewed for this report expressed any hope that conditions in Hungary would improve.

**Homophobia**

In 1995, Hungary amended its laws on unmarried couples living together to include same-sex couples. These “registered partnerships” do not have the same legal status as marriage; same-sex couples do not have the right to take each other’s names or adopt children. Jobbik, like the ruling Fidesz Party and other socially conservative parties, opposes expanding LGBT rights, particularly same-sex marriage. Hungary’s new Constitution, which came into force on Jan. 1, 2012, states that:
(1) Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman established by voluntary decision, and the family as the basis of the nation’s survival.

(2) Hungary shall encourage the commitment to have children.\(^{130}\)

Moreover, the constitution explicitly protects citizens against discrimination on the basis of race, gender, disability, language, religion and other categories, but does not mention sexual orientation. This has prompted protests from LGBT Hungarians.\(^{131}\)

However, since it gained seats in Parliament in 2010, Jobbik has attempted to pass much stronger anti-gay laws similar to those in Russia. In 2012, Jobbik M.P. Adam Mirkoczki submitted a bill that would ban “promotion of sexual deviations,” as defined in the broad amalgamation of “homosexuality, trans-sexuality, transvestitism, bisexuality, and pedophile behaviors.”\(^{132}\) The bill called for banning advertising or programs that would present LGBTI behaviors as acceptable, and made promotion of such “disorders of sexual behavior” punishable by up to eight years in prison.\(^{133}\) LGBT Hungarians and their supporters rallied against the law, which ultimately did not pass.

Prior to the 2014 election campaign, a leading liberal website noted that “it is unclear whether at present Jobbik as a party stands by these policies, especially given its recent attempts at a more youth-oriented election campaign.”\(^{134}\)

Budapest’s Pride march had been held for a decade with sporadic protests but no violence, but in 2007, that changed:

“Anti-gay, nationalist protestors—some giving the Nazi salute and screaming homophobic slurs—attacked Pride marchers with eggs, bottles, rocks, and smoke bombs. Eleven Pride participants were beaten, two so badly that they required hospitalization.”\(^{135}\)

Jobbik has consistently opposed Budapest Pride, on the grounds that it was “anti-Hungarian and anti-Christian.” In 2011 and again in 2013, participants leaving the Pride with clothing or flags that identified them as LGBT supporters were also attacked.\(^{136}\)

In 2014, however, Hungarian police were deployed in far greater numbers than the antigay protestors, and succeeded in keeping them apart. Right-wing protestors affiliated with Jobbik and the 64 Counties movement\(^{137}\) shouted homophobic remarks and suggested that homosexuals should be taken to the gas chambers.\(^{138}\) At one point the protestors broke through the lines, but police managed to hold them back, and the marchers proceeded unhindered. However, organizers also asked Pride demonstrators to hide visible gay pride symbols as they left the event to lessen the chances of attack.\(^{139}\)
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Jobbik today

Sanitizing Its Image

During the 2014 election campaigns, the Hungarian media and political analysts were in broad agreement that Jobbik had toned down its antisemitic rhetoric to appeal to voters most concerned with the bad economy, predatory foreign banks and multi-nationals, and political corruption. But covert antisemitic messages hid in plain sight.

One Jobbik advertisement showed a typical Hungarian family around a dinner table laden with a festive turkey. But on the wall hung a map of Greater Hungary—a map that claims the territories lost at Trianon. The bookshelf behind them holds tracts by notoriously antisemitic writers, including Albert Wass and Cecile Tourmay. Nevertheless, Jobbik’s cleaner image was credited with increasing the party’s share of the popular vote.

Gaining official positions

Jobbik is now claiming the official positions that it sees as its due as the winner of 23 seats in the new 199-seat Parliament. Former skinhead Tamas Sneider was elected as one of six deputy speakers of Parliament, with 150 MPs from Orban’s Fidesz Party voting for him and four Fidesz MPs failing to appear for the vote. According to the World Jewish Congress, Sneider had been given a suspended sentence in 1992 for beating up a Romani man. Jobbik’s version of the event was that Sneider had a “brush with the skinhead movement” as a teenager and was unfairly convicted after an altercation with a “gypsy criminal.” He will head the social and family affairs committee of Hungary’s new parliament. Liberals are also outraged that Dora Duro, the wife of Jobbik M.P. Elod Novak, will control the committee on education and culture.
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Convicted of beating a Roma, Tamas Sneider will chair the social and family affairs committee of the Hungarian Parliament.

On the Offensive in Court

Jobbik has also gone on the offensive in court in an attempt to defend its reputation. It sued a respected historian, Laszlo Karsai, for calling it “neo-Nazi” and won that case in 2013. The decision was overturned on an appeal on the grounds that such definitions are made by historians and beyond the writ of the court. Nevertheless, Jobbik sued a TV station this year for calling it a “parliamentary far-right party.” In a stance that raises fresh questions about the chilling effect of the new Hungarian legal media laws on the free media, the government’s new Media Authority and Media Council, a media supervisory body appointed by parliament, both sided with Jobbik. On June 3, the Hungarian Supreme Court also found in favor of Jobbik, concluding that since Jobbik claims it is not a “far-right party,” the TV station was expressing an opinion, which is only permitted during certain times as TV and radio news coverage is required to be impartial.

These cases suggest that the Hungarian Supreme Court is not prepared to uphold universal media freedoms when they conflict with the new Media law, or possibly with the views of the government-controlled Media Authority and Media Council on the definition of impartiality in news coverage. (For more about media freedom, see page 68).

The effect of these mixed decisions has been to prompt new lawsuits, including against lawmakers. For example, Sneider is now suing a Socialist Party rival candidate who protested his ascent to the post of Deputy Speaker on the grounds that he was “fascist and racist.” The best
antidote to hateful speech is more speech; the outcome of this case will be a bellwether for the ability of Hungarians to exercise this right to denounce Jobbik.

Zoltan Mihaly Orosz, mayor of Erpatak.

Controls some Municipalities

Jobbik has steadily built its strength in local offices, and now has ten mayors in various parts of the country. They are trying to put Jobbik’s policies into practice, particularly in regards to “workfare.” One of the most colorful is Zoltan Mihaly Orosz, the mayor of Erpatak, a small, poor town in the northeast. The mayor dresses in mid-19th century clothing and has festooned the town hall with all manner of right-wing symbols, from the Flag of Trianon flying outside Town Hall to maps of Greater Hungary to quotes from Horthy over the front door. The mayor supported Jobbik in the April Parliamentary election, and his government-owned car was decorated with Jobbik elections poster, in apparent violation of Hungarian campaign finance laws. He also used government vehicles to tour the country promoting Jobbik, including going to Budapest to demonstrate against the Pride march, according to the independent news agency Atlatszo. In August, 2014, to protest Israeli actions in Gaza, Orosz staged a public hanging of effigies of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former President Shimon Peres, at which he conflated criticism of Israel with old antisemitic conspiracy theories by declaring himself opposed to “the efforts of Freemason Jews to rule the world.”

The mayor implements several public-work programs, almost exclusively used by the town’s Roma residents who cannot find work elsewhere and are reliant on public benefits. He divides the Roma into “builders” and “destroyers,” and attempts to deal with each appropriately. Those who work growing vegetables or other tasks receive extra wages; those who do not must subsist on the minimum welfare payment. This system has become known in Hungary as “The Erpatak
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Model,” and Jobbik urges other mayors to implement it.” Orosz insists the program is not racist but critics accuse him of running a “micro-dictatorship” including violent intimidation of his foes.

Across Hungary, the number of participants in public work programs has nearly doubled, from 186,000 in 2010 to 311,500 in 2012, but it is ineffective, according to the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights:

“Large-scale as it actually is, this expensive public work system tends to draw resources away from active labour market programmes and state subsidies. As the only solution, people are forced into public work which involves severe conditions and sanctions violating basic rights and dignity and which, in their current form, involve vulnerability, inequitable working conditions and often pointless work, representing a dead-end for most of the people participating in public work. Moreover, Roma are reportedly discriminated when applying for public work and thus are highly affected by the risk of being excluded from social services.”

Jobbik has announced it will run a full slate of candidates across the country in the local elections scheduled for October 12. Early indications suggest that Jobbik may have a range of antisemitic, anti-Roma opponents from various other Hungarian parties.

More Extreme than Jobbik: The Shadow Groups

“Are we going to be firm enough to shoot down a rotten, crappy Jew?”

–Zsolt Tyrityan, leader of the Outlaws Army, August, 2012

Jobbik’s rise to elected office, and hence its more mainstream political status, has opened political space for even more extremist groups to its right. Some operate specifically as movements that are not registered legal entities, so that they cannot be banned. Some of their leaders aspire to be paramilitary groups that train members to “be prepared” to kill Roma and Jews.

These groups include the 64 Counties Movement, the Outlaw’s Army, Pax Hungarica, and the Hungarian National Front. Prior to the 2014 elections a party called Hungarian Dawn—billing itself as the ideological equivalent of Greece’s Golden Dawn—also formed. However, it failed to muster candidates for the election and appears not to be active. Most of these groups see Jobbik as betraying their core ideology by transitioning to mainstream Hungarian politics. In some cases, Jobbik officials give speeches at their summer camps or maintain friendly ties. Jobbik leaders openly state in the press that they maintain operational control over the New Hungarian Guard.

According to Kristof Domina of the Athena Institute, which keeps a database of Hungarian extremist movements at home and abroad, extremist activity has declined overall since the banning of the Hungarian Guard. However, the two remaining groups that pose the greatest threat to human rights are the 64 Counties Youth Movement, because it is attempting to mobilize
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ethnic Hungarian extremism in neighboring countries, including Romania, Serbia, and Croatia; and the Hungarian National Front, which is extremely small but conducts paramilitary training, including for the other groups. The Outlaw’s Army is notable because of its criminal origins and its allegedly close connection to Jobbik. Outlaw’s Army and Pax Hungarica are also reportedly funding themselves by masquerading as NGOs. They appear to be operating with impunity.

These organizations deny any connection to hate crimes or other offenses. “They learned their lesson from the banning of the Hungarian Guard,” Domina said. “These successor organizations …. Are very careful not to be involved [in any criminal activity] as an organization. That doesn’t mean that their supporters are not doing a lot. But they are careful to keep a distance.”

The 64 Counties Youth Movement

The group’s name refers to the 64 counties that made up Hungary in medieval times and includes lands now belonging to Romania, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Ukraine. The group is led by Laszlo Toroczkai, who was also elected mayor of the tiny village of Asothalam in 2013 on the Jobbik ticket. He has been variously banned from Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia for his activities there.154

In Serbia, 64 Counties was reported effective in exploiting the government’s inability to protect the ethnic Hungarian population against hate crimes. It “has solidified its influence in the ethnic Hungarian political scene in Serbia by concentrating its efforts on places of Serb-Hungarian conflicts.” 155

The movement has a sister branch in Moldova. Its Romanian branch is one of at least three radical ethnic Hungarian groups that are also active in the Transylvania area. These are the Hungarian Youth of Transylvania (EMI), which runs a well-attended summer training camp for extremists, attended by senior Jobbik leaders. The Transylvanian chapters of Jobbik (although Jobbik received only 3,000 votes from the region in the April elections) and the antisemitic Szekler Guard156 (Szekely Garda) is reportedly disbanding.

The Hungarian National Front

The National Front was a far-right political party active in Hungary in the 1930s. The revivalist neo-Nazi Hungarian National Front was tiny even before it split in 2012, and is not active in Hungarian politics. However, for the past decade, the group has held paramilitary training on the shooting range of a former Soviet military base outside the city of Gyor in western Hungary.

The group has reportedly trained 50 to 80 Hungarian youth each year. It has also posted its propaganda online in many languages, boasting of the best paramilitary training camps. Trainings are conducted by former police and military officers who were dismissed from their posts due to their ideology. In the summer of 2013, the group held a “military-like weapons training” for its own members and visiting Swedish extremists from Svenska Motstandsrörelsen (the Swedish Resistance Movement).157 The Hungarian National Front is pro-Russian and anti-NATO.
According to the Athena Institute, it has announced that “after a neo-Nazi government is formed, Hungary must be re-armed—including fighter aircraft, armor and air defense systems—from Russian sources to make it resistant to a possible NATO-led invasion.” One of the men convicted in the 2008-2009 Roma serial killings had reportedly attempted to make common cause with Hungarian National Front, but no connection was ever proved.

The group is openly antisemitic and has conducted numerous “aggressive, hostile propaganda campaigns” against the Hungarian Jewish community.\textsuperscript{158} In 2011, it also denounced the visit of the U.S. Ambassador to Gyöngyös and blamed the problems in the village on a “U.S. Government supported conspiracy.”\textsuperscript{159} One of its videos calls the U.S. intervention in Iraq a “Jewish conspiracy” and shows images of a slain American soldier, saying that “Rambos are dealt with.”\textsuperscript{160}

**Pax Hungarica**

One of the few independent Hungarian investigative news organizations, Atlastzo.hu, recently published articles documenting the little-known origins and activities of two lesser-known hate groups, the Pax Hungarica Movement and the Outlaws Army.\textsuperscript{161} Each has legalized itself by taking over an already registered, seemingly unrelated, non-profit organization. Roma and Jews are not permitted to join. Pax Hungarica, which considers itself the ideological heir of the Arrow Cross Party, is one of the conveners of the “Day of Honor,” an international neo-Nazi convention. It organizes book burnings and is reportedly tied to the Gede Brothers Publishing House, whose main objective is the reprinting of anti-Semitic and Nazi propaganda from the interwar period, according to an investigation by Atlastzo.hu. However, Gede Brothers is able to collect public funds through its “foundation,” Atlatszo reported.

**The Outlaws Army**

With only 60 members, the neo-Nazi Outlaws Army\textsuperscript{162} is tiny but advertises its willingness to use violence to achieve its goals, using rhetoric that appears to incite paramilitary groups to acts of racist violence. The Athena Institute reports that its leader, Zsolt Tyirityán, has on several occasions warned his audience “to be prepared to kill members of the Roma and Jewish communities” if they want to survive the coming race war.\textsuperscript{163} Tyirityán also lectured at a training camp about the structure and operations of the IRA, urging Hungarian groups to emulate it. In a call to action captured on videotape, he said, “I ask you to step into the battle not only symbolically, but physically; we shall create a real radical resistance, then form an unbreakable shield to be ready, both mentally, physically and emotionally to pull the trigger of that automatic weapon.”
Hate Violence

Government Hasn’t Adequately Confronted Hate Crimes

The government does not keep comprehensive statistics on hate crime, and one study from several prominent NGOs suggests that the vast majority of hate crimes are unreported in Hungary.\textsuperscript{164} Lack of trust in police is cited as a major cause.\textsuperscript{165}

Nevertheless, the study concluded that the number of hate crimes was increasing,\textsuperscript{166} a finding supported by other NGOs and interviews in Hungary. The E.U.’s Fundamental Rights Agency\textsuperscript{167} concludes that the government response to violent hate crime has been inadequate in several respects. In particular, the police and public prosecutors often fail to investigate and characterize cases of violence as possible hate crimes, even where such circumstances are apparent.\textsuperscript{168} The NGO study concluded that, because of this, “the investigations are conducted, and perpetrators prosecuted for and convicted on charges of less severe crimes.”\textsuperscript{169} In many cases, the perpetrators are never caught at all.

Journalists and human rights groups reported striking police passivity in the town of Devecser in August, 2012 when far-right groups assembled, held a demonstration that included fiery speeches, threw rocks and water bottles at what they thought were Roma houses, and shouted, “You are going to die here.”\textsuperscript{170} One person was injured, as was a Jobbik M.P. who was participating. According to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, which has filed suit on behalf of two Roma victims to the European Court of Human Rights, “The police failed to dissolve the demonstration [although] the speeches incited hatred against Roma citizens and serious crimes were committed by the leaders of the event. Moreover, the police have not intervened at all when several participants seriously insulted verbally the Roma being present and then physically attacked them.”\textsuperscript{171}

The case demonstrates a number of problems with the way police and prosecutors deal—or have not dealt—with hate crimes. First, although it was known that Jobbik was organizing a demonstration\textsuperscript{172} and a large number of right-wing groups showed up at the village where about a third of the 5,000 residents are Roma, the police did not intervene to prevent violence—a pattern repeated elsewhere.

Second, the police frequently do not investigate allegations of hate crimes. In the Devecser case, a court had to order the police to reinvestigate after the two Roma victims filed suit for police inaction. The victims contend that violates their rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Third, Hungarian law provides penalties for incitement to imminent violence, but only Roma defendants have been convicted—for inciting violence against ethnic Hungarians. The law has never been used to punish incitement to violence against Roma.\textsuperscript{173} In the Devecser case, no charges were filed against the speakers at the rally, including Zsolt Tyirityan of the Outlaw Army:

Tyirityan: “What do you think, according to you, are there signs of a racial war in this country?”
WE’RE NOT NAZIS, BUT…

Crowd: “Yes!”

Tyirityan: “According to you, based on race or ethnicity, is there going to be an escalation to a conflict?”

Crowd: “Yes!”

