Like any government, the U.S. government has the ability to help or hinder the cause of human rights through its foreign policy. The Trump administration’s early actions have given ample reason to doubt it will actively use tools like Global Magnitsky sanctions, for example, to promote accountability for abuses. But addressing the U.S. government’s potential to undermine human rights is just as crucial as encouraging it to champion them.
For nearly three decades, the Leahy Laws – one applying to the State Department, the other to the Defense Department – have required the U.S. government to withhold training, weapons, and other assistance from any unit of a foreign country’s security forces if that unit has been implicated in a gross violation of human rights. These laws reflect a clear commitment to international human rights standards and to ensuring that the United States does not fund human rights violations and support abusive actors. In practice, however, tracking the implementation of these laws is difficult, and public reporting has made clear that previous administrations have effectively looked the other way in sensitive cases.
In the first of a new series of resources, we are publishing today an explainer for our civil society colleagues and other interested stakeholders about the Leahy Laws, with an emphasis on how these human rights restrictions compare to the Global Magnitsky framework. While the Leahy Laws are not a sanctions program, one feature they have in common with Global Magnitsky is the opportunity for civil society organizations to provide credible information about human rights violations as a way of shaping U.S. policy and driving more rigorous implementation.
The stakes are high. The U.S. government each year provides billions of dollars in training, equipment, and other assistance to security forces around the world – including in countries where police, military, and paramilitary units are routinely accused of gross violations of human rights such as torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings. While security assistance can sometimes help prevent abuses, Congress has rightly mandated that accountability must precede any U.S. support to units specifically implicated in such crimes.
Of course, the Trump administration has largely ceased to enforce several key anti-corruption statutes, and it may attempt to do the same with the Leahy Laws. Even if it does, better understanding how these restrictions have been implemented is key to strengthening them and other legal protections in the future.
Despite the importance of the Leahy Laws, there is limited public disclosure of which units have been barred from receiving U.S. support, or why, or when the statutory exceptions have been used. The limited transparency that does exist is too little to allow close monitoring of implementation, hold decision-makers accountable, or evaluate whether the laws are working as intended. Recent press coverage about the irregular handling of Leahy vetting for several units of Israel’s security forces highlighted one set of weaknesses in the program; the global picture of implementation is important as well.
Ensuring that the Leahy Laws are enforced is essential regardless of which administration is in office. Much as we have worked to advance the use and understanding of targeted human rights and anti-corruption sanctions, we hope to help civil society partners and others understand how the Leahy restrictions on U.S. security assistance are working – and ensure they have the tools to make them work better, and propose reforms as needed in the future.
