The Role of the Commanders

Both U.S. and international law provide that commanders are responsible for the acts of their subordinates. Under the doctrine of "command responsibility," the commander is responsible for crimes directly ordered, as well as for crimes committed by subordinates when the commander knew or should have known they were going on but failed to prevent or punish them.  Despite this, no civilian official or officer above the rank of major responsible for interrogation and detention policies or practices has been charged in connection with any death of a detainee in U.S. custody, including the deaths of detainees by torture or abuse. Consider these examples.

• Only 28% of the individuals charged in connection with a death in custody and 31% of those who received any kind of punishment are officers; the majority of those charged and punished are non-commissioned personnel.
• The highest ranking officer to be held responsible for detainee death is a Major: Major Clarke Paulus was convicted of dereliction of duty and maltreatment for ordering a subordinate to drag Iraqi detainee Hatab by the neck, and for allowing Hatab to remain unmonitored for hours in the blazing Iraqi sun; he was discharged but received no prison time. Major Jessica Voss received a reprimand for her failure to provide adequate supervision in the death of Iraqi General Mowhoush; she was not charged in the death.
• Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman, Captain Matthew Cunningham, and Major Robert Gwinner, the three commanders who attempted to cover up Iraqi detainee Hassoun’s death and who instructed their subordinates not to cooperate with investigators, were not punished in connection with the death. They received only reprimands for obstruction of justice.
• Captain Carolyn Wood was the commander in charge of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, members of which were involved in the killing of Afghan detainees Habibullah and Dilawar. Within weeks of those killings, Wood was awarded the first of two Bronze Star medals for “exceptionally meritorious service.” She was subsequently assigned to the Army’s Intelligence Center in Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Human Rights First sought to verify whether Captain Wood was an instructor for new interrogators but was told by a Fort Huachuca representative that the information could not be disclosed.
• No action has been taken to discipline or otherwise hold accountable Colonel David A. Teeples, commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry, on whose watch two senior members of the Iraqi military, General Mowhoush and Lieutenant Colonel Jameel, died of abuse.
• Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, U.S. Army Commander of the Coalition Joint Task Force in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, who authorized the use of sleep and environmental manipulation, aggressive dogs, and stress positions against detainees, was promoted to head the Army’s V Corps in Europe. Chief Warrant Officer Welshofer pointed to one of Sanchez’s memoranda as a basis for his belief that he could use a sleeping bag technique that lead to the death of Iraqi General Mowhoush. General Sanchez recently indicated plans to retire early.
• In 2005, three members of the 82nd Airborne Division came forward to describe abuse of detainees by members of their Division in both Afghanistan and Iraq; they specifically described systematic and recurrent torture and other abuse of Iraqi detainees from September 2003 to April 2004, during their deployment. Major General Charles H. Swannack, Commander of the 82nd Airborne, has not been held accountable for the acts of his subordinates.