Tyirityan: “So then let’s send a message to them!”

Even though marchers went directly from the rally to throw stones at the Roma houses, the court ruled that the speech had been insufficient to provoke racist violence, according to attorneys. 175

Despite some positive steps, the 2014 NGO hate-crimes study referenced above concluded that the government “has been ineffective in its meager attempts to prosecute hate crimes even as the number and severity of such crimes is widely believed to be increasing.” 176

New Steps to Address Extremist Violence

Despite clear shortcomings, the Hungarian government has taken some steps to address extremist violence. The government has continued to increase the number of Roma in the police force—a critical step. Although overall hiring is down due to austerity, the government has been reaching out to Roma students to encourage them to join the police. 177

The government responded to activities of the Hungarian Guard successor groups and other radicals by introducing a new provision in the criminal code explicitly banning “uniformed marches intended to cultivate fear in communities.” 178 It also imposed fines of $250—a large sum for many Hungarians—for wearing fascist-era uniforms even when the groups were not marching. Domina said that the tactic appears to be working, because “we have seen repeated Facebook campaigns for Guardsmen who need money to pay these fines.” 179 Although many have ceased marching, these groups continue to find other ways to create a climate of fear and fan hostility toward Jews and Roma.

In 2013, the government introduced new rules allowing the police to prevent paramilitary groups from engaging in hate violence. 180 It also told the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that the National Police Headquarters had established a specialized hate-crimes unit with a representative in each county dealing exclusively with hate crimes. 181 The government also adopted a National Crime Prevention Strategy for the next 10 years, and an Action Plan for 2013-2015. However, UNHCR noted that there were no specifics about how the government planned to counter hate crimes so the strategy “remained a problematic issue.”
Orban: Increasingly Problematic U.S. Ally

Retreats from Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law

“I survived two dictatorships. It’s possible that the third one is now on its way.”

– Gyorgy Konrad, renowned writer and Holocaust survivor, October, 2010

Prime Minister Viktor Orban has become a polarizing figure in Hungarian politics as well as an increasingly problematic member of the European Union and ally of the United States. Since 2010, Orban and his Fidesz party have made sweeping changes to the Hungarian constitutional and legal systems. Several of these changes have eroded the rule of law, human rights protections, and checks and balances among government institutions—consolidating ever more power in the hands of the Prime Minister. Moreover, Orban remade many of the independent institutions designed to keep governments accountable in a fully-functioning democracy.

This has put Hungary on a collision course with the European Union over upholding rule of law standards, and the cat-and-mouse game between Orban and the E.U. shows no sign of abating.

From the E.U. perspective, the situation in Hungary has deteriorated enough for the European Commission to create a new mechanism to encourage E.U. member states to better uphold international standards. Hungarian actions have also drawn criticism or censure from the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the OSCE and the United Nations, as well as the United States government.

Orban is known as a staunch anti-Communist who vowed to root out the remnants of socialism he believes remained more than 20 years after the end of the Soviet era. But fellow-dissidents from the struggle against the Soviet Union have turned against him, saying that he is recreating a de-facto one-party state. “Never since the regime change of 1989 when communist dictatorship was crushed has there been such an intense concentration of power in the region as in present-day Hungary,” wrote 13 veterans of the Hungarian democracy and human rights movements of the 1970s and 1980s, in an open letter on January 2, 2012, the day the new Hungarian constitution came into force.

In the 2014 Freedom House rankings of nations in transition, Hungary has deteriorated since 2004, falling sharply since Orban’s election in 2010. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents the highest level of democratic progress, Hungary’s democracy rating fell from 1.96 in 2005 to 2.96 in 2014. The government’s performance declined in each of the seven criteria—electoral process, civil society, national governance, local governance, independent media, judicial independence, and corruption.
Hungarians are voting with their feet: about 500,000 are thought to have left the country in recent years, with 200,000 in London alone. These are generally Hungary’s best-educated, most competitive citizens who can find work elsewhere in the E.U. and are free to move. This trend long preceded the Fidesz government, but the number of emigres to the U.K. appears to have accelerated sharply since 2010, as GDP plummeted and the Fidesz government introduced a range of restrictive measures.

There are also increasing reports of government retaliation against critics—and their families—who have lost their jobs in disproportionate numbers during austerity cutbacks. As part of his political agenda, Orban proudly slashed the public work force and shut down half of Hungary’s semi-governmental agencies, the “kind of institutions that served only to increase the bureaucratic burden on businesses and citizens.” Critics, however, say the civil service cutbacks were implemented in a way that cleaned out opposition loyalists. “Not all austerity is created equal...” writes Princeton University scholar Kim Lane Scheppele. “Since Fidesz came to power, critics of the Hungarian government have been losing their jobs at an astonishing rate.” Private-sector employees, including editors and businessmen who have crossed the government, have also been pushed out:

“Private businesses that sought government contracts were told in a whisper campaign that they had to purge all government opponents from their workforces in order to be eligible contractors. This rule applied to projects funded by the European Union as much as to ones supported by Hungarian taxpayer money.”

Scheppele notes that this sort of politicking is not a human rights violation, but it has created a broad chilling environment for those not in the Fidesz camp.

During the preparation of this report, several interlocutors in Hungary, the United States, and Europe suggested that to focus on the Jobbik threat alone was misguided, asserting that Orban poses a far greater threat to democracy, stability, and human rights in the region.

Retired Yale University historian and Orban critic Eva Balogh described it this way in a post-election analysis: “There is a paper thin line between Jobbik and Fidesz. I know that the western media is preoccupied with the growth of Jobbik, but I think everybody would be better off realizing that the real problem is Fidesz and the system Viktor Orban created. Jobbik will be in opposition, but Viktor Orban, who often carries the Jobbik banner, has practically unlimited power. He is the much greater danger, not [Jobbik leader] Gábor Vona.”

Sweeping Changes to the Constitution and a Major Legal Overhaul

Fidesz argued that the previous Hungarian Constitution was outdated, drafted in 1989 just after the country gained independence from Soviet dominance but before it had become a market economy. When criticized by the United States and Europe, the government retorted that it was elected to do the people’s bidding—twice, by large margins—and thus had a mandate to rewrite the constitution to build a stronger Hungary.

E.U. officials rejected the argument that winning a supermajority enables an E.U. member to change its constitution by means or in ways that undermine E.U. norms. They encouraged Hungary to submit its constitutional revisions and other important laws to the Venice Commission,
an expert legal body that advises the Council of Europe, which between 2011 and 2013 issued a series of negative legal opinions on the revisions to the Hungarian constitution and laws. The European Commission held discussions with the Hungarian government and instituted infringement proceedings in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against Hungary for violation of its obligations under E.U. law. Cases against Hungary were also filed at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR.)

The Hungarian government protested at every stage. It made some changes in response to criticism and court judgments, but in almost every case, the changes made in response did not address all of the issues raised.

In June, 2013 the European Parliament accepted a devastating report on Hungary, written by Rui Tavares, a Portuguese Member of the European Parliament and the E.P.’s rapporteur for the Committee on Civil Liberties. The Tavares Report is a sweeping indictment of Orban’s legal changes, finding them contrary to European values, democracy and the rule of law:

“Following the 2010 general elections in Hungary, the governing majority gained more than two thirds of the seats in parliament, enabling it to rapidly initiate intense legislative activity to reshape the whole constitutional order of the country (the former Constitution has been amended twelve times and the Fundamental Law four times so far) and thus substantially to modify the institutional and legal framework, as well as a number of fundamental aspects of not only public but also private life.”

The Tavares Report became the heart of the E.U.’s complaint against Hungary.

Among the multiple serious issues raised by the Tavares Report, the Venice Commission, and other legal authorities is the pattern of adopting a series of laws, written by Fidesz while the party was in opposition, that appear to be acceptable when viewed individually but that collectively add up to a less democratic whole. (The supplement on page 79 covers a wider range of Hungarian laws identified as problematic by the E.U. and other international bodies.)

**Makes It Easier to Amend the Constitution**

“We have laid down for the future foundations as solid as granite.”

–Prime Minister Viktor Orban, referring to the new constitution when it came into force in January, 2012, and was subsequently amended five times

Under Hungarian election law in place since 1990, a disproportionate number of seats in Parliament are awarded to the winner of an election, under a system designed to help plurality parties form stable governments. When Fidesz won 53 percent of the vote in 2010, the election law converted this victory into 68 percent of the seats in Parliament, giving Fidesz a two-thirds
majority. Under the old constitution, a four-fifths vote of the Parliament was required to initiate drafting a new Constitution.

**TABLE: 2014 OSCE Election Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Votes received</th>
<th>% of Seats in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)</td>
<td>43.20%</td>
<td>48.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fidesz-Hungarian Civil Union (KDNP)</td>
<td>42.00%</td>
<td>42.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)</td>
<td>6.50%</td>
<td>4.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Fidesz-Hungarian Civil Union (KDNP)</td>
<td>52.70%</td>
<td>68.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)</td>
<td>19.30%</td>
<td>15.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)</td>
<td>16.70%</td>
<td>12.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Fidesz-Hungarian Civil Union (KDNP)</td>
<td>44.90%</td>
<td>66.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unity (MSZP-EGYUTT-DK-PM-MLP)</td>
<td>25.60%</td>
<td>19.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)</td>
<td>20.20%</td>
<td>11.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But "one month into its term, Fidesz used its two-thirds vote to amend the constitution to remove the four-fifths requirement." This allowed Fidesz, which had already amended the existing Constitution multiple times, to enact a new Constitution in 2011 without broad political and civil society input and without any votes from the opposition. It then used its super-majority to amend the new constitution five times.

**Rewrites the Election Law to Favor Itself**

The ruling party also used its super-majority to change the electoral system unilaterally, strengthening the winner-take-all provisions of the election law. Critics asserted that the laws and districts were being revised by Fidesz in ways that favored itself, including gerrymandering. Hungary dismissed such allegations, arguing that its system was based on the British system for electoral redistricting. The OSCE in its final election report concluded that the winner-take-all provision for awarded surplus votes in each individual district to the parties resulted in Fidesz and its coalition partner, the Christian-Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), being allocated six additional seats.

The 2014 elections results shown in the chart below demonstrated that the electoral reforms that had enhanced the winner-take-all system greatly helped the ruling party. As the chart below shows, in 2006, Orban lost the parliamentary election with 42 percent of the vote, but still managed to get 42 seats in Parliament. In 2014, he won 67 seats in Parliament having received only 44.9 percent of the vote. Three percentage points made the difference between having a plurality in Parliament and controlling a two-thirds majority that conveys the ability to amend the Constitution at will.
April Election: Free But Not Fair

The April 6, 2014 election was widely considered by many observers to have been free, but not fair, for three main reasons: First, under the election system his party designed, Orban maintained an unassailable two-thirds majority in Parliament despite the fact that his share of the vote decreased by nearly eight percentage points.

Second, the media environment was biased in Orban’s favor. The European Parliament (EP) found the Fourth Amendment to the new constitution “may be used to arbitrarily interfere with freedom of expression and may have a chilling effect on journalists, and also on artists and others.” Independent journalists and media monitors said the chill had set in well before the election.

Third, the ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, who had been given Hungarian citizenship by the Orban government, were allowed to vote by mail and voted overwhelmingly for Orban. However, Hungarian voters in other countries, who voted heavily against Orban, faced multiple obstacles to voting, including a website that malfunctioned and the requirement that voters who were abroad but retained residence in Hungary to appear in person at diplomatic missions in order to vote. The OSCE concluded that this violated the right to equal suffrage. Scheppel calculated that without the voters in neighboring countries—most of whom had never lived in Hungary—Fidesz would have won only 43.5 percent of the vote. Orban later said that without those votes, he would not have held his two-thirds majority.

The OSCE noted that “Political pluralism is undermined by an increasing number of [media] outlets directly or indirectly owned by businesspeople associated with Fidesz and by the allocation of state advertising to these media outlets.” Opposition candidates had trouble putting up their campaign ads on billboards, lamp posts and buses, and had less access to the broadcast media. In the middle of the campaign, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fidesz campaign slogans, “Hungary is performing better,” was identical to the one used by the government a year earlier, in violation of election laws, but the court’s decision was not fully implemented. The OSCE also found that “three out of five monitored TV stations displayed a significant bias towards Fidesz by covering nearly all of its campaign in a positive tone while more than half the coverage of the opposition alliance was in a negative tone.” Moreover, the OSCE final election report concluded:

“The legal framework for these elections was amended substantially in recent years. While some changes were positive, a number of amendments negatively affected the election process, including important checks and balances. The main governing party enjoyed an undue advantage because of restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and campaign activities that blurred the separation between political party and the State.”

Erodes Checks and Balances

The Fourth Amendment to the new Constitution, enacted in 2013, substantially limited the powers of the Constitutional Court to check the power of the government. It restricted the court’s powers to review some budget and spending legislation, personal data protection, religious freedom, and rights related to citizenship. It prohibited the Constitutional Court from reviewing so-called “Fundamental Law” which are laws that have the force of constitutional law and must be passed by a two-thirds vote. The Fourth Amendment also abolished 22 years of Constitutional Court jurisprudence, including on protection of fundamental rights, so that it remains uncertain how Hungary’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights should be understood within the Hungarian legal system.
During this period, the Fidesz supermajority in Parliament also passed a number of detailed, ordinary laws—on such topics as judicial reform, administration of the courts, regulation of privacy and the media—in the form of Fundamental Laws. Doing so insulated these laws from review by the Constitutional Court. The Tavares Report warned that “the extensive use of cardinal laws to set forth very specific and detailed rules undermines the principles of democracy and the rule of law, … making it more difficult for any new future government having only a simple majority in the parliament to respond to social changes, and thus of potentially diminishing the importance of new elections.” The Venice Commission condemned the practice of shielding ordinary law from constitutional review as “a systematic one, which results in a serious and worrisome undermining of the role of the Constitutional Court as the protector of the constitution.”

**Weakens the Judiciary**

Constitutional and other legal changes also concentrated power in the hands of the government by weakening the independence of the judiciary.

For example, Fidesz has made it much easier to appoint sympathetic judges. Under the new system, a single two-thirds vote of the Parliament is sufficient to put a judge on the Constitutional Court, abolishing the multiparty agreement that was once necessary for nomination. The number of judges on the Court was also boosted from 11 to 15, giving Fidesz four more judges to name immediately.

The government also engineered the early retirement of judges, including one quarter of the judges on the Supreme Court, and can now appoint loyalists. This also allowed Fidesz to sack the President of the Supreme Court, who argued that the move was unconstitutional.

In 2011, the government proposed to reorganize the judiciary and lower the mandatory retirement age for judges and prosecutors from 70 to 62. However, it also decided that retirement at age 62 would also be applied retroactively to judicial officials who had already been appointed to longer terms. One of them was the President of the Supreme Court, Andras Baka, whose six-year-term was not set to expire until 2015.

Baka’s job was to comment on the proposal, and he spoke out against it. The rule would force 274 judges to retire by 2012, he said, forcing 40,000 cases to be reassigned. Second, it would confer unprecedented powers on the new National Judicial office, without adequate accountability. And third, Baka argued that the only reason for the government to put the status of judges in the Fundamental Law of Hungary was to make it impossible for the Constitutional Court to review that decision, which “violates the fundamental principles of a democratic state governed by rule of law.” Baka added: “Such an unjustified step insinuates a political motivation.”

Baka’s objections were ignored and he was fired. He filed suit with the European Court of Human Rights. In a June 16, 2014 decision, the court ruled for Baka, saying his dismissal was due to the “criticisms that he had publicly expressed in his professional capacity on the legislative reforms concerned.” However, though Baka and most of his colleagues will receive monetary
damages, the court did not require that Hungary change the law and automatically reinstate them. Some judges have returned to their old positions, but Baka is no longer on the Supreme Court.

**Restricts Religious Freedoms**

The religious freedom issue offers another example of Fidesz’s strategy of making fundamental changes and sticking to them despite European legal authorities or its own Constitutional Court finding that they violate human rights or democratic principles. In 2011, the government changed the Law on Churches to de-register more than 300 religious groups and give Parliament the power to decide which would be permitted to register as churches in Hungary. That decision must be made in each case by a two-thirds vote of Parliament, which essentially gives the majority the arbitrary ability not to grant legal status to a church supported by a minority of the population. The Venice Commission objected in a 2012 opinion, and Hungary’s Constitutional Court struck down parts of the law in 2012 and 2013.

Fidesz’ answer to the Venice Commission and the Constitutional Court was to tinker around the edges, but to re-enact the main point—that Parliament would vote on who could become recognized as a church—as part of the Fundamental Law, thus shielding it from review by the Court. Many religious organizations were eventually able to re-register. However, the new system—which politicizes what was formerly a purely administrative decision—remains in place. In April 2014, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that the system was discriminatory and “a politically-tainted re-registration procedure.”

**Restricts Media Freedom**

Hungary’s new Freedom of Information Act, adopted in July 2011, prompted another long cat-and-mouse game with the European Union, which has not ended well for the Hungarian media. Through a number of regulatory changes, the Hungarian media is now supervised by two bodies, the Media Authority and the Media Council, which have power over content in the broadcast media. Media outlets can be subjected to stiff fines, and there are no safeguards “on the financial and editorial independence of public broadcasters,” according to the Tavares Report.

The Center for International Media Assistance put it this way:

“Hungary’s independent media today faces creeping strangulation. State capture of Hungarian media is unfolding slowly but surely, principally through the “soft censorship” of financial incentives and influence that affect media outlets’ editorial content and economic viability. The process has accelerated under the current government, which uses state advertising to bolster friendly media outlets, mainly those owned by leading businesspeople very close to the ruling party.”

The Media law was revised in 2012, but the revisions did not address some of the major concerns. The OSCE noted numerous problems with the way the media law affected the April, 2014 election campaign, and noted that “Political pluralism is undermined by an increasing
number of outlets directly or indirectly owned by businesspeople associated with Fidesz and by the allocation of state advertising to these media outlets.  

On May 27, 2014, one of Hungary’s top news sites, origo.hu, published an expose of alleged overspending on foreign trips by Janos Lazar, Orbán’s chief Cabinet Secretary and right-hand man. Lazar protested the article but paid back the public funds about $8,700. A week later, the editor who published the piece was out. At least 10 origo.hu journalists resigned, including the author of the Lazar expose. About 1,000 journalists marched to Parliament to protest what they said was political and financial pressure by the government against the media. Lazar denied having anything to do with the editor’s departure.

The origo.hu incident and the introduction of a new tax of up to 40 percent on all advertising revenues touched off allegations that the government was trying to intimidate media owners in less visible ways. Media owners complained that the tax would put some of them out of business, while others suggested that was the government’s intention. The company that is expected to owe the most tax is the German-owned TV channel RTL Klub, which has remained independent of the government and is protesting the tax as a way to muzzle media outlets by threatening their profits, if not their financial survival.

### After Re-election, Cracks Down on NGOs

On June, 2014, the Government Control Office (KEHI) raided three NGOs that are responsible for distributing funding to Hungarian civil society groups under a program called the Norway Grants. These grants are made as part of an agreement between the E.U. and Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein to fund projects in less-developed European countries. According to Reuters, the Norway Grants have financed organizations that have criticized Hungary’s government heavily in recent years. Specifically, the government claimed that the Norway Grants had been doled out to favored individuals and had directly funded a small new left-wing political party “Politics Can Be Different” (LMP), violating Hungary’s ban on foreign financing of election campaigns.

Norway protested, expressing deep concerns about Hungarian government’s attempts to limit freedom of expression. Equally problematic was the revelation that the government was keeping a list of 13 NGOs it deemed to be “left leaning” and “problematic.” According to Reuters, the government said it had no intention of fighting individual NGOs, but charged that the grants sought to exert political influence, an allegation Norway strongly denied. The groups listed included, among others, Transparency International, the Hungarian Helsinki Commission and other organizations that have criticized the government for undermining democratic principles and the rule of law. In late June, KEHI also announced that it would investigate, among others, Transparency International, the K-Monitor, a financial watchdog group, and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union to learn how they had spent the funds. The groups were required to turn over their financial records or face fines.

The case also highlights another weakness in the Hungarian legal system: the inability of groups who claim they were unfairly targeted by KEHI to seek redress. Lawyers for the NGOs said the KEHI investigation appeared to be based on two rules from the National Budget.
Procedure Act interpreted in a sweeping and overbroad fashion. However, attorneys said, the Act contains no provisions for specific legal remedy against arbitrary or abusive actions by KEHI. As a result, neither Norway nor its funding recipients can seek remedy in regular courts for any action that KEHI might take as a result of its investigation, although they may attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the regulation before the Constitutional Court.

Orban defended the government’s actions toward NGOs:

“We are not opposing non-governmental organisations here and it is not non-governmental organisations who are moving against us, but paid political activists who are attempting to enforce foreign interests here in Hungary. This is why it is extremely justified that the Hungarian Parliament has formed a Committee to regularly monitor, record and make public foreign influence so that all of us, including you, can know precisely who the real characters are behind these masks.”

Co-opts Jobbik’s Agenda

“The [Fidesz] party speaks with two tongues. On the one hand, one distances oneself from right-wing extremism in order to maintain a good reputation abroad and because one notes that the political damage would be too severe. On the other hand, Fidesz pays tribute to anti-Semitic writers of the interwar period … or expresses right-wing extremist positions in regime-friendly newspapers because it wants to attract voters on the right.”

—Kristian Ungvary, historian, January 2013

On the question of antisemitism, Fidesz and Jobbik have critical differences: Fidesz is pro-Israel, has relationships with Jewish organizations, and condemns antisemitism. However, one of the most serious charges against Fidesz is that its policies on cultural, social, and economic issues have become similar to Jobbik’s, whether in an attempt to win away Jobbik voters, because the Fidesz conservative agenda is close to Jobbik’s, or because Fidesz uses its radical rival to drum up public support for controversial policies.

A group of political scientists documented the similarities between the measures that Jobbik proposed in its 2010 election campaign (but that were not in Fidesz’s 2010 campaign platform) with the actual measures implemented by the Fidesz government between 2010 and 2012. They found 12 cases in which the Fidesz-led government implemented policies that Jobbik had first articulated. For example:
Jobbik proposed taxes on multinationals, charging that “they use accounting tricks to make profits disappear and take them out of the country.” Fidesz has imposed special taxes on telecommunications, banks, energy providers and media companies, hitting multinationals hard. 237

Jobbik campaigned on making it “obligatory in at least one of the upper years of primary schools for the children to go on a school trip to the Hungarian territories seized from us.” The government launched a program that allows public school students to receive funding for at least one trip to a neighboring country inhabited by Hungarians.

Jobbik proposed to declare the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon a “Day of National Remembrance.” Parliament did so in May 2010, calling it a “day of national unity.”

Jobbik politicians reportedly complain that Fidesz is “stealing their issues.” The prominent writer Gyorgy Dalos told a German magazine that “There are no longer any clear boundaries between the thinking of Fidesz and Jobbik.” 238 Orban has continued to drum up anti-E.U. sentiment inside his party, occasionally using rhetoric reminiscent of Jobbik’s. In a speech delivered in 2013 upon being re-elected leader of Fidesz, Orban said:

“All of you will march against us: Honey-tongued bankers, greedy multinationals, the Brussels bureaucrats serving them and of course their local errand boys.” 239

While it is common in democracies for mainstream political parties to co-opt the ideas of populist competitors, the similarities between the agenda of Jobbik, known for antisemitism and inspiring racist violence, and the programs of an E.U. member government and U.S. ally is cause for concern.

Pursues Revisionist History

In 2012, the Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel returned an award given to him by Hungary in 2004. 240 Born in Transylvania in the region that is now Romania, Wiesel and his family were deported to Auschwitz, where his parents perished. Wiesel returned the award after Laszlo Kover, the Fidesz speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, attended a ceremony honoring notorious Nazi sympathizer, Jozsef Nyiro, who had been an M.P. for the Arrow Cross.

The ceremony was part of a broader effort by the Orban government to rehabilitate Nyiro. It has made his works a part of the Hungarian education curriculum, and made an aborted attempt to rebury Nyiro’s remains in what is now Romania. The reburial ceremony was attended by two government officials, Kover and the Secretary of State for Culture Geza Szocs, as well as Jobbik leader Vona. Official parliamentary funds helped pay for the event.

Wiesel “found it outrageous that the Speaker of the Hungarian National Assembly could participate in a ceremony honoring a Hungarian fascist ideologue,” adding: “Hungarian authorities are encouraging the whitewashing of tragic and criminal episodes in Hungary’s past, namely the wartime Hungarian governments’ involvement in the deportation and murder of hundreds of thousands of its Jewish citizens.” 241
Fails to Discipline its Own

The Hungarian government received a firestorm of international criticism over the Nyiro incident, yet did not criticize the participation of two senior government officials. This has become something of a pattern, in which Orban and other senior Fidesz leaders denounce antisemitic statements by Jobbik, yet fail to discipline Fidesz loyalists for similar statements against Jews, Roma, or LGBT people, or for the whitewashing of prewar Hungarian fascist leaders, antisemitic writers, or Nazi associates.

For example, according to the U.S. Holocaust Museum’s Paul Shapiro, in 2010 the government Fidesz appointed a new official to oversee the Holocaust Memorial and Documentation Center. His first proposal was to delete any mention that Hungary’s prewar Prime Minister Admiral Miklos Horthy was an ally of Adolf Hitler. After a fierce international outcry, the official was replaced, but neither Orban nor Fidesz ever denounced him or his proposal.

In 2013, Orban created a new, state-sponsored institution, the Veritas Historical Research Institute. Even before it began working, retired Yale University historian and Orban critic Eva Balogh questioned the need for such an institution, the motivations for its establishment, and why a group of historians would report directly to Orban’s chief cabinet secretary, Lazar. In 2014, the new director, Sandor Szakaly sparked international criticism for describing the deportation and massacre of up to 18,000 Hungarian Jews almost three years prior to the German occupation as a “police action against aliens.” (Germany, Hungary, and other European countries had stripped Jews of their citizenship.) Jewish community leaders demanded his resignation, and Szakaly apologized, saying he might have been wrong. Hungary’s ambassador to the United Nations formally apologized. But Szakaly retained his post as the director of the Veritas Institute, and gave an interview in July 2014 defending his views.

The failure to denounce reprehensible speech within its own ranks was also seen in January 2013, when Zsolt Bayer, a journalist and founding member of the Fidesz Party, wrote a newspaper column that said:

“The facts are the following: a sizable part of the Gypsies is not fit for coexistence. Not fit to live amongst people. These segments of Gypsies are animals and behave as animals. They want to [have sex with] whomever they see whenever and wherever. Upon meeting resistance, they kill. They defecate wherever and whenever they have the instinct. Upon feeling hindered in this for whatever reason, they kill. They want to have whatever they see. If they don’t get it instantly, they take it and they kill. These segments of Gypsies are incapable of human-like communication. Mostly inarticulate noises spout from their animal skulls and the only thing they understand about this miserable world is violence.”

Bayer was not expelled from Fidesz; the party’s spokesperson said that Bayer wrote the article as a journalist, not as a Fidesz party member. Orban was silent.

Shapiro concluded:
“If there is one thing that the Holocaust teaches above all others, it is that silence empowers the perpetrator, empowers the hater; and when it is the head of government that is silent, silence messages assent and license to proceed.”

Silence was issued again when Imre Kerényi, the personal representative of the prime minister responsible for cultural matters, said at a Christian Theatrical Festival in May, 2014 that the theatrical world should fight against the control of the “[expletive for gay] lobby.” The statements drew criticism from acclaimed artists and politicians but no reaction from Orban or Fidesz. The pattern was repeated again in July, 2014 when Minister Zoltan Balog, a close Orban associate, said that Roma had not been deported to concentration camps from Hungary, only from Austria. Roma leaders immediately produced testimonies by Hungarian Roma Holocaust survivors describing their deportation, and opposition leaders called for Balog’s resignation — without success.

Denounces Antisemitism

Amid an international outcry, in 2013 the Fidesz government began a major effort to denounce antisemitism.

In January 2013, Orban issued a statement to mark the 70th anniversary of the Holocaust in which he declared that “the government protects all citizens of Hungary and condemns all forms of anti-Semitism.” The statement added, “It must never happen again in Hungary that people be humiliated for their origin and religion.”

On April 28, 2014, after protests over a controversial World War II memorial, (See page 74, “Dispute Over Revisionism in a New World War II Victims’ Memorial”) Hungary’s President Janos Ader gave a landmark speech at the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. Ader not only acknowledged Hungarian officials’ collaboration in deporting the Jews, but also mourned their loss to the nation:

“Every third victim in Auschwitz was a Hungarian Jew. Close to half a million of my compatriots died here. Within a few weeks of the German occupation of Hungary they were herded into ghettos with systematic cruelty, then deported here to Auschwitz with the collaboration of the Hungarian state’s administrative bodies. This place is Hungary’s largest cemetery.”

Ader also warned against Holocaust minimization or self-justification:

“Every excuse made, every indulgent, self-justifying gesture may lead to right back to where we are standing now, and may lead to what should never be allowed to happen again.”

In May, Orban made headlines by telling the World Jewish Congress in Budapest that “Hungary has a moral duty to have zero tolerance of anti-Semitism.”

In October, Hungary’s deputy prime minister, Tibor Navracsics, attended a conference on antisemitism where he too said that the Hungarian state had “turned its back against its own
citizens, and indeed took part in their elimination. In June, 2014, Navracsics also unveiled a new memorial in Budapest to Raoul Wallenberg.

At the same time, the Jewish community and other civil society groups were working with the government to revise Hungary’s textbooks, expanding the section on the Holocaust and correcting key parts of the historical record. They urged the government not to proceed with its plans to include in the curriculum writings by authors associated with Hungarian fascism, including Nyiro, Wass, and Dezso Szabo. The outcome will be known this fall when textbooks are expected to be published. Their contents, and the school curriculum, will be scrutinized as a sign of Orban’s commitment to realize his rhetoric.

Dispute Over Revisionism in a New World War II Victims’ Memorial

Protestors against the construction of the World War II memorial, which opened on July 20, 2014. Photo by Bodey Janos / Index.

Even while Orban has been actively denouncing antisemitism, his relationship with the Jewish community has become increasingly strained over what many charge is an officially sponsored campaign of historical revisionism. Prominent historians and members of the Jewish community have said that by rehabilitating major fascist figures of the 1930s and 1940s, accentuating Hungary’s status as a victim of the Nazis, and emphasizing that Hungary “lost its sovereignty” during the Nazi invasion, the government seeks to minimize the role that Hungarians played in the deportation and murder of Jews—both before, during, and after German
occupation. The Jewish community expressed its concerns about historical revisionism in connection with the government’s plans to build a Nazi occupation museum called the “House of Fates,” overseen by Orban’s controversial historical adviser Maria Schmidt. The Yad Vashem center for Holocaust research in Israel announced that it would not take part in building the “House of Fates,” after the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary decided to pull out of that project and other government-sponsored observances of the 70th anniversary of the Holocaust.

The bitterest dispute has erupted over Orban’s plan to build a new World War II monument depicting the archangel Gabriel, symbolizing Hungary, being seized by the imperial German eagle, with an inscription that reads: “Memorial to the Victims of the German Occupation.”

Members of the Jewish community and other victims of the Holocaust said the memorial falsely implies that Hungarians were passive victims of the Nazi occupation rather than active collaborators.

Orban suspended work on the memorial during the run-up to the April, 2014 elections, committing not to move forward without further consultations with the Jewish community. Two days after his re-election victory, and without any further discussions, workers broke ground for the memorial in central Budapest. Large demonstrations ensued and were forcibly dissolved by police. Orban’s decision to proceed with the monument came as a shock to many who had hoped that his statements against antisemitism might also include a willingness to reconsider the statue.

In May, 2014 30 Jewish members of Congress wrote a letter to Orban urging him to abandon the memorial.

“Hungary is an important ally and partner of the United States. But we believe that partners need to speak frankly with one another,” said Rep. Eliot L. Engel (D-New York.) “We think that the Hungarian government should build an appropriate memorial that tells the entire Hungarian story of the Nazi Occupation, not one that whitewashes the truth.”
Orban replied, saying the monument was not intended to be another Holocaust memorial, of which Hungary has many, but a “freedom fighting people’s memorial of the pain of having its liberty crushed” by the German occupation that began in March, 1944. Orban said the monument “reminds us all that the loss of our national sovereignty led to tragic consequences, claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands, and brought immense suffering upon further millions, the entire nation.” Critics retorted that the Jews’ tragedy began with anti-Jewish laws enacted years before Hungary’s sovereignty was surrendered.

On July 20, 2014, the statue was moved into Budapest’s Freedom Square during the night to avoid protestors, and assembled under police guard. Protestors, including Holocaust survivors, stood outside the fence waiting for it to open. Demonstrators threw eggs at the statue.

Normal Corrective Mechanisms No Longer Functioning

Functioning democracies are supposed to be self-healing. While popular majorities may commit excesses or violate human rights, the constitution, enforced by an independent judiciary, is designed to rein them in. It is the job of the media, civil society watchdog groups and human rights advocates to publicly challenge government actions. However, when a fairly elected government uses its super-majority to change the rules to enhance and perpetuate its power, abuses of power are likely to follow. Fidesz has undermined the checks and balances that are meant to prevent an over-concentration of political power in a single person or party, appears to be using its economic and political leverage to starve the media and intimidate its critics, and can continue to amend the Constitution and legal code without debate to further its own interests.

Little thought seems to have been given to the possibility that one day Jobbik, or another extremist, human-rights-violating party, could win 45 percent of the vote and also wind up with a two-thirds majority in Parliament.

The rise of Jobbik to political power and its implications for human rights cannot be addressed except in the broader context of this concentration of power in the ruling party under the Constitution. Presumably, the government thinks that it can crack down effectively should Jobbik (or the extremist groups with which it has close ties, or a radical left-wing group) get out of hand.

So far, Fidesz has been wise enough not to attempt to outlaw its ultra-nationalist rival on account of its ideology, hateful rhetoric, or racist positions. Such a move that would likely do more harm than good by casting Jobbik as a victim of political persecution and make it even more popular. Orban should instead enforce existing laws against violence or other crimes, promptly and impartially. Actions that are not firmly based in international standards of rule of law would likely be interpreted as political retaliation, undermining efforts to persuade the public of the dangers of racist, antisemitic propaganda or policy proposals.

Transparency for all political actors can be improved. Corruption, a chief complaint of Hungarian voters in 2014, is difficult to address when campaign and business financial disclosure laws are opaque and selectively enforced. At the moment, political parties are not required to disclose their funding sources. The Hungarian NGO most respected for its work in this area, Transparency International, was one of the targets of the NGO crackdown. Such developments
leave Hungary less equipped to counter corruption, abuses of power, or violent extremism in a
democratic, rights-respecting manner.

The E.U. Pushes Back

As Hungary rebuffed E.U. concerns about its sweeping changes to the Constitution and
other laws, the E.U. began to push back. But European leaders have concluded that the existing
tools for resolving disputes over the rule of law in member states are not adequate to deal with a
democratic backslider like Hungary.

E.U. Begins Infringement Proceedings

The European Union has no mechanism by which a member country can be expelled. It can,
however, launch “infringement proceedings” against a country that is violating EU treaties or
directives. In the case of serious, sustained violations, the European Council can invoke Article 7
of the Lisbon Treaty, and suspend a country’s voting rights. Among European diplomats
grappling with what to do about Hungary, an Article 7 proceeding is referred to as “the nuclear
option.” It has never been used.

The European Commission responded to the situation in Hungary by initiating infringement
proceedings under Article 258 of the Treaty of the European Union, where Hungary was believed
to be in violation of E.U. law. In at least two of those proceedings touching on the issues
discussed above the European Court of Justice ruled that Hungary had violated E.U. law: the
abrupt dismissal of hundreds of judges and prosecutors by lowering their mandatory retirement
age and undermining the independence of the data protection authority.

But because many of the constitutional and legal steps Orban was taking was not in clear
contravention of a specific E.U. legal obligation, the Commission also secured an agreement with
the Hungarian government to refer major new laws to the Council of Europe’s Venice
Commission for analysis and to implement those recommendations.

Infringement proceedings pursuant to Article 258 have their limits. They are brought by the
Commission to challenge a specific and concrete violation of E.U. law. They are generally too
specific to address “the structural problems that persistently noncompliant states pose.” For
example, the European Court of Justice in the judge retirement age case found Hungary in
violation but ultimately certified Hungary’s remedy—which was to give monetary compensation to
the prematurely dismissed judges, rather than to change the underlying forced retirement system.

Moreover, as a result of European court judgments and in response to negotiations and
expert opinions, Hungary made several changes to its legal code, but left important concerns
unaddressed and at times introduced new problems. As the cases piled up, E.U. officials and
international legal scholars complained that Orban’s strategy was to make some changes but not
to yield on the fundamental issue: typically the shift of power to Fidesz controlled institutions.

Exasperated with the continuing deterioration of the rule of law in Hungary, in 2013 several
E.U. members asked for a mechanism that would cover a broader set of rule of law issues but fall
short of the Article 7 nuclear option. In March 2014, the European Commission adopted a new
framework to deal with “systemic threats to the rule of law” in Member States. The framework allows the Commission to enter into a dialogue with the Member State by issuing a “rule of law opinion” where “there are clear indications of a systemic threat to the rule of law.” Such threats include violations of internationally-recognized rights. If the issues cannot be resolved through dialogue, the Commission will issue a formal public recommendation of specific steps to be taken by the Member State and a timeframe for doing so. If satisfactory progress is not made, the Commission can—but does not necessarily have to—begin one of the mechanisms set out in Article 7 to curtail the rights and benefits of an E.U. Member State.

This framework is a positive step forward in that it begins to break down a long-standing, informal “gentlemen’s agreement” that one E.U. Member State shall not criticize another. It applies to all countries equally. The framework also makes the role of the European Commission in these circumstances a transparent one, instead of relying on informal negotiations. Moreover, the framework fills an important gap—for rule of law concerns that do not constitute a direct violation of E.U. law—between slapping the wrist of a Member State without further consequences and initiating proceedings under Article 7 to rescind the voting rights of a Member State.

The framework is operational but has yet to be employed. New E.U. Commissioners will be named in the fall, and at that point there will be an opportunity for a new Director General for Justice to assess the situation in Hungary (and other countries) in light of the new procedure.

The incoming president of the European Union, former Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker of Luxembourg, has said (without mentioning Hungary by name) that he would support Article 7 proceedings against member states that breach democratic values.
SUPPLEMENT: Complaints from the European Union against Hungary

A long list of legal and administrative changes has prompted concern or censure from the European Union, the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, the OSCE and others concerning the rule of law, human rights, and checks and balances:

These include the following actions taken by the Fidesz-controlled Parliament:

The Independence of the Judiciary and the Authority of the Constitutional Court

- Increased the number of Constitutional Court judges from 11 to 15 and eliminated the requirement that agreement must be reached with the political opposition in Parliament in order to elect those judges, resulting in 8 of the current 15 judges being elected solely by the Fidesz two-thirds majority.270

- Lowered the mandatory retirement age of judges from 70 to 62 and applied that new limit to existing judges regardless of when their current terms ended, resulting in removal of hundreds of judges and prosecutors, including almost 10 percent of the most senior jobs in the judiciary.271

- Changed the method of court administration to concentrate into the hands of a single official—the President of the National Judiciary Office (OBH), elected by a two-thirds majority of the Hungarian Parliament. Gave this official the authority to transfer cases from one court to another without employing clear, objective standards.272

- Changed the competence of the Constitutional Court in ways that restricted its powers to review certain budget and spending legislation, personal data protection, religious freedom claims, and rights related to citizenship.

- Prohibited the Constitutional Court from reviewing proposed amendments to the Fundamental Law, thus rendering the Court unable to ensure that proposed amendments comply with constitutionally guaranteed rights.273

- Re-enacted several ordinary laws that had been overturned by the Constitutional Court in the form of Fundamental Laws, such as the provisions of the Fourth Amendment on the judiciary, court administration, recognition of churches and the authority of the Constitutional Court itself. Because the Constitutional Court cannot review these re-enacted laws, they have the force of constitutional law but are not subject to constitutional review.274 The Venice Commission called this problem of shielding ordinary law from constitutional review “a systematic one, which results in a serious and worrisome undermining of the role of the Constitutional Court as the protector of the constitution.”275

- Repealed the case law of the Constitutional Court from 1989-2011, undermining its independence and abolishing important principles of the court on protection of fundamental rights, thus throwing into doubt the Court’s ability to protect those rights.

Privacy

- Abolished the post of Commissioner on Data Protection, thus violating the independence of the post by prematurely terminating the term of the Commissioner, transferring the powers of the Commissioner to a newly established National Authority for Data Protection, which is under Orban’s control. The head of the Authority is appointed by the Prime Minister.
and the President, rather than the Parliament, which had selected the old Commissioner.

Regulation of the Media and Free Expression

- Established the Media Authority and Media Council, which has power over content in the broadcast media and can impose very high fines that can lead to self-censorship among journalists. Key provisions of the legislation are not clearly defined, and the financial and editorial independence of the public broadcasters is not guaranteed.\(^{276}\)

- Restricted political advertising during electoral campaigns in ways that clearly favored the ruling party.\(^{277}\)

- Enacted hate speech provisions in the Constitution that impose a vague prohibition on speech aimed at violating the dignity of groups, including the “Hungarian nation.” These prohibitions have only been used against members of the Roma minority.\(^{278}\)

Freedom of Religion

- De-registered hundreds of previously registered churches, requiring them to re-apply for recognized “church” status—which confers several privileges not granted to other religious organizations—under a politicized procedure which requires a two-thirds vote in the Parliament rather than a decision by the courts.\(^{279}\)
6. Greece

“It is not only this crisis. It is history. Europe is the cradle of totalitarian nightmares. It is not only the cradle of the democracy and human rights we like so much.”

—Dimitris Christopoulos, Vice President, International Federation for Human Rights

Origins of Golden Dawn

Golden Dawn exploded on the Greek political scene in 2012, stunning pollsters, politicians and the public by winning 6.92 percent of the vote and 18 seats in Parliament.

It rose amid the worst economic crisis in postwar history: Greece has lost 25 percent of its GDP since 2008, unemployment has nearly tripled, and one in three Greeks is living below the poverty line. The economic shock is all the greater as Greece had been a high-income country; from 1950–1973, the period of the “Greek economic miracle,” its growth rate was second in the world only to Japan’s. By 2014, when Golden Dawn came in third with 9 percent of the vote for the European Parliament, Greece was even worse off than the United States during the Great Depression: unemployment hit 27.8 percent in July 2014, compared with a 25 percent peak U.S. unemployment rate in 1933.

At first blush, it seemed Golden Dawn, with its Nazi rhetoric, swastikas, and black-shirted street thugs, was just a skinhead group taking advantage of economic misery and public anger at the political failure and corruption of all of its recent governments. After all, in the 2009 Greek Parliamentary elections, the party had received just 0.29 percent of the vote. But Golden Dawn is more than just another neo-Nazi fringe group. Its leadership has direct ideological and personal links to officers in the notorious Greek army units that collaborated with the Nazis during World War II, fought with the British against the Greek communists after 1944, and went on to lead the U.S.-backed military dictatorship that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974, known as “The Junta” or “The Regime of the Colonels.”

Golden Dawn was founded by Nikolaos Michaloliakos, an ultra-nationalist radical and admirer of the Junta. In 1973, he joined the “4th August” party, named for the date of a military coup in 1936. Michaloliakos was arrested at least twice for political violence and convicted in 1978 in connection with terrorist bombings in Athens. During a 10-month stint in Korydallos Prison, he met and befriended the ousted leaders of the military dictatorship, including the leader of the Junta, Colonel George Papadopoulos. As a young artillery officer, Papadopoulos had served in the notorious “Security Battalions,” known as the Greek SS, which rounded up Jews and hunted down left-wing Greek partisans who were fighting the Nazis. Papadopoulos and his fellow colonels, many of whom had also served in the Security Battalions, were notable for...
their mass arrests: more than 7,000 Greeks were imprisoned, exiled or sent to labor camps during Junta rule.

The colonels were also infamous for the torture of 2,000 people, mass firings of leftist professors and judges, and the crushing of Greek democracy. All of this Papadopoulos justified as necessary to prevent a Communist takeover.

Junta leaders also expressed Greek supremacist ideology that reappears in Golden Dawn’s rhetoric today:

> Foreigners confess and acknowledge Greek superiority. Human civilization was wholly fashioned by our race. Even the enemies of Greece recognize that civilization is an exclusively Greek creation.²⁹³

Upon his release from prison, Michaloliakos launched a weekly magazine called *Golden Dawn*, mainly written by Christos Pappas (now a Golden Dawn Party M.P. in prison awaiting trial). It espoused blatantly Nazi ideology. Its first issue in December, 1980, announced that the group aimed to overturn “the global status quo.” This would be achieved through “a global cultural revolution, which is the necessary presupposition for a new Golden Dawn of humanity. A Golden Dawn, which will lead humanity again to nature and the Greek Ideals of civilization. A Golden Dawn which will be the beginning of a new life, a life in which there will be no place for Zionists, their products and their agents.”²⁹⁴ One issue of the magazine called the Jews “the eternal enemy of our people who have the audacity to speak of persecution and antisemitism,” while another denied the Holocaust.²⁹⁵

Greek-American scholar Moses Altsech later wrote that while most Greek neo-Nazi groups were “small and poorly organized, given to decorating the streets with swastikas,” Golden Dawn, which already had offices in several cities, is “well-financed, although it is unclear from what sources.”

According to Dimitris Psarras, considered to be Greece’s leading expert on Golden Dawn, the “mystery” of the party’s financing and origins is a poorly hidden secret. “The organization maintained good relations over many years with large companies and especially Greek ship owners,” Psarras writes. The Junta supported the interests of Greece’s major ship owners, and after the fall of the dictatorship, many of them helped the former members of the regime and hired them. The Second Congress of Golden Dawn in 1992 was held in a luxury hotel in Athens which then belonged to ship owner John Theodorakopoulos.²⁹⁶ “The leadership of the organization is not a fringe group of skinheads,” Psarras writes. “The Fuehrer [as Michaloliakos is called by his
followers] owns a hotel in the center of Athens, while others are businessmen and members of the middle class."

For many years members of the Golden Dawn were bodyguards for businessmen and politicians, including from the New Democracy Party, which was not antisemitic. Members or supporters of Golden Dawn who were elected to Parliament on the tickets of other parties also voted against taxation of ship owners. Moreover, Psarras and other experts said, even when it was a small group of a few hundred members, Golden Dawn maintained relations with the "deep state": the police, the army, the judiciary, and the Orthodox Church.

Michaloliakos’ friendship with the former Junta leaders paid off in 1984, when Colonel George Papadopoulos founded a new party from prison, the National Political Union (EPEN), and selected Michaloliakos to run its youth group. The following year, Michaloliakos clashed with Papadopoulos and left the party to reestablish Golden Dawn magazine. He founded the political party Golden Dawn in 1985. The majority of the EPEN youth group also left the party, but did not join Michaloliakos because they believed the Nazi ideology and symbols would be unacceptable to mainstream society—an assessment that Marine Le Pen of France and other European right-wing leaders still share.

Michaloliakos’ magazine served up “a weird amalgam of Nazi propaganda, antisemitism, traditional nationalism and pagan fantasy,” The Guardian wrote. It once advocated a return to “the faith of the Aryans”—the Olympian gods—claiming that Christianity had “grafted Jewish obscurantism on to the trunk of European civilization.” It attracted followers, and every April 20th, Golden Dawn, like other European Nazi parties, would meet to commemorate Adolf Hitler’s birthday. The party participated in the elections for the first time in 1994 and won less than 1 percent of the vote.

While Michaloliakos’ unadulterated Nazism and adoration of Adolf Hitler were considered extreme, the nationalist, antisemitic and Greek supremacist ideas he expressed were more widely held. Opinion polls conducted in the 1980s—well before the arrival of waves of immigrants—showed a high level of xenophobia. A 2012 survey by the leading Greek market research company TNS ICAP found that 63 percent of those asked thought “the Greek nation superior to other nations.” And in a global survey conducted by the Anti-Defamation League, and released in May 2014, 69 percent of Greeks sampled expressed antisemitic attitudes. Greece was found to be the most antisemitic country in Europe, a finding many Greeks vehemently dispute, arguing that Greece’s much-improved relationship with Israel has lessened antisemitic as well as anti-Zionist sentiment.

Many leftist Greeks argue that Golden Dawn is just the latest iteration of an ultra-nationalism that has deep roots in Greece, from the prewar dictatorship of General Ioannis Metaxas who copied the institutions of Fascist Italy, to the Nazi collaborators who fought Communists and other left-wing Greeks during the German occupation, during the Greek Civil War, and again during the colonels’ dictatorship. Said Laertis Vasiliou, an actor and director who was targeted by Golden Dawn after his latest play was deemed blasphemous: “Now the Nazis are back. It’s not something new in Greece. They are here, and they were here always.”
In the early 1990s, Golden Dawn benefited from a sharp rise in xenophobic sentiment triggered by the arrival of large numbers of Albanians, and a rise in petty crime. It joined in the Greek nationalist outrage that flared up in 1992 when the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia became independent and decided to name itself Macedonia (the same name as the Greek province). In 2012, Golden Dawn leaders were still ranting against Macedonia from the floor of Parliament.

In the 1990s, Greece also had a sharp increase in the number of television channels, many of which aired controversial talk shows that promoted Greek national superiority. “When the crisis came, there was already a post-modern Greek nationalism,” said Konstantinos Georgousis, 34, who made a documentary about life in the street with Golden Dawn. Television presented the young Golden Dawn lawmakers “like media stars,” and many young people who didn’t know their ideology considered them “very nice, very trendy, very flamboyant,” he said, adding, “It was so obvious that the old parties had failed in every way that Golden Dawn looked like… if not heroes, then clean at least.”

Golden Dawn M.P. Ilias Kasidiaris striking a fellow member of Parliament on live television.

In September 2013, following the events to be described below, Michaloliakos and six others were arrested and charged with directing a criminal organization—the Golden Dawn Party—as well as other crimes including weapons possession, assault and murder. By May, 2014, all 18 of the party’s members of parliament had seen their parliamentary immunity lifted so they could be interrogated and charged. All have denied wrongdoing. As the government prepares its case
against the jailed top leaders, more evidence has emerged about Golden Dawn’s top-down, military-command style, and its indoctrination of young recruits into violence and Nazi ideology.

The government will attempt to prove, among other allegations, that Golden Dawn members were required to participate in violent attacks as a condition of promotion. Leaked testimony from a key witness in the case confirmed earlier reports that members were videotaped committing illegal acts for blackmail in the event that they attempted to break their lifetime vow of loyalty. Greek officials are also investigating the sources of the unreported funding that allowed Golden Dawn to run 70 offices and distribute food to the poor (but only after inspecting identity cards to confirm their Greek citizenship).

Michaloliakos denies all charges and calls himself a political prisoner. He remains in pretrial detention, back in Korydallos Prison.

A Defector’s Story: “Golden Dawn Was Organizing an Army”

A defector from Golden Dawn, who will be a witness in the criminal case, told his story to Human Rights First on condition of anonymity. He said recruiting for Golden Dawn was easy because the true unemployment rate in his city is 50 percent. People who had left for Athens could no longer pay their rent and were moving back. Some could not feed their children. At its peak, his local chapter had 2,000 members, including some elderly people.

In 2011, he said, Golden Dawn was supported by a wealthy local business man. Though a member of the ruling New Democracy Party, he wanted Golden Dawn to do well in the 2012 elections so that the conservative ruling party could end its uneasy coalition with its leftist partner, PASOK, and team up with Golden Dawn instead. The businessman said that “Golden Dawn is the militia arm of New Democracy” and spent more than $1,500 on military outfits for its cadres. The businessman also paid for their offices and gave the advice, including “Don’t go and attack migrants in the middle of the day.”

Other local business leaders were also supportive, especially Ilias Panagiotaros, a Golden Dawn M.P. and leader who imported and sold equipment and uniforms to the police. According to the defector, Panagiotaros was importing T-shirts from Pakistan for about 50 cents each and selling them to Golden Dawn for $2 each. Golden Dawn required all of its members to buy one for about $20. The irony was not lost on Nazim Mahmoud, a Pakistani migrant who learned after Golden Dawn thugs beat him up that its regulation black T-shirts were stitched back home.

A local enterprise procured weapons. The “most advanced” cadres used air guns for intimidation, but found a way to alter them to shoot bullets, he said. Ammunition was purchased from legal gun owners, whose license allowed them to buy three boxes of bullets per year. Brass knuckles are legal in Greece, as are short knives. “Everybody had a knife,” he said. “They weren’t trained, but considering the number of stabbings in Greece in the last few years it seems a lot of people here learned to use them.”

They did not fear law enforcement. “The police couldn’t touch us,” he said, then corrected himself. “The police had specific orders not to touch us.” Once, when four Golden Dawn members attacked two Pakistani migrants and beat them “really, really badly,” he received a phone call.
from the police chief who had ties to the local Golden Dawn boss and told him the case would not be investigated. Once they realized they could operate with impunity, they turned to intimidation for profit, evicting recalcitrant tenants and collecting debts.

Meanwhile, while he was reading Golden Dawn nationalist propaganda, his boss had moved on to books and DVDs of Hitler. One day, just before the 2012 election, when the party realized they would win seats in Parliament, he noticed that the portrait of Colonel Papadopoulos in a member’s house had been switched to a portrait of Hitler. The defector’s grandfather had fought with the partisans during the Second World War and was killed by the Germans, so this was a bridge too far. He quit.

The defector believes that the government had been allowing Golden Dawn to grow for its own gain, and decided to take legal action only when the organization became too powerful. Despite threats against him, he intends to testify that Golden Dawn was a “criminal organization,” as the government charges.

“‘Criminal organization’ is correct and precise, because Golden Dawn was organizing an army,” he said. “One of the basic prerequisites to go up in the hierarchy was to go to special training camps.”

Leaders took recruits to the mountains for 15-day training programs, conducted by a former member of the Greek Special Forces. It included paintball, target practice, living in tents, and ideological indoctrination.

Finally, they were introduced to the concept of the “Blue Tribe,” the Aryan Nation.

Just as the defector was about to explain how Golden Dawn cadres were taught to identify who was an Aryan, a woman from Senegal with a baby on her back came up to his cafe table to sell necklaces. She had been in Greece three years, and was thinking of returning home. There is no work here, she said, and she is afraid of being locked in “prison”—the notorious migrant detention centers.

“They want us to leave,” she said. “I tell all the Senegalese not to come to Greece. There is nothing good here and it is better to stay home.”

I asked the defector, “Does this mean that Golden Dawn has succeeded?”

“Yes,” he said.305
A Pandora’s Box of Hatreds

“We are ready to open the ovens.”

—Alexandros Plomaritis, unsuccessful 2012 Golden Dawn candidate for Parliament, about the party’s plans to purge Greece of migrants and dark-skinned people

Golden Dawn is no ordinary ultra-nationalist party. No other extreme right party in Europe is as stridently racist, nativist and violent, none is so unapologetically antisemitic, and none so openly calls for the overthrow of the State. It seeks to impose its vision of Greek racial superiority across society and has used intimidation and violence to achieve those ends. It has targeted doctors and medical facilities, artists, bloggers, teachers, human rights workers, playwrights, and even priests. Even while the top leadership of the party sits in jail, people known to be witnesses in the Golden Dawn trial have received death threats.

While Greek prosecutors have been trying to prove that Golden Dawn leaders were running a criminal organization, the police have embarked on several efforts to purge themselves of officers who ignored Golden Dawn while it committed a wave of assaults and other crimes and those who participated in its abuse of migrants. At least 203 officers have been identified and some 30 prosecutions against police officers are ongoing.

Most worrisome, Golden Dawn’s popularity has grown after violent attacks on migrants, dark-skinned Greeks, and even on members of parliament. While E.U. democracies are assumed to have self-corrective mechanisms in the form of voter rejection of extremists or those who use violence to achieve their ends, this has so far not happened in Greece. Golden Dawn’s radical agenda and methods have contributed to its growth.

Antisemitic

Golden Dawn has once again proved that the presence of Jews is not a prerequisite for antisemitism. Indeed, the Golden Dawn defector said he had never met a Jew. The elimination of Jews and the alleged influence of international Jewry is part of the party’s rhetoric that reflects its ideology of enforcing racial superiority and purging the country of non-Hellenic influences.

Greece’s Jewish population is estimated at just 5,000, of whom about 1,000 live in the city of Salonika (Thessaloniki in Greek). Romaniote Jews have been living there for two millennia, joined by Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain in 1492. The city’s Jewish population was about 50,000 before the Holocaust; fewer than 2,000 survived.
Golden Dawn cadre at a summer camp.

Golden Dawn is not accused of physical attacks on Jews, but the group’s antisemitic vitriol, Holocaust denial, and glorification of Adolf Hitler have been well documented. In a 2013 television interview, the ever-combative Michaloliakos sparred with his interlocutor:

Michaloliakos: “What Auschwitz? Were you there?”

Journalist: “No, I was not, but, as many people, I have read books about it.”

Michaloliakos: “And I have read many books that question the number of the six million Jews, and they say that it is an overestimation which was made up… even the antifascist writers claim this… There were no ovens [crematoria]! This is a lie... There were no gas chambers either. There were many dead in the concentration camps, from many nations. This was a war crime. The concentration camps built by the Americans for the Japanese, this was also a war crime.”

Ilias Kasidiaris, the Golden Dawn M.P. and spokesman, sports swastika tattoos and has read from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion on the floor of the parliament. He said that “history has not yet given its final verdict on Hitler.” M.P. Panagiotaros said that Hitler “was a great personality, like Stalin. In every period of time, there must be, there are some people who are doing the dirty job.”

M.P. Artemis Matthaiopoulos was the bass player of a Nazi-punk band called “Pogrom.” According to the Times of London, its song titled “Auschwitz” contains obscenities about Simon Wiesenthal, Anne Frank, and “the whole tribe of Abraham. The Star of David makes me vomit.” The band’s best-known song is a threat to migrants, titled “Speak Greek or Die.” Golden Dawn increased its mandate in the European Parliament even after publication last fall of photos seized from its leaders’ homes in police raids, showing MPs in Nazi regalia giving the Hitler salute.
While Golden Dawn’s leaders insist they will not recreate the Holocaust against Jews, and there are no proven Golden Dawn-related physical attacks on Jews or Jewish community property, some party officials have threatened to establish crematoria for migrants (while insisting that there were no Nazi-run crematoria). In 2012, a Golden Dawn candidate and his associates were filmed by Georgousis saying, “We are ready to open the ovens,” to “turn them into soap,” or “make lampshades of them.” Such abhorrent statements by Golden Dawn leaders are now so commonplace that some Greeks say they have lost their shock value.

The case against Golden Dawn has not appeared to quell other antisemitic incidents—although the government has now begun to enforce bans on hate speech under the anti-racism law. On March 2, 2014 in Thessaloniki, a doctor linked to Golden Dawn was arrested for having a sign outside his office reading “Jews not welcome.” He was convicted to a 16-month prison term, suspended for three years, and fined, according to the Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece.

In June, 2014 the Holocaust memorial in Athens was desecrated with antisemitic slurs.
WE’RE NOT NAZIS, BUT…

**Racist and Xenophobic**

“We’re the Athenian citizens, not those that came from Bangladesh. The Athenian citizens, the finances of the city will be utilized exclusively to assist the Athenian citizens. Not the illegal immigrants, not the Pakistanis, not the Afghans, none of those that come to Greece to commit crimes.”

—Ilias Kasidiaris, Golden Dawn Spokesman, announcing his candidacy for mayor of Athens, Feb 16, 2014

Greece is a major gateway for undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers. An estimated 90 percent of Europe’s undocumented migrants arrive through Greece. With the onset of the recession, their growing presence became a political flashpoint as waves of refugees from Afghanistan, Kashmir, Syria, Somalia, and Eritrea, as well as migrants from many other countries, continued to arrive on Greek shores. Golden Dawn explicitly wants to “cleanse” the country of migrants, especially those with dark skin.

By 2009, Golden Dawn was raiding places where groups of migrants squatted. In 2009 it chased about 600 Somali migrants out of the building they were occupying and beat them. No charges were filed. A female Golden Dawn member who was at the scene was later the subject of a criminal complaint, alleging that she had marked the doors of apartments occupied by migrants with a Celtic Cross, an old Nazi symbol, so that a Golden Dawn attack squad that arrived later arrived knew which residents to attack. The woman later ran for election on the Golden Dawn ticket, but was unsuccessful. Police have not acted on a criminal complaint that was filed against her.

Meanwhile Golden Dawn leaders exploited and exacerbated anti-immigrant hostility. Kasidiaris called Roma “human garbage” during a public anti-Roma meeting in Aspropyrgos in May, 2011. Upon entering Parliament, Golden Dawn lawmakers continued to spout slurs, without reprimand. In October, 2012 M.P. Eleni Zaroulia, who is Michaloliakis’ wife, referred to the “sub-humans who have invaded our country, with all kinds of diseases” during a meeting of the
Parliament’s plenary. The Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner reported that “there was no strong reaction by the parliament or a prosecutor to this extreme hate speech, which was widely reported in the Greek media.”

Golden Dawn’s nativist stance had appeal that transcended the hard-right. In May 2009, residents in the neglected neighborhood of Ayos Panteleimonas closed a playground, claiming migrants had made it unsanitary. About 10 days later, a group of young men arrived to enforce the closure—and to ensure that non-Greeks would be afraid to cross the square in front of the park. At the time, the residents hadn’t heard of Golden Dawn but they embraced the black-clad patrollers. A Greek Orthodox priest who was distributing food to migrants was threatened by Golden Dawn activists, and instead of confronting the situation, the church transferred him to a new parish.

By 2010, virulent opposition to migrants went mainstream, lending credibility to Golden Dawn. A large number of penniless migrants were crowded into neighborhoods in Athens and surrounding areas, often forced to live in squalid conditions. As jobs dried up, street crime increased, as did resentment from citizens who had little police protection and saw no government steps to address the problems in their neighborhoods. Golden Dawn promised to do the job by “cleansing” Greece of the migrants. As the situation worsened, other politicians—including from the governing New Democracy party—began to speak out on the issues that had propelled Golden Dawn into Parliament.

For example, in March 2012, Minister of Public Order Michailis Chrisochoidis described the migrants in central Athens as a “ticking time bomb,” warning that “infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV are increasing through sexual contacts, drug use, and miserable living conditions.” He issued a decree requiring people living in certain areas to be tested for disease; migrants who failed could be detained and those who passed would be permitted to work only if they had a certificate of good health.

Moreover, migrants could also be detained if they belonged to “groups vulnerable to infectious diseases,” as determined by their country of origin, and whether they were an intravenous drug user or sex worker, or even “in conditions that do not meet minimum standards of hygiene”—a license to arrest slum-dwellers. Human rights groups protested. In August, the government instead launched a sweep of such neighborhoods, detaining the undocumented in old facilities unsuitable for prolonged detention and promising to build 30 new detention centers, which soon also became overcrowded.

Faced with economic and social meltdown, and with a general election ahead, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras jumped on Golden Dawn’s anti-migrant bandwagon, proclaiming, “Our cities have been taken over by illegal immigrants, we have to reclaim them.” With such inflammatory rhetoric, the New Democracy Party failed to demonstrate to citizens that the uncontrolled migration and the conditions in which migrants lived would be addressed properly, that there was no need to resort to violence, or that vigilantes would be punished.
Golden Dawn stridently rejects “politically correct” views that Greece should be a diverse society. It blames the government for not protecting Greeks and Hellenism against what it sees as a “foreign onslaught” that has triggered a rise in crime:

About 1/3 of the Greek population lives condensed in the metropolitan area of Athens and roughly around 4/5 of Greece’s 3 million illegal immigrants have also settled there in a period of about 15 years. The Greek population had very little experience with violent crime and rapes when the country was 98 percent Greek 2 decades ago. The government and police were not prepared to deal with the skyrocketing increase in violent crime, rape, and diseases the last 5 years. When the indigenous Greek population cried for help, the state ignored them, as most wealthy state officials lived in areas where all illegal immigrants did was take care of their large gardens and houses as servants. The leftist political groups not only ignored them, but told them they should be ashamed for being concerned and frightened.326

However, new arrivals were not the only “foreigners” targeted by Golden Dawn; it is also accused of attacks on Roma citizens, dark-skinned Greeks, and members of the Muslim community in Thrace—groups that have always been in Greece.

Homophobic

Greek society has become more sympathetic to LGBT rights, and this spring Athens celebrated its 10th Pride Parade. The Bishop of Thessaloniki, however, deemed the parade “a disgrace and a challenge,” and called homosexuality “a perversion of human existence,”327 Greek law generally protects the rights of LGBT persons, although they face intolerance and discrimination.

Golden Dawn portrays itself as a protector of a Greek traditional morality threatened by Western influences, and is hostile to LGBT individuals and attempts to secure their civil rights. Panagiotaros told an Australian interviewer in April, 2014 that “until 1997 the international association of doctors and I don’t know what considered homosexuality a sickness, illness, which it is.”328

The Racist Violence Reporting Network (RVRN) documented six incidents of attacks based on sexual orientation in 2013, and another 16 victims targeted for their gender identity.329 Anecdotal reports suggest that the number of hate crimes targeting LGBT people is higher, and transsexuals are the most vulnerable to attack. NGOs are attempting to better document such cases.

Islamophobic

Golden Dawn frequently expresses animosity toward Turkey, Greeks of Turkish origin, and other Muslims, and aspires to see Istanbul, once the Byzantine city of Constantinople, under Greek control again. The party has strenuously opposed the opening of a mosque in Athens—a move the government agreed to but has since delayed. Golden Dawn M.P.s deliberately insulted their Muslim colleagues, and people who appear to be from Muslim-majority countries have been targeted for attacks.
Recently, Golden Dawn has been stoking anti-Turkish sentiment and targeting the minority Muslim community in Thrace with such slogans as “Turks out of Thrace.” Following its strong showing in the May, 2014 European elections, Golden Dawn members again paraded to Parliament to “commemorate” the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in 1453.

Brutally Violent, Attacking with Impunity

Greece has suffered so much political violence that its citizens tend to have a relatively high tolerance for it, but Golden Dawn’s brutality has shocked the conscience of many Greeks. In addition to at least two murders, Golden Dawn members or supporters are accused of torturing an Egyptian immigrant, biting off the ear of an Iranian refugee, carving the Golden Dawn initials into a Somali man’s back, and burning down a house inhabited by poor Egyptian fishermen. One victim was a nine-year-old boy. The state’s current case against Golden Dawn’s leaders includes ordering about a dozen violent racist attacks. Even worse, for more than four years they did it with relative impunity, and in some cases with the cooperation of the police.

A Pattern of Racist Attacks

Greece has not kept proper hate-crime statistics, and underreporting is rampant. Many victims are undocumented, and if they report the incidents the police are nevertheless required by law to begin deportation proceedings against them. NGOs that assist victims, particularly the Greek Council on Refugees and Doctors of the World, have made valiant attempts to do their own reporting. It is generally agreed that mass attacks on migrants and others were occurring as early as 2008, probably peaked in 2012, and have declined sharply since the arrests of Golden Dawn leaders in September, 2013. However, serious assaults on migrants continue to be reported. Greek prosecutors are seeking to prove that many of the racist attacks that have plagued Greece since 2009 were organized and directed by Golden Dawn’s leadership.

In 2012, the Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) documented 154 incidents, mostly in Athens. Of these, 151 were committed against refugees and migrants, three were against European citizens, and seven reported occurred inside police stations or migrant detention centers. That same year, police recorded 84 incidents with possible racist motivation, including threats, bodily harm, and humiliation, but most were not serious crimes, according to Hellenic Police Spokesman Christos Parthenis. The Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe noted that 17 violent incidents between early June and October 2012 involved members of Golden Dawn, including the party’s M.P.s.
In 2013, the RVRN recorded 166 incidents involving at least 320 victims. Most victims were immigrants and refugees, including undocumented migrants (213), asylum seekers (66), and recognized refugees (4). Most were also Muslim. They believed they were targeted because of their skin color or because they were foreign. In many cases, victims were approached and asked to produce identification to show they were legal residents. When they could not, they were assaulted. Most of these attacks occurred in public places by vigilantes in groups of two to twenty. In 75 of the 166 cases, victims believed the attackers were members of extremist groups, and in 15 cases, victims or witnesses said they recognized Golden Dawn members or associates among the perpetrators, or saw the Golden Dawn insignia. RVRN’s 2013 statistics included one particularly shocking case in which the supervisors of immigrant strawberry pickers shot 155 of their employees after a labor dispute.

That year police recorded 109 cases of violence with suspected racist motives, and charges were pressed in 43 cases. The most significant was the first trial of two Greeks accused of murdering Pakistani immigrant Sachzat Loukman, stabbed to death as he bicycled to work on the morning of January 2013. Greeks in the Petralona district of Athens organized demonstrations demanding justice for Loukman and a more aggressive response by authorities. Two men were arrested for the murder. Golden Dawn leaflets were found in the house of one of them. Both were convicted of the murder, but the judge declined to categorize the crimes as racially motivated, triggering criticism from lawyers and rights activists.

Following the murder of Greek rap musician Pavlos Fyssas, the mass arrest of Golden Dawn leaders and members from September 2013 onward, and the dismissal of several senior police officials for connections with Golden Dawn activities, the number of racist incidents decreased. RVRN said the sharp drop in attacks supports the conclusion of the RVRN that the violence was the result of “hit squads” organized by Golden Dawn, against which the Greek State was too slow to take action.

**Situation in 2014**

In 2014, street attacks on Greeks as well as migrants have continued, but at a slower pace.

- On May 29, after the Golden Dawn rally to commemorate the fall of Constantinople, a journalist found a Greek couple near the metro station, the man nursing a broken nose with an icepack. The young couple said they had been beaten up by Golden Dawn, probably because the thugs thought they looked like leftists.

- On June 14, two men stepped out of their car in the Metaxourgeion area of central Athens and attacked a migrant. According to an eye witness who also noted the car’s license plates, the men ”started to literally jump on his head in front of an absolutely apathetic” traffic guard. When bystanders shouted at them to stop, the men replied, “Now you are going to see what Golden Dawn means, we know who you are.”

Recently, some of those participating in anti-migrant street patrols, fearing arrest, have become more cagey—using threats and humiliation instead of overt violence—according to Nikitas Kanakis, the head of Doctors of the World in Greece. During the election campaign, some Golden Dawn activists pulled the scarfs from the heads of Muslim women, told migrants, ”We
know where you live," and ordered homeless people to move out of the neighborhoods Golden Dawn patrols. Kanakis believes that human rights groups and authorities must to do more to track and respond to threats and other racist behaviors that had not been a priority during the period of mass violence.

Greece’s law enforcement and judicial systems have had difficulty responding to Golden Dawn crimes promptly, in part due to longstanding systemic weaknesses. Greece law enforcement agencies have been ineffective in curbing political violence from the left since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974. The November 17 group, a Marxist-Leninist movement formed in 1975 and for years described as the most dangerous terrorist group in the West, assassinated 23 people and waged at least 103 attacks before 19 of its members were unmasked in 2002. One of the key assassins, convicted in 2003, walked away from parole this year and threatened more violence against the state to protect the Greek people against austerity policies. Many other terrorist attacks have never been solved, and anarchist groups that operate in some Athens neighborhoods continue to have violent clashes with police and Golden Dawn.

The reforms, staffing increases, and training that will be required to combat Golden Dawn will also help Greece combat other forms of extremism and terrorism.

Case Studies

The following cases, researched by the Greek Council on Refugees, Doctors of the World, and Human Rights First, illustrate the inadequacies of Greek law enforcement and criminal justice systems to end impunity for violent hate crimes. How they are handled going forward will be a barometer of the commitment of the Greek authorities to end impunity for hate violence, protect the rights of victims, tackle racism inside the police, immigration and other agencies, and hold attackers and their accomplices accountable for these crimes.

Nazim’s Story: Attacked by Golden Dawn, Beaten by Police, But He’s the One on Trial

Nazim Mahmoud, a 36-year-old Pakistani attacked by Golden Dawn activists, has been in Greece for 14 years, is a legal resident, and speaks Greek. Because of his legal status and his activities as an organizer in the Pakistani Greek community, he requested that his real name be used in this report, in part because so many of his undocumented friends have not been able to tell their stories, and in part, he said, because he wants justice.

On May 18, 2012 at about 2:30 am, in his Athens apartment, Nazim heard intruders trying to break down the door of his building, which had been built to house Greek refugees returning from Asia Minor but was now inhabited mainly by migrants. Golden Dawn had just won seats in Parliament, and motorcycle squads were roaring through immigrant neighborhoods waving their flags and shouting threats. Nazim had heard rumors that Golden Dawn was planning mass attacks to celebrate.
When he heard doors being smashed in, "My first thought was, it's the fascists," he said. He called the police and begged them to come. Golden Dawn thugs charged into the building where about 20 or 25 Pakistanis lived in apartments around central courtyards. They broke down the door, and began to kick and beat Nazim, along with the two other men who lived with him. There were eight attackers screaming obscenities, several armed with wooden sticks.

The men left to attack other residents, and Nazim pulled a bureau in front of his broken door to prevent them from reentering. Police later charged him with resisting arrest because he did not immediately open the door until he was sure it was the police.

Eventually the police took all the Pakistanis out of the building; many illegal migrants fled to avoid detention and deportation. But instead arresting the assailants, police arrested Nazim and two others with moustaches. "It was like a joke—they rounded up the ones with moustaches," he said. While he was handcuffed, two young men and a woman who had been with the attack squad came over and began to beat him. "[The police] saw the Golden Dawn thugs beating me while I was in handcuffs, but that didn't stop them," he said.

The three Pakistanis were shoved into the back of a police car. Once inside, one of the officers slapped him and then turned to his partner and said, "Give me a napkin, because I have the blood of a dog on my hands," Nazim said. "He turned to us and said, 'You are dogs.'" They were taken to the Peristeri police station, hooded and beaten again by the police, he said. Then they were thrown into a cell. "I told them I was the one who called the police, and I want to file charges"—a request he made repeatedly, to no avail. He was fingerprinted, transferred to another police station and then sent back to the Peristeri police station without explanation. By the time his lawyer arrived at the police station, the 48-hour statutory period for filing criminal charges had expired—which Nazim believes was the purpose of the transfers.347

However, Nazim says, the perpetrators went to the police station and were immediately permitted to file a criminal complaint against him for assault. His trial is scheduled for Jan. 14, 2015. His assailants have not been arrested, and he believes police just shelved his complaint against his attackers. Since the attackers have not been arrested or interrogated, Nazim cannot prove that they are supporters, members, or under orders from Golden Dawn.

Nazi did not try to report his beating by police or file a complaint against them, saying he was sure retaliation would be swift. He intends to stay in Greece at least until his trial; if he does not get justice, he may return to Pakistan. "I am afraid, but I don't want to leave before the trial. I was the victim, but I was the one persecuted... I want to defend my rights."
Many cases of hate violence don’t get filed by the police. There is a pattern of police complicity in Golden Dawn attacks, and police in this case not only failed to treat Nazim as a victim, they allegedly abused him physically and prevented him from filing charges against his assailants. There is still opportunity for the Greek authorities, either before, during, or after his trial, to remedy these abuses by fairly adjudicating the case against Nazim, investigating the alleged police abuse and inaction, punishing any officials, as well as pursuing a case against Nazim’s attackers. These steps would demonstrate an end to impunity for racist attacks and advance initial government efforts to reform the police.

K.S. Refugee from Iran Bitten, Golden Dawn Attackers Never Found

K.S. fled Iran after taking part in anti-government demonstrations. His application for refugee status was pending when he was attacked on October 10, 2013, in between Larisa station and Metaxourgeio Square in Athens. The attackers punched and kicked him. Then one of them bit off part of his ear and spat it on the ground. Friends collected K.S. and the ear and rushed him to a public hospital emergency room, where doctors tried but failed to reattach the ear. They did not take DNA samples of saliva on the ear, although such steps would have been standard in the case of an assault on a Greek citizen, according to the lawyers defending K.S.

Greek public hospitals do not have interpreters, so the doctors were unable to communicate with K.S., but they knew he was an undocumented migrant, and it would be illegal to keep him in the hospital without reporting him to police. They called Doctors of the World, which sheltered him until he was better, and the Greek Council for Refugees filed a complaint on his behalf to the new Department to Combat Racist Violence of the Police. His lawyers attempted to contact the police in order to provide testimony and other information from the victim, but the police didn’t respond.

A few months later, K.S. agreed to appear in a video about his attack, which was released on January 10, 2014. Only after the shocking video was posted online did police investigate the case. They found K.S. at his legal address and arrested him, so that he could give testimony in a preliminary hearing. Police did not contact K.S.’s lawyer, who filed the complaint. In accordance with Greek law, a deportation procedure was filed against him. He was held for three days until his lawyer secured a hearing with a police colonel, who ordered him released. However, his assailants have never been found, so the case has not proceeded.

Because Greek law exposes undocumented migrants to detention and deportation even if they have been victims of a crime, many such victims of violence don’t go to the police and some are reluctant to go to the hospital for treatment after being attacked. Thus even crimes involving very serious injuries are not reported and even if complaints are later filed, investigations are
hampered and proceed slowly, if at all. Intense publicity appears to have prompted the authorities to action in this case, although it remains unclear if there will be progress on the case.

Walid Taleb, Egyptian Migrant, Tortured for 36 Hours

Walid Taleb, a 29-year old undocumented Egyptian migrant who worked in Salamina for a baker, says he was attacked by his employer on Nov. 4, 2012, after asking for his unpaid wages. The trial, which has been repeatedly postponed, has become a symbol of the plight of migrants who have been scapegoated and abused in Greece.

Walid said five men, the baker, the baker’s son (allegedly a Golden Dawn member), two associates of the baker, and an Albanian are accused of holding Walid captive for about 36 hours and torturing him.

“They brought a chain, they locked it around my neck and wrapped the rest of the chain around my body and started beating me,” he said. “My face was full of blood; I could not see.” While Walid was chained to a tree, the baker tore up Walid’s Koran and stepped on it. Then, “they brought plastic chairs, beers and cigarettes and started laughing at me. ‘Are you Muslim?’ they asked, and then started hitting me with a stick on the head,” he said. They forced beer in his mouth, and called him a dog. They then beat, kicked, and burned him with cigarettes while drinking beer. Eventually, they dragged him to a shed where they hung him from the ceiling by his hands. “Whenever I was fainting, they would relax the rope and throw water on me,” Walid said.

Eventually, the attackers tired and left briefly, and Walid escaped. He was found nearly unconscious at a gas station, where he was photographed with the chain around his neck. The baker claimed that Walid had stolen money from him. Walid was hospitalized, and police stayed with him and encouraged him not to delay going to the police station to file criminal charges against his attackers. He did so, but in accordance with Article 19 of the immigration law, he was jailed for two days while deportation proceedings were begun. With help from a lawyer, he was given temporary permission to remain in Greece.

Walid lost sight in one eye, and suffered damage to his neck, along with other injuries. The attackers were charged with unlawful detention, robbery, and “unprovoked body injuries,” serious crimes but far less severe charges than torture and kidnapping. These crimes can be punished by imprisonment of up to 30 years. When presenting the charges to the court, the prosecution did not characterize the crimes as being racially motivated. It is thus not certain if that aspect of the case was thoroughly investigated or if the prosecution will ask the court to consider any racial motivation at the sentencing.

According to the lawyer, Stavroura Koklioti, Golden Dawn members were outside the courthouse supporting the accused during the preliminary hearing held November 8, 2012. The judge released the baker and the others with the requirement to report regularly to the local police station pending trial. “Seeing him walking free made me feel sick. Sicker than before. Because he was let free even though he did all these things to me,” Walid said.

The case has yet to come to trial, and has been postponed four times, most recently in June, 2014. Meanwhile, Walid is effectively forced to live in the same tiny town with the men he says tortured him and threatened his life. He rarely goes out and is being supported financially by
friends. Despite the Greek heat, he typically wears turtlenecks to cover the scars on his neck. While awaiting the trial, Walid returned to Egypt to visit his family. When he returned, his temporary residency permit was no longer valid. After a media outcry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a permit for him to remain in Greece.

This case reflects a pattern in which police and prosecutors fail to investigate and categorize cases as having a racist motive and deal with incidents accordingly. Greek prosecutors have requested that the aggravating circumstance be applied in only two cases, despite reports of hundreds of racist attacks. Also, the Greek justice system moves very slowly and there is a chronic backlog in prosecuting criminal cases. Only one prosecutor is dedicated to hate crime and he has responsibility for other cases as well, despite the fact that many racist violence cases languish in the system. Long wait times leave victims in limbo and allow perpetrators of hate crimes to remain in their communities, where their mere presence serves as a daily symbol of impunity.

Attacks on Cultural and Societal Foes

Golden Dawn violence is not limited to migrants and “foreigners.” It has attacked health workers and artists in the name of “protecting” Greek values. On April 4, 2014 Golden Dawn supporters once again attacked a free clinic run by Doctors of the World in Perama, on the outskirts of Athens. The group’s free clinics have attracted many migrants who have been attacked and need medical treatment but fear arrest and deportation if they go to public hospitals. The clinics have also seen a large influx of low-income Greeks who have lost their medical insurance following the loss of their jobs. In the April incident, a group showed up at the clinic shouting “Blood, Honor, Golden Dawn,” and “Foreigners Go Home.” The clinic staff locked themselves and their patients inside, fearing a repeat of a 2013 beating of one of the clinic’s volunteer translators.

Golden Dawn leaders have also used Greek blasphemy laws to attack its cultural opponents and to imply that only Golden Dawn can defend the Greek Church against an onslaught of corrupt, Westernized values.

In 2012, a Golden Dawn group led by M.P. Christos Pappas disrupted a performance of the play “Corpus Christi” directed by Laertis Vasiloiou, considering the play to be blasphemous. They tore
down posters, threw stones, threatened theatergoers, and shouted violent homophobic and racist threats against the director, including “Here will be your grave.”

“The police did nothing,” Vasiliou said. The demonstrators shouted, “Our savior is Jesus from Nazareth, your savior is the anti-Christ.” When he noted that Jesus was a Jew, the crowd screamed back, “No, Jesus was a Greek!” Pappas escorted Bishop Seraphim of Piraeus to a police station where they filed a blasphemy case against Vasiliou, and were photographed together doing so. Vasiliou, who is Albanian-born and openly supports LBGT rights, eventually closed the performance.

The case raises significant concerns about the abuse of blasphemy laws for political purposes, as well as Golden Dawn’s ability to threaten and intimidate its foes with impunity. On three separate occasions, Vasiliou claims he went to the Athens police and won restraining orders to enjoin Golden Dawn from attempting to stop the performance, but none were enforced. He and his family received death threats, he has been moving from place to place, and he has not been able to stage a production since 2012, he said, because no Greek theater or film festival wants to risk trouble with Golden Dawn. He has filed a criminal case against his attackers, but the case has not moved forward.

“They are everywhere and they are bullying everyone, from small businesses to big institutions…” Vasiliou said. “You call the police and they say, ‘You know, it’s Golden Dawn, what can we do?’” If the state cannot protect the basic rights of its citizens, he said, “then the state isn’t a state. I don’t know what it is.”

Corroding the State from Within

Golden Dawn claims to have extensive support from the police, the army, and other prominent members of society. While some of these boasts—for example, its assertion that it “has 50 divisions”—are pure propaganda, there is clear evidence of infiltration and collaboration especially with the police.

According to an investigation by the Internal Affairs Department of the Greek Police, police involvement in racist attacks rose sharply between 2009 and October 2013, with the peak in 2012. In all, 203 police officers and 3 civilians were involved in incidents of racist violence. The highest proportion of offenders were found in the Police Department of Athens (especially the motorcycle police of central Athens), the Emergency Response Unit and Immigration office in Attica, and the police department in Pireus, all areas where Golden Dawn was particularly active. In 2013 alone, the Racist Violence Recording Network recorded 44 incidents of violence by uniformed police officers, 23 of which took place in detention centers.

In June 2012, as reports piled up of police standing by during Golden Dawn attacks, a study of voting behavior indicated that Athens police had voted disproportionately for Golden Dawn. In April, 2013 a report by Nils Muiznieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, warned:

In polling stations in Athens where staff members of the Greek police voted, along with other Greek citizens during the June 2012 elections, “Golden Dawn” percentages
were far above the national average, ranging from 17.2 percent to 23.04 percent. Estimates indicate alarmingly that more than 50 percent of the police officials in these polling stations voted for Golden Dawn.\textsuperscript{354}

Police sympathies for Golden Dawn reportedly grew with the party’s decision to support police who were ordered to break up violent demonstrations in 2012 against the austerity agreements between the Greek government and international financial institutions. Police who had seen their pay cut along with all other public servants were battling anarchists and other left-wing forces that had been clashing with police for years. Golden Dawn members were on the streets backing up the police. Video has since emerged showing police officers standing by as Golden Dawn activists threw stones at anarchists.\textsuperscript{355} As the anarchists also have a long history of violence in Greece, Golden Dawn’s taking up arms against them seemed only the latest iteration of a decades-long struggle between the Greek right and left.

Golden Dawn leaders have gone far beyond protection of the police and have also asserted that they were ready for a “civil war” between Greek nationalists on one side and immigrants, their enablers, and anarchists on the other. In a 2012 interview with the BBC, M.P. Ilias Panagiotaros predicted that Golden Dawn would within two election cycles become the most popular political party in Greece and bring “a revolution”:

\begin{quote}
We are in a civil war… We have tens of attacks by anarchists [on] police stations with a lot of bombs, shootings, policemen being dead….We have illegal immigrants making illegal demonstrations being supported by left-wing anarchists and members of Parliament… So, this Greek society is ready to have a fight. I mean a type of civil war. On one side there will be nationalists like us and Greeks who want our country to be as it used to be. On the other side there will be illegal immigrants, anarchists, and all those who have destroyed Athens several times.\textsuperscript{356}
\end{quote}

Greece’s intelligence agency was not immune from infiltration by Golden Dawn. Immediately before the September raids to arrest Golden Dawn leaders, on September 27, 2013 the Director of the National Intelligence Service (in Greek, EYP) Third Counter-Intelligence Division, the official responsible for telephone surveillance of Golden Dawn, was abruptly removed. Neither the EYP nor police commented, but media reported that the man was related to a Golden Dawn M.P. Two other officials were also transferred without explanation.

Three lawyers involved in cases against Golden Dawn called for an investigation, alleging “the long-term penetration of and activities of the Nazi criminal gang within the EYP and the police.”\textsuperscript{357} It is not known whether the EYP has conducted an internal investigation.

However, immediately after the first Golden Dawn arrests, the Minister of Public Order Nikos Dendias ordered the Chief of Police, Nikolaos Papagiannopoulos, and the Director of Internal Affairs, Panagiotis Stathis, to launch an investigation of the widespread accusations of police officers colluding with or joining in criminal activities attributed to Golden Dawn. Eight senior officials were suspended pending the investigation. On October 30, 2013, Stathis gave a press conference at which he reported that 15 police officers had been arrested, ten of them “directly or indirectly linked to criminal activities of Golden Dawn.” The chief of the Agios Panteleimonas
police station in downtown Athens, which had been a Golden Dawn stronghold, was among those arrested after the Internal Affairs investigation. He was charged with abuse of authority, weapons trafficking, and forgery, and authorities cited evidence that he may have been working with Golden Dawn.

After questioning 319 officers in 104 stations, the Internal Affairs investigation concluded that “there was no evidence of ‘cells’ or ‘factions’ of para-constitutional forces in the Greek police.” However, the report noted, “There is a grave concern that police inaction and unwillingness and the delay of disciplinary punishment gives the impression of tolerance and cover-up.”

Officials said that at least 30 court cases against police officers are ongoing. It is premature to evaluate whether the internal investigation of police will be far-reaching enough to deter rights violations or whether the criminal prosecutions of police will succeed in curbing police impunity.

Law enforcement sources said there was also evidence that the Coast Guard and possibly other agencies had been infiltrated, and that investigations were continuing.海岸警卫队与金日成的合作尤其令人不安，因为有证据表明，海岸警卫队官员试图将一批批移民推回大海。移民在遣返过程中死亡。

Claims to Defend the Greek Orthodox Church

Golden Dawn leaders have frequently asserted their desire to protect the Greek Orthodox Church and boasted about the support the party has received in return. “We have bishops that are worthy,” Michaloliakos said in a 2013 speech, naming four bishops who allegedly supported Golden Dawn—including one who allegedly “convinced a whole elderly shelter to vote for us.” All four denied supporting the party. However, bloggers released a photo they said is from 2012 showing a priest blessing Michaloliakos and cited other alleged connections between the party and church leaders. Metropolitan Bishop Ambrosios of Kalavryta had created controversy by writing an open letter on his blog in 2012 that said that “Golden Dawn is not a (bully gang) organization,” and advising them: “If you iron out your approach, and allow it to mature, you can become a sweet hope for the desperate citizen and a quiet strength in (an obviously) rotting political system.”

Michaloliakos also claimed that the Archbishop of Cyprus had “helped with the elections in Cyprus—we were very close to having the first nationalist M.P. in Cyprus.” The Archbishop denied supporting ELAM, the Cypriot branch of Golden Dawn, saying their ideas were too extreme.

However, he had previously been under fire for comments considered anti-immigrant and pro-Golden Dawn. The Archbishop of Athens, although never speaking out against fellow clergy, began pointedly denouncing racism in 2012: “The Church loves all people, white and black, and non-Christians. It loves all people. It also follows its path and does not need guards.”
The Government Response

“Clandestine immigrants should be removed from the country. They have become society’s tyrants.”

–Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, 2012

The Case against Golden Dawn

After years of tolerance and indifference, Greek authorities swung into action following the murder of anti-fascist musician Pavlos Fyssas on September 17, 2013. Fyssas was stabbed, and as he lay dying, he pointed out his attacker to police who had rushed to the scene. The alleged perpetrator was arrested, and turned out to have worked in the cafeteria at Golden Dawn headquarters. He reportedly visited the Golden Dawn branch in the Keratsini neighborhood where Fyssas was murdered several times a week.

The Greek public exploded, with a night of fierce protests against Golden Dawn and police inaction, followed by anti-fascist demonstrations that drew 50,000 people into the streets of Athens. Politicians from across the political spectrum condemned the murder—even Michaloliakos, who said Golden Dawn had had nothing to do with it. The Greek President, Karolos Papoulias, warned: “It is our duty not to allow any space whatsoever to fascism—not even an inch.”

Greek law does not permit the banning of political parties based on their ideas, so the authorities have pursued a different and potentially more far-reaching and effective approach to Golden Dawn, which focuses on the criminal activities of the organization. Following the Fyssas murder, police arrested at least 20 Golden Dawn leaders and other suspects, including Michaloliakos, and two special magistrates were put in charge of building a case against the
party’s leaders and members for “ordering and directing a criminal organization.” The crimes include murder, racist and many other violent attacks, and weapons violations.

As the investigation proceeded, the magistrates asked Parliament to strip immunity from the 18 Golden Dawn lawmakers so that they could be questioned. All are charged with running a criminal organization. The senior leaders deny all charges. Other members of the party have turned state’s evidence, and some of their testimonies have leaked to the media, as have some of the photographs seized from the leaders’ houses and computers.

By August, 2014, 78 defendants had been charged in connection with Golden Dawn, and 30 were in pretrial custody. At least five witnesses, all Greek citizens, had entered the witness protection program. Many others are not Greek citizens, but are willing to testify, and have come to Athens without police protection and at their own expense. They are particularly vulnerable. Judicial officials and their families have received death threats, including two bullets enclosed in a threatening letter mailed to the lead prosecutor of the Supreme Court, who had appointed the two magistrates. Golden Dawn has a history of public intimidation in and outside courtrooms. While officials are concerned about the potential for retaliation against witnesses, even years after the proceedings are concluded, non-Greeks are not eligible for witness protection programs.

The prosecution will attempt to prove that Golden Dawn consisted of about 1,000 core cadres and about 300 to 400 junior members, divided into cells of four or five in all parts of Greece. Young members were invited to participate in “an atrocity”—typically beating up migrants—and those who proved themselves and advanced in the organization went to training camps, where they were indoctrinated and initiated in a ceremony that appears to have elements of Hellenic mythology and Nazi ideology. Leaders were referred to with military titles and Michaloliakos was known as “the Fuhrer,” to whom all members swore a loyalty oath for life. Cadres were taught to sing the Nazi anthem with Greek lyrics—a skill they demonstrated in a defiant rally in front of the Greek Parliament building on the day that the legislature voted to lift Michaloliakos’ parliamentary immunity so he could be questioned by prosecutors.

The Greek government’s case against Golden Dawn is unprecedented in seeking to dismantle an elected party for its criminal activity. A credible prosecution of its leaders could restore battered public confidence in the rule of law. It could serve as a model to other nations struggling with neo-fascist movements whose members commit hate crimes but who deny all culpability. And credible trials against police officers who are charged with colluding in hate crimes, particularly if racism is found to be an aggravating motive, would send a strong signal through the law enforcement community about accountability and the new norms expected of public servants.
Too Little Too Late?

To succeed, however, the prosecution must be strictly by the books, respecting stringent human rights and legal standards for the accused. Golden Dawn has already appealed its case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. It is critical that Greek authorities commit no legal or procedural errors that could lead to the case being overturned on appeal.

Unfortunately, the government has undermined its own credibility. In May, a leaked videotape showed a senior aide to Prime Minister Samaras telling Golden Dawn spokesman Kasidiaris that the criminal case had been filed because Samaras feared losing votes to Golden Dawn. The aide, Panayiotis Baltakos, could be heard on the tape saying that the government did not have evidence against Golden Dawn. Kasidiaris said he leaked the tape to show that Golden Dawn was the victim of politically motivated prosecutions. Baltakos resigned, and said his comments were intended only to draw information from a political foe.

Moreover, the special magistrates prosecuting the case have warned Parliament that its long delays in lifting immunity impeded their work. Under Greek law, if the trial of the suspects is not completed within 18 months of arrest, they must be released. Their trial is expected to begin by the end of the year, but the government is not guaranteed to complete the trial of all 78 defendants before some must be released from pre-trial detention. Though the case would continue, this would be a serious blow to the government’s authority and a boon to Golden Dawn’s assertions that the trial is political persecution.

In interviews with Greeks with a range of political views, from Golden Dawn supporters to human rights lawyers, not one expressed the belief that the case would be credible, fair, and free from political taint. However unfair this perception may be to the police, prosecutors, and victims who are trying to hold perpetrators accountable for a wave of violent crimes, it shows a severe deficit in public respect for the Greek judicial system.

Institutional Reforms Begun, More to Be Done

Recognizing the problems

From 2009, the response of the Greek government to the explosion in racist violence has gone from denial that there was any problem, to admitting that there was a problem but only isolated cases, to eventually recognizing a pattern of violence linked to Golden Dawn coupled with instances of police inaction or complicity. In December 2013, the Hellenic Police Internal Affairs Unit noted that: “Especially in cases of racial violence, the inaction of certain police officers, and in some cases the active cooperation/compliance of them in racist violence, has degraded the already negative experience of the victims and has created the impression of lack of inspection and impunity of police tolerance, cover-up or compliance.”

As street violence reached frightening proportions and complaints about police behavior mounted at the end of 2012, Greek authorities announced a plan to train police to deal with racist violence, improve data collection, set up a special prosecutor to deal with racist crimes, and ordered an internal investigation of police misbehavior. They have taken several laudable steps,
but as described below, much more remains to be done to establish a functioning law enforcement response to violent hate crimes, policy impunity, and a deficit of public trust.

**Special units to combat racist violence**

In 2012, the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection created 68 special units in the Greek police to combat racist violence. According to the police, these anti-racism units were staffed with 200 police officers specially trained in the nature of racism/xenophobia in Greece and how to address hate crime, deal with vulnerable groups, and recognize racist motivation in crimes. They also studied international human rights and Greek law on illegal immigration and racism, and examined the work of the Racist Violence Reporting Network.

**Establishing a hotline and improving data collection**

Each anti-racism unit is also tasked with collecting data into an annual report submitted to police headquarters. Twice a year, the police units are also required to feed their reports into a data collection system set up by the Ministry of Justice in 2012. Authorities also set up a 24-hour hotline that allows citizens or institutions to report racist violence, even anonymously, for the anti-racist violence units to investigate.

**Creating a special prosecutor**

The ministry created a “special” prosecutor to deal with racist crimes; but unlike other Greek special prosecutors such as those created to handle economic crimes or corruption, this official also has other duties. Lawyers pointed to a workload that could easily fill up 100 percent of one individual’s time, including a growing backlog of cases, the need to reopen “cold cases” that had been inappropriately dropped because of the victim’s race or immigration status, monitoring inadequate police investigations of potential racist motivations, and a lack of support staff.

A report by the Council on Europe Human Rights Commissioner welcomed the establishment of the anti-racist units and the hotline, but added, “These units need to be adequately resourced and their staff, which should include persons with knowledge of languages spoken by the complainants, needs to be systematically and adequately trained in human rights and anti-discrimination.”

**Remaining Problems**

As described above, Golden Dawn’s attacks have exposed structural weakness in the Greek law enforcement system’s response to hate crime, not only in the police force, where reforms have begun, but also among the nation’s prosecutors and judges. Even if the prosecution of Golden Dawn’s top leaders succeeds, the country will likely be left with many young people who have experience committing violent attacks and continuing animus toward migrants, LGBT people, Jews or Muslims. And Greek law enforcement will likely continue to face stiff challenges in confronting the intertwined problems of hate crimes and migration policies. Those challenges include:
Underreporting

Violent hate crime is generally underreported. This is especially true in Greece where there is a pattern of police inaction or complicity in violent attacks. In addition, many victims are migrants without proper documentation who are by law subject to detention and deportation when they make themselves known to the authorities. Unless undocumented victims feel they will not face deportation or reprisal, they refuse to report racist attacks—even when offered legal help in pursuing their cases. In the 2013 ENOUGH project, in which victims were offered legal help in pursuing their case, victims in only 22 of 75 cases agreed to bring the cases to the attention of the law enforcement authorities. Of the 166 incidents recorded by the Racist Violence Reporting Network in 2013, only 33 were reported to the police. In a separate study, the Greek Ombudsman, a public advocate responsible for reviewing government performance, found that police recorded only 84 of the 253 cases the Ombudsman had identified as occurring in 2012.

Inadequate Investigation

Combating violent hate crime requires a timely investigation of any evidence of bias motivation by law enforcement authorities adequately trained to do so. According to lawyers assisting victims as well as police representatives, overworked police need clear guidelines and increased training on how to identify and investigate violent hate crime. Police officials interviewed by the E.U. Fundamental Rights Agency in 2013 reported that police officers had difficulty identifying racist motivations and would benefit from such training. Lawyers and human rights activists assert that the existing instructions to the police to investigate racist motives—circular 7100/4/3 of May 25, 2006—is outdated and ineffective. Without adequate instructions and training, cases are not characterized as having a racial motivation, which under Greek law is a ground to increase the penalty for a conviction of the underlying crime under article 79(3) of the criminal code.

Further guidance and training is necessary to break police of old patterns of indifference. In one example of the challenge, an LGBT activist was attacked on August 28, 2012, and then repeatedly asked police to obtain surveillance camera footage that might have identified the attacker. Police did nothing, and then told him the footage had been erased long ago. The failure to arrest perpetrators of a large number of Jewish cemetery desecrations is also notable, in light of the anti-Jewish graffiti sprayed on the Athens Holocaust memorial this month. One prominent NGO has concluded that in these types of cases “police investigations are never thorough and this is why they have never led to the identification of perpetrators,” the Helsinki report said.

Prosecutors Do Not Apply Racist Motive

While the special prosecutor for racist crimes is attempting to document racist motive in hate-attacks, not all prosecutors have the training or time to do so—and nor are all judges open to the recommendation that harsher sentences be imposed for racist attacks. The Greek Helsinki Monitor reported that even when police forward bias-motivated violence cases to prosecutors, they are not acted upon in at least one-third of cases.
Many cases are mischaracterized by the police or prosecutors as robbery or assault. For example, a Nigerian taxi driver who had lived in Greece for 22 years was battered in central Athens, and police arrested two of the three suspects, 17-year-olds who had Nazi symbols and Golden Dawn brochures. But since the attackers also robbed him of 300 Euro, the police officer recorded the crime only as robbery, and did not include a racist motive. When such a motive is not recorded, the victim is required to pay a 100-Euro fee to file a criminal complaint for assault, which obviously inhibits reporting.

**Judges Do Not Recognize Racist Motive**

In 2008, Greece added to the criminal code a provision\(^{385}\) that declares that: “Perpetration of an act of hatred on national, racial or religious grounds or hatred or due to differentiated sexual orientation or gender identity constitutes an aggravating circumstance and sentence cannot be suspended.”

But judges have not been willing to declare a racist motivation in many crimes.\(^{386}\) NGOs and lawyers tracking the investigation and disposition of hate crimes report that the penalty enhancement for racist motivation has been applied in only one criminal case, in the 2013 conviction of two Golden Dawn members who attacked a shop in Athens owned by a migrant from Cameroon.\(^{387}\) In the most recent high-profile case involving an attack on a migrant, a Greek court convicted two men of murdering Sachzat Loukman from Pakistan, stabbing him to death as he rode his bicycle to work in January, 2013, in Petralona. Golden Dawn materials were found in their houses. Though the perpetrators were convicted and given stiff sentences, the judge did not find a racist motivation in the crime. Such findings ensure that NGO statistics and police statistics will continue to have sharp discrepancies, undermining public trust in the police and the judiciary.

**Attitudes within the Police**

The December 2013 report by Internal Affairs highlighted the trust gap between police, citizens, and migrants and recommended that “reform of police services should emphasize in fighting abuse and corruption, including quickly implementing disciplinary measures against perpetrators within the force as well as supervisors.” The problem goes well beyond police inaction or complicity in violence and other crimes committed by Golden Dawn members and supporters. An investigation by the Greek Ombudsman into the fate of complaints filed with its office concerning police officers alleged to exhibit racist behavior found that out of 22 complaints filed in 2012, only 6 were investigated and in only one case was disciplinary action taken: a fine.\(^{388}\) An effort to establish an independent body within the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection to receive complaints and investigate allegation of abusive or arbitrary behavior by the police has yet to bear fruit. At a minimum, such a body would help promote reform of police attitudes and behavior and promote public trust.
The Trust Deficit

“In Greece we do not have only economic and social crisis. The entire political system has collapsed. The group of citizens supporting Golden Dawn just wants revenge. These citizens have no hope for tomorrow. Also they feel completely powerless. So they are looking for a ‘dynamic’ organization to represent them. The violence of Golden Dawn is an answer to the political system.”

April 2014

Perhaps the most trenchant problem that Greece must face is the profound trust gap between politicians and citizens, police and the public, taxpayers and the neighbors they suspect of not paying taxes, and the institutions of state and the circumstances of the ten percent of citizens suddenly living below the poverty line. Addressing this crisis in trust that the rights of all citizens will be protected is vital, as is a broad-based economic recovery that can offer an alternative to hopelessness and rage.
7. Endnotes


13. For example, Jobbik’s complaints about the deficiencies of the E.U. bureaucracy resemble that of many other European rightist parties, although some would reform the EU rather than withdraw from it. Jobbik’s policy statement: “The system of EU institutions is in large part anti-democratic. The vast majority of Union subsidies to Hungary end up in the coffers of multinational corporations that operate here, while most of the remainder is lost to the bottomless pit of political corruption.” “The European Union.” Jobbik Manifesto. <http://www.jobbik.com/sites/default/files/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>. 2010.


16. China and Saudi Arabia


19. ibid


22. Source in Hungarian, English link: http://index.hu/belfold/2010/11/05/orban_keleti_szel_fuj/


24. ibid


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31 Orban, July 26, 2014 speech in Tunsádfürdő, Romania.
42 Footnote on Vona’s lecture and photo with Dugin.
43 Dugin’s philosophy also justifies the invasion of Crimea, according to a March 14, 2014 article in Foreign Affairs by Aton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-thoburn/putsins-brain.
46 Ibid
51 See Jobbik’s official biography of Vona at http://www.jobbik.com/partyLeadership_-g%C3%A1bor_vona_party_chairman
53 Hungarian Guard website: http://ujmagyargardamozgalom.com/
57 Photo of Salaszi’s appearance before the Hungarian People’s Tribunal: http://collections.yadvashem.org/photosarchive/en-us/28413_101623.html
58 The Hungarian Guard armband: http://raedwald.blogspot.com/2010/05/meanwhile-in-hungary.html
59 The links between the Jobbik flag and its predecessors were reported as early as 2006: http://www.ipost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-News/Nazi-linked-flag-surfaces-in-Hungary
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63 ibid
66 See videos at: http://ujmagyargardamozgalom.com/
70 In Hungarian: Magyar Országos Véderő Egylet
71 Field, Richard. “Field makes case for his innocence, condemns committee.” The Budapest Times. 17 June 2011
72 ibid
74 ibid
77 Mutual Benefits, p. 5
79 Jobbik was in an electoral alliance with MIÉP and joined by Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP) organizations from 15 counties.
83 Bartlett et. al, pp 31-43.
90 ibid, p.2
91 Human Rights First interviews, Budapest, April 1 1-7, 2014.
95 http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/apr2010/gb20100420_420459.htm#p2
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101 Only a few dozen cases are reported to authorities each year, underreporting is common, and “official criminal statistics do not even show proper figures for those cases that are reported to the authorities. “Dombos, Tamás and Udvari, Márton. “Hate Crimes in Hungary: Problems, Recommendations, Good Practices,” NEKI. 2014 p. 13-14. http://dev.neki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/gycbscbs-angol.pdf

102 Human Rights First interviews, Budapest, March 2014.


109 “Seven Statements about the Nature of Anti-Semitism in Hungary.” p. 3-4.


112 Human Rights First Interviews, Budapest, April 2014.

113 During the Gaza conflict, Vona led a protest in front of the Israeli embassy and called for suspension of Hungarian diplomatic relations with Israel and a boycott of Israeli-made products, but organizers reportedly asked protestors not to use antisemitic language. Many did however: http://news.yahoo.com/far-party-hungary-wants-israel-boycott-205621684.html


115 The Telegraph called Morvai “the coiffeured, fragrant new face of the Far Right in Europe”: “Morvai denies being anti-Semitic, homophobic, or racist in any way, dismissing such criticisms as “the favourite topics of an ‘ignorant and misled’ European Union”: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/europe-s-capital-of-anti-semitism-budapest-experiences-a-new-wave-of-hate-a-722880.html.


118 http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/antisemitic-and-racist-statements/hungarian-political-leaders


120 Neményi M. et al., Increase in legal awareness with regards to equal treatment with 2010 and 2013: focus on women, Roma, the disabled and the LGBT community, Equal Treatment Authority, Budapest, 2013.


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130 Article L of the Hungarian Constitution: http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf


136 “Hate Crime Record.” Athena Institute.


154 In Hungarian: Betyárseg


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“Hate Groups Map.” Athena Institute.

In Hungarian: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7oGpiHc38&list=PLC6B559B12D1A638F

Jászberény, Sándor. “Pax Hungarica: support the heir of the Arrow Cross Party with 1% of your taxes,” and “The Army of Outlaws (Betyársereg) organizes behind traditionalist group in Vecsés.”

“The group’s ideology is based on racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, chauvinism and Hungarianism. The members of the group explicitly define themselves as outlaws and they romanticise violence. This is not surprising, since most of the members have a criminal past and there is circumstantial evidence that suggests that the group has connections to organised criminal groups.” The Athena Institute. http://athenainstitute.eu/en/map/olvas/33#read

Athena Institute.


FRA Report, P. 37


Hate Crime Study, p. 12; HCLU; “Mid-term Implementation Assessment: Hungary.” Universal Periodic Review. p.12 (“In case of most hate crimes, no proper criminal procedure is launched.”) See also FRA Report, p. 37.

Dombos, Tamás and Udvari, Márton. P. 12.


“We Attacked the Gypsies, And We Are Proud of it: Extreme Right Demonstration Gets Violent in Devecser, Hungary.” The Contrarian Hungarian.


Ibid

Human Rights First Interviews in Hungary, April 2014


FRA Report, p. 39

Act II of 2012 on minor offences bans “participating in the activity of a dissolved civil organization” or “publicly wearing the uniform or the vestment of a civil organisation dissolved by the court” or clothing that is “reminiscent” of such groups. The “misuse of the right of public assembly” can be punished by three years’ imprisonment. In Hungarian: http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/t1200002.htm/t1200002_17.htm. FRA, page 47 http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-thematic-situation-report-3_en_1.pdf

Interview with Human Rights First, June 2014

Ibid p. 41.

Ibid


About 250,000 Hungarians are registered as living abroad, but the real number is believed to be much higher. Last year, the Central Bank governor put the number of departures at about 500,000: http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/hungary-losing-its-best-and-brightest/

190 Ibid
192 “A violation of the Union’s common principles and values by a Member State cannot be justified by national traditions nor by the expression of a national identity when such a violation results in the deterioration of the principles which are at the heart of European integration, such as democratic values, the rule of law or the principle of mutual recognition,” Article M of the European Parliament resolution of June 23, 2013, “On the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012)” (2012/2130(INI)) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0229+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en
193 The Venice Commission opinions on Hungary: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?country=17&year=all
200 Ibid, p. 19
202 EP resolution, article BD.
204 Ibid., p. 1 and p. 7
205 Ibid, p. 29
206 Ibid Article BZ
207 Scheppele calculates that 95% of the absentee vote from the neighboring countries went to Fidesz: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/legal-but-not-fair-hungary/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
208 OSCE/IDIHR Final Report, 6 April 2014, p.10
209 July 26, 2014 speech in Tusnádfürdő, Romania
210 OSCE/IDIHR Final Report, 6 April 2014, p.12-18
211 Ibid, p. 2.
212 Ibid, p. 7
213 Tavares Report, paragraph 8, p. 21
214 Id.
215 Scheppele: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/first-lets-pick-all-the-judges/?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw
216 Tavares report, section B, paragraph 16
217 Ibid, section B, paragraph 16
221 Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház And Others V. Hungary, Judgment (Merits) April 8, 2014, para 115.
222 Tavares Report, para. BW
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225 OSCE/IDIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, 6 April 2014. p. 16


231 The NGOs on the list are: Chalk Circle (Krétakör Foundation); K-Monitor Watchdog for Public Funds (K-Monitor Public Benefit Foundation); NaNE Women’s Rights Foundation; Foundation for Democratic Youth; Transparency International Hungary; Hungarian Women’s Lobby; Hungarian Civil Liberties Union; Asimov Foundation; Roma Press Center (Romi Press Center); Labrisz Lesbian Association; Patent Association Against Patriarchy; Rainbow Mission Foundation. Association of Liberal Youth. In Hungarian: http://444.hu/2014/05/28/lazar-janos-norveg-civilalap/

232 [2011. évi CXCV. törvény], Article 63 paragraph (1) point a) and c)

233 July 26, 2014 speech in Tuszádfürdő, Romania


237 The first statement in the Constitution is, “We are proud that our king Saint Stephen built the Hungarian State on solid ground and made our country a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago.” http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%2020New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf


248 This was published as a column in the Magyar Hírlap, newspaper, which is seen as close to the government: http://enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/hungary.pdf


250 In Hungarian: http://www.hirlap.hu/eleveny/2014/07/25/felele-buknak-a-partkatonak/


253 ibid

According to Steven Andras Geiger, Hungarian-American founder of the Mensch Foundation International, whose father was in a labor camp and who fled Hungary in 1956: “Most of the victims were Jews, Gypsies and Communists. Naturally, when the Allies began bombing and when the Russians arrived, other Hungarians also became victims. The Germans occupied Hungary without one shot being fired at them from the Hungarian Army. After all Hungary was allied with the Germans(Axis Powers). The Hungarians were in total collaboration with the German occupiers in deporting the Jews and Gypsies to Auschwitz and other concentration camps as well as shooting Jews into the Danube. It is why this statue is viewed by many as historical revisionism.” July 20, 2014


“Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based.” European Commission. 15 October 2003.


“European Commission launches accelerated infringement proceedings against Hungary over the independence of its central bank and data protection authorities as well as over measures affecting the judiciary.” Press Release. European Commission. 17 January 2012.


Tavares Report, p. 14


Venice Commission Opinion of 15 October 2012, para. 60.

Tavares Report, 17

Venice Commission June 17 Opinion

Ibid

Tavares Report, article BV; see also objections raised in 2010 by Dunja Mijatović, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, about the effects on media freedom: http://www.osce.org/fom/74687

OSCE Final Report, p. 14


Venice Commission; European Court of Human Rights

Interview in Athens, April, 2014.

In Greek, Χρυσή Αυγή

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317. According to some accounts, he was first jailed for attacked journalists covering a funeral of a junta colonel accused of torture.


322. Many of those who had served in the Security Battalions were later allowed to join the Greek National Guard. Kalyvas, p 133.

323. Colonel Ioannis Ladas, from “Greece under Military Rule—The ideology of the Revolution of 21 April 1967” by Richard Clogg, p. 41


325. “Antisemitism in Contemporary Greek Society,” 1995, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It was published under the pseudonym Daniel Perduant, the study was written by a Greek Jewish émigré, Moses Altech, whose parents lived in Athens at the time of publication and had seen a swastika carved in the door of their building.


327. Interview with Dimitris Psarras. Athens, April, 2014.

328. Hasapopoulos [Page 14].


331. Interview in Athens, May 2014.

332. Greeks accused Macedonians of harboring designs on Greek territory and stealing Greek history, particularly their claim to Alexander the Great, who was born in what is now Greece but is also revered in Macedonia.


334. Human Rights First interview with defector, Greece, April 2014.

335. The videotape of these statements, part of a documentary titled “The Cleaners” by Konstantinos Georgousis, was given to prosecutors investigating the case against Golden Dawn. Excerpts from the documentary are available at http://www.channel4.com/news/racist-anti-semitic-violent-the-true-face-of-golden-dawn


337. Ibid

338. Some Romanioite sources claim they moved to Greece in about 350 B.C. following the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem.

339. Interview with “Protagonistes”, on MEGA (TV-channel), 13 May 2013, cited by Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece

340. … As a member of the nationalistic movement, I would merely like to read a few words taken from a document written in the last century, a genuine document that describes in detail the situation that we are experiencing today: “In order to oblitare any appeal their maliness may have, we will put them in the dock alongside thieves, murderers and every sort of base, groveling criminal,” Chapter 19 of the Protocols of Zion, 1903, from a speech delivered in the Greek Parliament on October 23, 2012, translated by Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece.


342. Panayiotis, Demetrioú. “Πορού ὁ νεαρός ὁ νέος ή πόροι, ὁι ὁ νέοι ή πόροι ον κόμμιται.” 5 Jan


344. The “Cleaners” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HdCEY2uNh8&t=94 (1:37) The Golden Dawn subjects attempted to sue the filmmaker but have not succeeded.
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K.S. told his story on a video published Jan. 10, 2014: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGBsU8k0Rzc
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350 Under Greek law, deportation orders may be issues with or without a provision for detention. The migrant can object to deportation, and if that objection succeeds, police will release him but the legal process over deportation goes forward.

351 Interview with Human Rights First, June 2014.


354 Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Greece Report, article 122, citing Article in To Vima, 19 June 2012 (in Greek): https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2053611


358 Human Rights First interviews in Athens, April and May 2014.


360 “The Greek Orthodox Church Blessing the Neo-Nazi’s.” Αναφορομούς, 21 June 2012. https://athens.indymedia.org/post/1408711/


363 Human Rights First interviews in Athens, April and May 2014.


365 “The Greek Orthodox Church Blessing the Neo-Nazi’s.” Αναφορομούς, 21 June 2012. https://athens.indymedia.org/post/1408711/


375 For example, Golden Dawn members demonstrated outside the courtroom in Piraeus during a hearing for the baker alleged to have attacked Egyptian migrant Waled Taleb. About 100 supporters also filled an Athens courthouse in March, 2013 for the trial of MP Kasidiaris as an accomplice in a 2007 armed robbery; “Greek neo-Nazi MP on trial over armed robbery, AFP, March 7, 2013.) Kasidiaris was acquitted over Greek neo-Nazi MP on trial over armed robbery, AFP, March 7, 2013.) Kasidiaris was acquitted. He was found guilty in July, 2014 on weapons possession charges: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/greece-neo-nazi-mp-trial-armed-robbery-afp-march-7-2013-1305111

376 “This may also reflect a broader public distrust of official corruption, including judicial independence, as well as poor auditing and reporting standards, ranking among the weakest countries in the E.U. in combatting corruption.. More than 70% of Greeks in the 2012 Eurobarometer poll complained that they are affected by corruption in their daily lives, higher than all except Romania. “Controlling Corruption in Europe, The Anticorruption Report, vol. 1, Mungiu-Pippidi ed, Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2013. Pages 7, 15 and 30.

377 Statement of the Internal Affairs Bureau to Human Rights First.

378 Presidential Decree No. 132/2012 by the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection created the new units as of January, 21, 2013. This included two divisions and 68 offices around the country charged with addressing racist violence, and coordinated by the Administration of Social Affairs.


380 Report by Nils Muiznieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Following his visit to Greece from 28 January to 1 February 2013 pp. 2-3


382 Ibid.


385 [FRA, Greece and Hungary, pp. 12, 14-15,]

386 [HRF interviews; RVRN 2013, p. 12; FRA, Greece and Hungary, p. 12.}
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Greek Helsinki Monitor 13 Jan 2014, p. 3 & n. 12  http://cm.greekhelsinki.gr/index.php?sec=194&cid=3834

Ibid, p. 8

Ibid, p. 4

Article 79 par 3 of the criminal code

“Racism, discrimination, intolerance and extremism: learning from experiences in Greece and Hungary,” European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013, p. 11

[Enough Report, pp. 8-9, 23]

[Greek Ombudsman, Special Report, p. 4]